case comes within rule in Arkansas

1968However, in Jackson v. Wolfe, 127 Ark. 54 , 191 S.W. 938 (1917), in answer to a similar contention, we said: “Counsel for plaintiff insist that the case comes within the rule of this court announced in Eagle v. Oldham, 116 Ark. 565 , and that under the rule there announced the will of Isaac Adair ought to be construed as devising the north half of the northwest quarter of Section 21, instead of the south half of the northwest quarter of said section, as set forth in the will.

1917Counsel for plaintiff insist that the case comes within the rule of this court announced in Eagle v. Oldham, 116 Ark. 565 , and that under the rule there announced the will of Isaac Adair ought to be construed as devising the north half of the northwest quarter of Section 21, instead of the south half of the northwest quarter of said section, as set forth in the will.

1978In Smith v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 196 Ark. 685 , 119 S.W. 2d 556 , we stated the rule of law applicable as follows: It is unquestionably the law that a general deposit of money in a bank passes the title to the bank and establishes the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor, and because of this relation, the bank is bound by contract to honor the checks of the depositor to the extent of the deposits and becomes liable if it refuses to do so.

1978In Smith v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 196 Ark. 685 , 119 S.W. 2d 556 , we stated the rule of law applicable as follows: It is unquestionably the law that a general deposit of money in a bank passes the title to the bank and establishes the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor, and because of this relation, the bank is bound by contract to honor the checks of the depositor to the extent of the deposits and becomes liable if it refuses to do so.

1968However, in Jackson v. Wolfe, 127 Ark. 54 , 191 S.W. 938 (1917), in answer to a similar contention, we said: “Counsel for plaintiff insist that the case comes within the rule of this court announced in Eagle v. Oldham, 116 Ark. 565 , and that under the rule there announced the will of Isaac Adair ought to be construed as devising the north half of the northwest quarter of Section 21, instead of the south half of the northwest quarter of said section, as set forth in the will.

1968However, in Jackson v. Wolfe, 127 Ark. 54 , 191 S.W. 938 (1917), in answer to a similar contention, we said: “Counsel for plaintiff insist that the case comes within the rule of this court announced in Eagle v. Oldham, 116 Ark. 565 , and that under the rule there announced the will of Isaac Adair ought to be construed as devising the north half of the northwest quarter of Section 21, instead of the south half of the northwest quarter of said section, as set forth in the will.

1940It is insisted by the insured that the case comes within the rule frequently announced by this court that even though a claimant is able to do some work and engage in general business or professional activities, a judgment for compensation will be sustained if the injury or illness prevents the insured . . from performing all of the substantial and material duties connected with his business or avocation. ’ ’ In Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Snow, 185 Ark. 335 , 47 S. W. 2d 600 , the insured was entitled to compensation if disability from sickness or injury prevented him . . at all

1940It is insisted by the insured that the case comes within the rule frequently announced by this court that even though a claimant is able to do some work and engage in general business or professional activities, a judgment for compensation will be sustained if the injury or illness prevents the insured . . from performing all of the substantial and material duties connected with his business or avocation. ’ ’ In Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Snow, 185 Ark. 335 , 47 S. W. 2d 600 , the insured was entitled to compensation if disability from sickness or injury prevented him . . at all

1927In one of the cases cited by appellant the court said, quoting from another decision of this court: “To constitute an instrument an escrow, it is absolutely necessary that the deposit of it should be irrevocable; ‘that is, that when the instrument is placed in the hands of the depository it -should be intended to pass beyond the control of the grantor for all time, and that he should actually lose control of ánd dominion over the instrument; for, in case the deposit is made in furtheranee of a contract between tlie parties, the contract must be so complete that 'it remains only for the grantee

1927In one of the cases cited by appellant the court said, quoting from another decision of this court: “To constitute an instrument an escrow, it is absolutely necessary that the deposit of it should be irrevocable; ‘that is, that when the instrument is placed in the hands of the depository it -should be intended to pass beyond the control of the grantor for all time, and that he should actually lose control of ánd dominion over the instrument; for, in case the deposit is made in furtheranee of a contract between tlie parties, the contract must be so complete that 'it remains only for the grantee

1920It is also claimed by counsel for the plaintiff that the accounts should be surcharged and falsified because they show that the guardian expended for the maintenance of the ward more than the clear income of the estate without having previously obtained an order of the probate court therefor, and that the case comes within the rule announced in Campbell v. Clark, 63 Ark. 450 .

1918In Stevenson v. Gault, 131 Ark. 397 -402, we approved the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180 , as follows: “If the inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock the conscience, or if, in addition to gross inadequacy, the purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness, or has taken any undue advantage, or if the owner of the property, or party interested in it, has been for any other reason misled or surprised, then the sale will be regarded as fraudulent and void, or the party injured will be permitted to redeem the property sold.” Undoubte

1918The case comes within the rule announced by us in the recent case of Hawkins v. Jones, 131 Ark. 478, 481 , where we said.: “In the case of Colonial & U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Sweet, 65 Ark. 152 , Judge Battle announced the rule which has been frequently followed that confirmation of a judicial sale should not be withheld where it appears that ‘the property sold has brought its market value, and the purchaser and those conducting or controlling it have committed no fraud, unfairness or other wrongful act injurious to the sale, and there is no occurrence, or special circumstance, affording, as in o

1918In Stevenson v. Gault, 131 Ark. 397 -402, we approved the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180 , as follows: “If the inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock the conscience, or if, in addition to gross inadequacy, the purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness, or has taken any undue advantage, or if the owner of the property, or party interested in it, has been for any other reason misled or surprised, then the sale will be regarded as fraudulent and void, or the party injured will be permitted to redeem the property sold.” Undoubte

1918The case comes within the rule announced by us in the recent case of Hawkins v. Jones, 131 Ark. 478, 481 , where we said.: “In the case of Colonial & U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Sweet, 65 Ark. 152 , Judge Battle announced the rule which has been frequently followed that confirmation of a judicial sale should not be withheld where it appears that ‘the property sold has brought its market value, and the purchaser and those conducting or controlling it have committed no fraud, unfairness or other wrongful act injurious to the sale, and there is no occurrence, or special circumstance, affording, as in o

1913Neither do we think the case comes within the principle announced in Bass v. Starnes, 108 Ark. 357 , 158 S. W.

1911In the case of American Tin Plate Co. v. Smith, 143 C.

1911The case comes within the rule announced by this court in Southern Anthracite Coal Co. v. Bowen, 93 Ark. 140 , where we said: “If appellant deputed to Thrasher the duty of making the wire rope secure, and he neglected to perform this duty, he assumed the risk of injury from his negligence in failing to discharge the duty imposed on him, and the master is not liable to him for the injury resulting. ” See cases cited.

1896Riddick, J., (after stating the facts.) We agree with counsel for appellee that this case comes within the rule laid down in Railway Co. v. Cullen, 54 Ark. 431 , and again in Railway Co. v. Tippett, 56 Ark. 459 .

1893It is argued that the case comes within the rule announced in the case of the Railway Co. v. Sageley, 56 Ark. 549 ; that there is no proof that the trains of the railway killed the cattle; that there is nothing therefore for the statutory presumption of negligence to rest upon; and that the judgment cannot be sustained.