case comes within rule in Missouri

1995We believe this case comes within the rule articulated in Jackson v. Director of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1995), also handed down today.

1995We believe this case comes within the rule articulated in Jackson v. Director of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1995), also handed down today.

1985In this connection, this case comes within the principle stated in Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579 , 148 S.W.2d 784 (1941).

1985In this connection, this case comes within the principle stated in Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579 , 148 S.W.2d 784 (1941).

1984United States v. Rooks, 577 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir.1978), cert denied 439 U.S. 862 [ 99 S.Ct. 183 , 58 L.Ed.2d 171 ] ...” Appellant herein told Officer Soule that he wanted to talk to him.

1984United States v. Rooks, 577 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir.1978), cert denied 439 U.S. 862 [ 99 S.Ct. 183 , 58 L.Ed.2d 171 ] ...” Appellant herein told Officer Soule that he wanted to talk to him.

1982This case comes within the rule declared in State v. Black, 611 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Mo.App.1980), quoting from State v. Samens, 362 S.W.2d 537 (Mo.1962): “The corpus delicti cannot be presumed and must be proved by legal evidence to show the crime charged has been committed by someone.” This court concludes the instant case comes within Black, Samens, and that portion of Verstraete , which declares: “Yet the rule does not require full proof of the body of the offense, independent of the confession.

1981A. No, sir.” The record reveals that movant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that this case comes within the rule of Haynes, supra. Movant’s point (2) is found to be without merit and is ruled against him.

1968That which bars the legal title here bars the equitable title. * * * Our conclusion is that the statute began to run against both the legal and equitable title when defendant took possession; that the legal and equitable titles were both barred by 10 years’ adverse possession, and this, too, though the owner of the equitable title was, during all that time, an infant.” 113 Mo. at 201-202 , 20 S.W. at 1068-1069 .

1968That which bars the legal title here bars the equitable title. * * * Our conclusion is that the statute began to run against both the legal and equitable title when defendant took possession; that the legal and equitable titles were both barred by 10 years’ adverse possession, and this, too, though the owner of the equitable title was, during all that time, an infant.” 113 Mo. at 201-202 , 20 S.W. at 1068-1069 .

1967McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527 , 46 S.W.2d 557 , 92 A.L.R. 641 ; Jones v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 285 , 228 S.W.2d 673 , 99 A.L.R.2d 181 ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., et al., 359 Mo. 446 , 222 S.W.2d 87 , 75 C.J.S.

1967McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527 , 46 S.W.2d 557 , 92 A.L.R. 641 ; Jones v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 285 , 228 S.W.2d 673 , 99 A.L.R.2d 181 ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., et al., 359 Mo. 446 , 222 S.W.2d 87 , 75 C.J.S.

1967McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527 , 46 S.W.2d 557 , 92 A.L.R. 641 ; Jones v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 285 , 228 S.W.2d 673 , 99 A.L.R.2d 181 ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., et al., 359 Mo. 446 , 222 S.W.2d 87 , 75 C.J.S.

1967McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527 , 46 S.W.2d 557 , 92 A.L.R. 641 ; Jones v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 285 , 228 S.W.2d 673 , 99 A.L.R.2d 181 ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., et al., 359 Mo. 446 , 222 S.W.2d 87 , 75 C.J.S.

1967McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527 , 46 S.W.2d 557 , 92 A.L.R. 641 ; Jones v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 285 , 228 S.W.2d 673 , 99 A.L.R.2d 181 ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., et al., 359 Mo. 446 , 222 S.W.2d 87 , 75 C.J.S.

1967McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527 , 46 S.W.2d 557 , 92 A.L.R. 641 ; Jones v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 285 , 228 S.W.2d 673 , 99 A.L.R.2d 181 ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., et al., 359 Mo. 446 , 222 S.W.2d 87 , 75 C.J.S.

1944Betts v. Brady, supra. We think this case comes within the principle of law announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Betts v. Brady,supra. In that ease, Betts was charged with the crime of robbery *428 in the State of Maryland.

1936Co., 288 U.S. 275 , 77 L.Ed. 743 , where it was said: `The jury adjudged him guilty of contributory negligence and moulded its verdict accordingly.

1936Co., 288 U.S. 275 , 77 L.Ed. 743 , where it was said: `The jury adjudged him guilty of contributory negligence and moulded its verdict accordingly.

1935Plaintiff refers also to the conjecture of this court in Teitsort v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 322 Mo. 640 , 15 S.W.2d 779 , as to how the first exception in the Joy case might be applied by the Illinois courts.

1935Plaintiff refers also to the conjecture of this court in Teitsort v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 322 Mo. 640 , 15 S.W.2d 779 , as to how the first exception in the Joy case might be applied by the Illinois courts.

1935Railroad Co., 263 Ill. 465 , 105 N.E. 330 , which states: "Exceptions to this general rule are (1) places where the railroad company has permitted the public to travel along or over its track for a considerable period of time and a considerable number *Page 113 of people have availed themselves of such use, and (2) where the railroad runs through populous portions of a city, where people frequently go upon or pass over the track with knowledge of the company or for such a length of time that the company is chargeable with knowledge." Plaintiff contends that this case comes within exception Num

1928As .a general proposition,-of course, when an entry which is required by law to be made.in the justice’s docket is regularly entered, it imports verity and is the only evidence as to the fact covered by such entry, and speh entry cannot be collaterally ■ attacked except for fraud, accident or mistake. [State v. Hobbs, 218 Mo. App. 448 , 279 S. W. 200 ; Tyree v. Midwest Envelope Co., 215 Mo. App. 630 , 258 S. W. 717 .] But in this case, the defendant in his motion to dismiss the appeal charges that the entry, made by the justice, showing the appeal as being taken two days after the trial was ha

1928As .a general proposition,-of course, when an entry which is required by law to be made.in the justice’s docket is regularly entered, it imports verity and is the only evidence as to the fact covered by such entry, and speh entry cannot be collaterally ■ attacked except for fraud, accident or mistake. [State v. Hobbs, 218 Mo. App. 448 , 279 S. W. 200 ; Tyree v. Midwest Envelope Co., 215 Mo. App. 630 , 258 S. W. 717 .] But in this case, the defendant in his motion to dismiss the appeal charges that the entry, made by the justice, showing the appeal as being taken two days after the trial was ha

1928As .a general proposition,-of course, when an entry which is required by law to be made.in the justice’s docket is regularly entered, it imports verity and is the only evidence as to the fact covered by such entry, and speh entry cannot be collaterally ■ attacked except for fraud, accident or mistake. [State v. Hobbs, 218 Mo. App. 448 , 279 S. W. 200 ; Tyree v. Midwest Envelope Co., 215 Mo. App. 630 , 258 S. W. 717 .] But in this case, the defendant in his motion to dismiss the appeal charges that the entry, made by the justice, showing the appeal as being taken two days after the trial was ha

1928As .a general proposition,-of course, when an entry which is required by law to be made.in the justice’s docket is regularly entered, it imports verity and is the only evidence as to the fact covered by such entry, and speh entry cannot be collaterally ■ attacked except for fraud, accident or mistake. [State v. Hobbs, 218 Mo. App. 448 , 279 S. W. 200 ; Tyree v. Midwest Envelope Co., 215 Mo. App. 630 , 258 S. W. 717 .] But in this case, the defendant in his motion to dismiss the appeal charges that the entry, made by the justice, showing the appeal as being taken two days after the trial was ha

1925The case comes within the rule establishd in the following cases: Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 ; Miller v. Lumber Co., 98 Mich. 163 ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Hamilton, 73 Wis. 486 .” In the foregoing case the husband was guilty of embezzlement, and the wife gave a mortgage on her property to make good the husband’s default.

1925The case comes within the rule establishd in the following cases: Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 ; Miller v. Lumber Co., 98 Mich. 163 ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Hamilton, 73 Wis. 486 .” In the foregoing case the husband was guilty of embezzlement, and the wife gave a mortgage on her property to make good the husband’s default.

1925The case comes within the rule establishd in the following cases: Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 ; Miller v. Lumber Co., 98 Mich. 163 ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Hamilton, 73 Wis. 486 .” In the foregoing case the husband was guilty of embezzlement, and the wife gave a mortgage on her property to make good the husband’s default.

1923Where the facts are either disputed, or different inferences may be fairly drawn from the undisputed facts, the question of negligence should be submitted to the jury. [Mauerman v. Siemerts, 71 Mo. 101 ; Nagel v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 653 .] We think this case comes within the rule, and the question was properly submitted to the jury." There was no statute in existence requiring the railway company to block its guardrails when the Huhn Case was tried.

1923Where the facts are either disputed, or different inferences may be fairly drawn from the undisputed facts, the question of negligence should be submitted to the jury. [Mauerman v. Siemerts, 71 Mo. 101 ; Nagel v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 653 .] We think this case comes within the rule, and the question was properly submitted to the jury." There was no statute in existence requiring the railway company to block its guardrails when the Huhn Case was tried.

1910This is conceded by the learned Attorney-General wherein, with commendable frankness, he admits that this case comes within the rule laid down in the case of State v. Hayes, 220 Mo. 1 , and cases cited.

1908Louis, 180 Mo. 80 , further than is in those cases announced.” Tbe doctrine of those cases summed up by tbe court is as follows: “If we understand that doctrine, it is to the effect that, notwithstanding tbe city is required to have competition in the letting of contracts, yet if there is a patented article, or an article not patented, but in the hands of one person or company, which article is necessary for the public improvement, and there are no other persons having the same general character of material, which could be brought into competition, the municipality is not forced to use other c

1907In Paul v. Threshing Co., 87 Mo. App. 647 , it was held that a party suing on his contract of employment who is discharged for good cause, or is guilty of fraud, cannot recover his salary.

1905Now, if the damages had not developed at all and there was no indication at the time the suit was brought that the trees would die, then I think it may be well said that plaintiff was unavoidably, ignorant of such damage, and the case comes within the exception to the rule as stated in Bank v. Tracey, supra, and is within the reasoning of the case of Brunsden v. Humphrey, supra. The rule is stated too broadly in Kerr v. Simmons, supra, and that case must be considered cum grana sails.