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45 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hafer v. Melogreen2 sentences1999See Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. 21 , 30-31 (1991). 1999See Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. 21 , 30-31 (1991). | 3 | 3 |
Schnabel v. Tylergreen2 sentences2009Ed. 2d 481 (1980); Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 136 , 913 A.2d 415 (2007); Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742-43 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (“[A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question of federal law . . . and not state law. 2009Ed. 2d 481 (1980); Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 136 , 913 A.2d 415 (2007); Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742-43 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (“[A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question of federal law . . . and not state law. | 1 | 6 |
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.green2 sentences2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available 2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available | 1 | 3 |
Pet v. Department of Health Servicesgreen2 sentences2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available 2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available | 1 | 2 |
Wiley v. County of San Diegogreen2 sentences2024The United States Supreme Court further explained that it believes that ‘‘the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement . . . . [Therefore] when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 [action], the [D]istrict [C]ourt must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint m 2024The United States Supreme Court further explained that it believes that ‘‘the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement . . . . [Therefore] when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 [action], the [D]istrict [C]ourt must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint m | 1 | 1 |
Tangreti v. Bachmanngreen1 sentence2022See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (plaintiff ‘‘must plead and prove that each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the [c]onstitution’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (‘‘a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took or was responsible for actions that hindered [a plaintiff’s] efforts to pursue a legal claim’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (‘‘[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement | 1 | 1 |
Huey B. Wright v. Harold Smith and Thomas A. Coughlin, IIIgreen1 sentence2022See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (plaintiff ‘‘must plead and prove that each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the [c]onstitution’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (‘‘a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took or was responsible for actions that hindered [a plaintiff’s] efforts to pursue a legal claim’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (‘‘[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Goordgreen1 sentence2022See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (plaintiff ‘‘must plead and prove that each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the [c]onstitution’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (‘‘a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took or was responsible for actions that hindered [a plaintiff’s] efforts to pursue a legal claim’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (‘‘[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement | 1 | 1 |
Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences2019Stare decisis, however, is "not an inexorable command" or an "absolute impediment to change," especially when a prior decision "is clearly wrong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 660 , 680 A.2d 242 ; see also State v. Miranda , 274 Conn. 727 , 734, 878 A.2d 1118 (2005) ("[i]t is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), quoting Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. , 154 U.S. 288 , 322, 14 S.Ct. 1030 , 38 L.Ed. 992 (1894). 2019Stare decisis, however, is "not an inexorable command" or an "absolute impediment to change," especially when a prior decision "is clearly wrong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 660 , 680 A.2d 242 ; see also State v. Miranda , 274 Conn. 727 , 734, 878 A.2d 1118 (2005) ("[i]t is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), quoting Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. , 154 U.S. 288 , 322, 14 S.Ct. 1030 , 38 L.Ed. 992 (1894). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taupiergreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. 2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. | 1 | 1 |
Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pacgreen2 sentences2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available 2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available | 1 | 1 |
Harte v. Commissioner of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mirandagreen2 sentences2019Stare decisis, however, is "not an inexorable command" or an "absolute impediment to change," especially when a prior decision "is clearly wrong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 660 , 680 A.2d 242 ; see also State v. Miranda , 274 Conn. 727 , 734, 878 A.2d 1118 (2005) ("[i]t is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), quoting Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. , 154 U.S. 288 , 322, 14 S.Ct. 1030 , 38 L.Ed. 992 (1894). 2019Stare decisis, however, is "not an inexorable command" or an "absolute impediment to change," especially when a prior decision "is clearly wrong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 660 , 680 A.2d 242 ; see also State v. Miranda , 274 Conn. 727 , 734, 878 A.2d 1118 (2005) ("[i]t is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), quoting Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. , 154 U.S. 288 , 322, 14 S.Ct. 1030 , 38 L.Ed. 992 (1894). | 1 | 1 |
Flanagan v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunitiesgreen2 sentences2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available 2019As in Laurel Park, Inc. , we held in Pet that although "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983," it is a "standard prerequisite for injunctive relief ." 7 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 -69 , 542 A.2d 672 ; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, 194 Conn. at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that Patsy did not abrogate "standard prerequisite" that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust available | 1 | 1 |
| Kowenhoven v. County of Alleghenygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lydia Colombo v. Raymond O'COnnellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Enright v. Solar Turbines, Incgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colombo v. O'COnnellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Junior Ray Duckworth, Cross-Appellants v. Gayle Franzen, Cross-Appelleesred | 1 | 1 |
| Mahoney v. Lensinkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charry v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goss v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Costello v. Town of Fairfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carey v. Piphus
green
2 sentences1992Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 permits an award of compensatory damages; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-56 , 98 S. Ct. 1042 , 55 L. 1992Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 permits an award of compensatory damages; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-56 , 98 S. Ct. 1042 , 55 L. | 3 | 1991–2010 |
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
green
2 sentences1999CT Page 15076 Section 1983 "provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." 9 (Emphasis added.) Thomas v. Roach , 165 F.3d 137 , 149 (2d Cir. 1999). "[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1985." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 , 71 (1989). 1999Section 1983 "provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." 9 (Emphasis added.) Thomas v. Roach , 165 F.3d 137 , 149 (2d Cir. 1999). "[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 , 71 (1989). | 3 | 1999–1999 |
Mulligan v. Rioux
green
2 sentences2026In Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716 , 643 A.2d 1226 (1994), our Supreme Court explained that Mohammadi v. Tong “[t]he standard of qualified immunity that protects public officials from civil suits pursuant to § 1983, arising from the performance of their discretionary functions, is distinct from that established under our common law. 2026In Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716 , 643 A.2d 1226 (1994), our Supreme Court explained that Mohammadi v. Tong “[t]he standard of qualified immunity that protects public officials from civil suits pursuant to § 1983, arising from the performance of their discretionary functions, is distinct from that established under our common law. | 2 | 2000–2026 |
Thomas v. Roach
green
2 sentences1999CT Page 15076 Section 1983 "provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." 9 (Emphasis added.) Thomas v. Roach , 165 F.3d 137 , 149 (2d Cir. 1999). "[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1985." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 , 71 (1989). 1999Section 1983 "provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." 9 (Emphasis added.) Thomas v. Roach , 165 F.3d 137 , 149 (2d Cir. 1999). "[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 , 71 (1989). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 , 101 S. Ct. 2748 , 69 L. 1992Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 , 101 S. Ct. 2748 , 69 L. | 2 | 1990–1992 |
City of West Haven v. Hartford Insurance
green
2 sentences2024Co., 221 Conn. 149, 160 , 602 A.2d 988 (1992). 17 We nevertheless note, as the court in Powell did, that ‘‘[t]he fact that the trial court has jurisdiction over the [counterclaim] does not preclude a party from seeking to remove the case to federal court . . . .’’ Powell v. Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d 773 n.12. 2024Co., 221 Conn. 149, 160 , 602 A.2d 988 (1992). 17 We nevertheless note, as the court in Powell did, that ‘‘[t]he fact that the trial court has jurisdiction over the [counterclaim] does not preclude a party from seeking to remove the case to federal court . . . .’’ Powell v. Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d 773 n.12. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences2020But each of those occasions involved individual claims of discrimination, and in each we apply either the [framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas)] or a hostile work environment analysis. . . . ‘‘Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by showing that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances g 2020But each of those occasions involved individual claims of discrimination, and in each we apply either the [framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas)] or a hostile work environment analysis. . . . ‘‘Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by showing that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances g | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Cook
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. 2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Pelella
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. 2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Conway v. Town of Wilton
green
2 sentences2019Because "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983"; Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 , 542 A.2d 672 ; the dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim for monetary damages plainly was improper. 8 In overruling our prior precedent, we are mindful of the principle of stare decisis, which "gives stability and continuity to our case law." Conway v. Wilton , 238 Conn. 653 , 658, 680 A.2d 242 (1996). 2019Because "exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983"; Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , supra, 207 Conn. at 368 , 542 A.2d 672 ; the dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim for monetary damages plainly was improper. 8 In overruling our prior precedent, we are mindful of the principle of stare decisis, which "gives stability and continuity to our case law." Conway v. Wilton , 238 Conn. 653 , 658, 680 A.2d 242 (1996). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Krijger
green
1 sentence2019See, e.g., State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 156 -57 , 193 A.3d 1 (single e-mail to judge containing multiple threatening statements); State v. Pelella , 327 Conn. 1 , 4, 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (single threat made during domestic dispute between brothers); State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 439-41 , 97 A.3d 946 (single in-person reference to injuries previously suffered by listener's son made during angry altercation); State v. Cook , 287 Conn. 237 , 240-41, 947 A.2d 307 (threat with table leg), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970 , 129 S. Ct. 464 , 172 L. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Carr v. Town of Bridgewater
green
1 sentence2013In Carr , the plaintiff also had been successful in mandamus action against the city defendants; id., 49 ; and, following the mandamus action, the plaintiff also brought a § 1983 action for damages against those defendants. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority
green
2 sentences2012The court emphasized, however, on the basis of controlling precedent from our Supreme Court, that a party has no right to bring a federal statutory action under § 1983 in connection with a state’s collection of taxes “if the party has an adequate legal remedy for the claimed violation under state law.” The court concluded that there was an adequate legal remedy under § 12-422, and, therefore, a § 1983 action seeking damages in connection with such conduct was “beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of this court.” The court, therefore, properly concluded that § 12-422 did not create an exhaust 2012The court emphasized, however, on the basis of controlling precedent from our Supreme Court, that a party has no right to bring a federal statutory action under § 1983 in connection with a state’s collection of taxes “if the party has an adequate legal remedy for the claimed violation under state law.” The court concluded that there was an adequate legal remedy under § 12-422, and, therefore, a § 1983 action seeking damages in connection with such conduct was “beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of this court.” The court, therefore, properly concluded that § 12-422 did not create an exhaust | 1 | 2012–2012 |
New England Legal Foundation v. City of Boston
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Kowenhoven v. Allegheny, 587 Pa 545, 563, 901 A.2d 1003 (2006) (holding that § 1983 monetary damages are unavailable in tax cases brought in state court when adequate legal remedy exists); General Motors Corp. v. San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 4th 448, 458-59 , 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544 (1999) (denying claim for damages under § 1983 because tax refund provided adequate remedy); New England Legal Foundation v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 614 , 670 N.E.2d 152 (1996) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where adequate state remedy existed); General Motors Corp. v. Linden, 143 N.J. 336 , 671 2012See, e.g., Kowenhoven v. Allegheny, 587 Pa 545, 563, 901 A.2d 1003 (2006) (holding that § 1983 monetary damages are unavailable in tax cases brought in state court when adequate legal remedy exists); General Motors Corp. v. San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 4th 448, 458-59 , 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544 (1999) (denying claim for damages under § 1983 because tax refund provided adequate remedy); New England Legal Foundation v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 614 , 670 N.E.2d 152 (1996) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where adequate state remedy existed); General Motors Corp. v. Linden, 143 N.J. 336 , 671 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| General Motors Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Kowenhoven v. Allegheny, 587 Pa 545, 563, 901 A.2d 1003 (2006) (holding that § 1983 monetary damages are unavailable in tax cases brought in state court when adequate legal remedy exists); General Motors Corp. v. San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 4th 448, 458-59 , 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544 (1999) (denying claim for damages under § 1983 because tax refund provided adequate remedy); New England Legal Foundation v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 614 , 670 N.E.2d 152 (1996) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where adequate state remedy existed); General Motors Corp. v. Linden, 143 N.J. 336 , 671 2012See, e.g., Kowenhoven v. Allegheny, 587 Pa 545, 563, 901 A.2d 1003 (2006) (holding that § 1983 monetary damages are unavailable in tax cases brought in state court when adequate legal remedy exists); General Motors Corp. v. San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 4th 448, 458-59 , 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544 (1999) (denying claim for damages under § 1983 because tax refund provided adequate remedy); New England Legal Foundation v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 614 , 670 N.E.2d 152 (1996) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where adequate state remedy existed); General Motors Corp. v. Linden, 143 N.J. 336 , 671 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Virgo v. Lyons green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Mitchell v. Forsyth red | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Sullins v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ex Parte Young red | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City red | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bobby Williams v. Robert B. Greifinger, Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer of the New York State Department of Correctional Services green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| City of Boerne v. Flores yellow | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Binette v. Sabo green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Wood v. Strickland yellow | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Jerome Singleton v. City of New York, Ronald Salzer and Anthony Dellaventura green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Forrester v. White red | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ex Parte Virginia green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Louis Batista, Manuel Padin and Felix Padin, Jr. v. Michael Rodriguez, Robert J. Nadrizny and the City of Bridgeport, the City of Bridgeport green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Sheehan v. United States green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| New York City Housing Authority v. Escalera green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Martinez v. California green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Smith v. Wade green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. red | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Hallas v. Town of Windsor green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Vincenzo v. Warden green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.