case comes within rule in Illinois

1992Defendant also contends that this case comes within an exception to the tacit admission rule which was noted in People v. Bennett (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 357, 361 , 121 N.E.2d 595, 598 , where the court held that the silence of an accused is not admissible in evidence where charges are made against him in circumstances such that “he is restrained from speaking either by fear, doubt of his rights, instructions given him by his attorney or a reasonable belief that it would be better or safer for him if he kept silent.” People v. Bennett involved a defendant in custody who remained silent when question

1992Defendant also contends that this case comes within an exception to the tacit admission rule which was noted in People v. Bennett (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 357, 361 , 121 N.E.2d 595, 598 , where the court held that the silence of an accused is not admissible in evidence where charges are made against him in circumstances such that “he is restrained from speaking either by fear, doubt of his rights, instructions given him by his attorney or a reasonable belief that it would be better or safer for him if he kept silent.” People v. Bennett involved a defendant in custody who remained silent when question

1994However, insurer argues, and we agree, that this case comes within an exception to the general rule which was recognized in Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444, 455 , 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 .

1994However, insurer argues, and we agree, that this case comes within an exception to the general rule which was recognized in Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444, 455 , 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 .

1992The case predates the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.

1992The case predates the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.

1990The plaintiff argues that this case comes within an exception to the parental tort immunity doctrine that was set forth in Johnson v. Myers (1972), 2 Ill.

1989(See Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.

1981While we tend to disagree that this case comes within the rule applied under the facts in Catalano v. Pechous and do not believe the mere filing of cross-motions for summary judgment invokes this doctrine (see Perlman v. Time, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill.

1981App. 3d 190, 199 , 380 N.E.2d 1040 ), we need not decide that issue as we believe the pleadings and affidavits do not contain disputed material facts regarding the issue of abandonment.

1980In defendant’s statement “If the police involved either had knowledge, or had reason to believe that defendant was on probation at the time the search was conducted, then the Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures must be applied in the proceedings to revoke probation.” That statement, in argument, refers to certain language quoted in Dowery and in People v. Watson (1979), 69 Ill.

1969Co. v. Gore, 202 Ill 188, 66 NE 1063 (1903), where the court reasoned that an attorney’s reading of a special interrogatory to the jury and discussing the evidence concerning that point was only for the purpose of the jury reaching a proper decision in the case.

1967Where a cause is heard by a chancellor without a jury, his conclusions on facts are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.” (Brown v. Zimmerman, 18 Ill2d 94, 102, 163 NE2d 518 (1959).) As we cannot say, as we must in order to reverse this order of reformation, that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

1966While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single equitable cause of action, that fact is not sufficient to take this case out of the rule of the above case.” In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 US 148 (1964), the court stated that the requirement of finality is to be given a “practical” rather than a “technical” construction.

1961(Reinken v. Reinken (1933), 351 Ill 409, 184 NE 639 .) Although plaintiff has proceeded in chancery for an injunction and damages, we believe, in substance, that the suit is analogous to an ejectment suit and the statutory suggestion, subsequent to judgment, for the recovery of mesne profits in the same proceedings.

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1952In our opinion the case comes within the rule of Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602 , where it was said (p. 609): “It may safely be concluded that where two separate causes of action are joined in a single complaint, even if both ask the same relief, an order dismissing one count of the complaint disposes of one separate branch of the case, and is a final and appealable order even though the matters of substantial controversy raised in the other count, or counts, remain undisposed of.” While it is true in the instant case the complaint was not divided into separate counts but was treated as a single

1949(People v. Grove, 284 Ill. 429 .) Our sole obligation is to determine whether this case comes within the exception.

1942(People v. Holten, supra; Jones v. O’Connell, 266 Ill. 443 ; People v. Holten, 287 id. 225.) Since the question of deciding whether there is a liability set out in the complaint will necessarily determine whether appellees should pay taxes which become lost through their action, and if collectible, would be revenue, the case comes within the principle of People v. Holten, 259 Ill. 219 , requiring us to consider the facts on direct appeal.

1942(People v. Holten, supra; Jones v. O’Connell, 266 Ill. 443 ; People v. Holten, 287 id. 225.) Since the question of deciding whether there is a liability set out in the complaint will necessarily determine whether appellees should pay taxes which become lost through their action, and if collectible, would be revenue, the case comes within the principle of People v. Holten, 259 Ill. 219 , requiring us to consider the facts on direct appeal.

1942(People v. Holten, supra; Jones v. O’Connell, 266 Ill. 443 ; People v. Holten, 287 id. 225.) Since the question of deciding whether there is a liability set out in the complaint will necessarily determine whether appellees should pay taxes which become lost through their action, and if collectible, would be revenue, the case comes within the principle of People v. Holten, 259 Ill. 219 , requiring us to consider the facts on direct appeal.

1936In that case the court said: ‘If the statement so designates the place that the officers of the town, being men of common understanding and intelligence, can by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and without other information from the plaintiff, find the exact place where it is claimed the damage was received, it is in this respect sufficient, because it fully answers the purpose of the statute.’ ” In Isaacson v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill.

1928On these facts counsel for plaintiff urges that the case comes within the doctrine of respondeat superior and the rulings in Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40 , and Gates v. Mader, 316 Ill. 313 .

1928This is in no way in conflict with Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432 — because this case comes within the exception stated that “unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.” The plaintiff in this case was so precluded from the facts above recited.

1928On these facts counsel for plaintiff urges that the case comes within the doctrine of respondeat superior and the rulings in Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40 , and Gates v. Mader, 316 Ill. 313 .

1928The case comes within the rule stated in Watson v. Lee Loader & Body Co., 302 Ill. 276 , where, after reciting section 55 of the Practice Act, Cahill’s St. ch. 110, If 55, which provides for partial judgments and under which plaintiff proceeded in the instant case, the court síaid: “That section has not repealed the statute in relation to tender, nor abolished the law of tender and deprived any party of its benefit.

1922Appellants also contend that this case comes within that rule of law which says that courts of equity will enjoin the owner of land from defacing or meddling with graves on his land or from in any way interfering with the use of the land as a cemetery where such land has been dedicated for cemetery purposes, and cite in support of that position Davidson v. Reed, 111 Ill. 167 .

1913It is claimed that the case comes within the doctrine announced in City of Chicago v. Luthardt, 191 Ill. 516 .

1911The case comes within the rule stated in Vanlandingham v. Ryan, supra, where the court said: “For it may be that the cause of action is well set forth and the judgment proceed upon the ground that the cause is not sufficient to Sustain an action.

1906The case comes within the rule laid down in Commonwealth v. Barry, 125 Mass. 390 .

1906As .the taxes, both school and city, sought to be collected are not illegal, and as the authorities seeking to impose them had the power to levy the tax but the difficulty is that they are claimed to have been illegally levied, and as appellant owned property subject to the taxes and for the purposes proposed which he did not list to the assessor and which thereby escaped taxation, the case comes within the rule announced in Williams v. Dutton, 184 Ill. 608 , that equity “will not lend its aid to a complainant unless even-handed justice and good conscience demand that relief should be granted.