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51 California opinions name it 2 courts 1875–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sawyergreen2 sentences1976(See People v. Sawyer, 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 77 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 749 ]; cf. People v. Ortega, 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 902 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ].) Since the resolution of defendant’s guilt or innocence turned on his credibility vis-a-vis that of the prosecution witnesses, the case comes within the rule that a miscarriage of justice has occurred when the case is closely balanced and the acts of misconduct are such as to have contributed materially to the verdict. 1976(See People v. Sawyer, 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 77 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 749 ]; cf. People v. Ortega, 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 902 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ].) Since the resolution of defendant’s guilt or innocence turned on his credibility vis-a-vis that of the prosecution witnesses, the case comes within the rule that a miscarriage of justice has occurred when the case is closely balanced and the acts of misconduct are such as to have contributed materially to the verdict. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Ortegagreen2 sentences1976(See People v. Sawyer, 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 77 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 749 ]; cf. People v. Ortega, 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 902 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ].) Since the resolution of defendant’s guilt or innocence turned on his credibility vis-a-vis that of the prosecution witnesses, the case comes within the rule that a miscarriage of justice has occurred when the case is closely balanced and the acts of misconduct are such as to have contributed materially to the verdict. 1976(See People v. Sawyer, 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 77 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 749 ]; cf. People v. Ortega, 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 902 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ].) Since the resolution of defendant’s guilt or innocence turned on his credibility vis-a-vis that of the prosecution witnesses, the case comes within the rule that a miscarriage of justice has occurred when the case is closely balanced and the acts of misconduct are such as to have contributed materially to the verdict. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences1976(People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ]; People v. Covert, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 91 .) In this case we conclude that it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been in defendant’s favor if the prosecution had not implied, through improper cross-examination, that the defendant had previously engaged in similar illegal acts.” As in Wagner , when the issue turns upon the credibility of the defendant, and substantial divergence in testimony exists, we must find that error was “such as to have contributed materially to the ve 1976(People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ]; People v. Covert, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 91 .) In this case we conclude that it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been in defendant’s favor if the prosecution had not implied, through improper cross-examination, that the defendant had previously engaged in similar illegal acts.” As in Wagner , when the issue turns upon the credibility of the defendant, and substantial divergence in testimony exists, we must find that error was “such as to have contributed materially to the ve | 3 | 3 |
Bank of Italy v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1961Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483 [ 105 P. 582 ]; 16 Cal.Jur., p. 812, § 30.) ” Conroy v. Civil Service Com., 75 Cal.App.2d 450, 458 [ 171 P.2d 500 ] : “The respondent frankly admits this rule but claims that this case comes within the exception stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31 [ 251 P. 784 ], as follows: ‘An important exception to the foregoing general rule is that if the facts as admitted or proved be susceptible of but one construction or conclusion the right to the writ becomes a matter of law and the officer may be compelled to act in accordance with the facts as admitted o 1961Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483 [ 105 P. 582 ]; 16 Cal.Jur., p. 812, § 30.) ” Conroy v. Civil Service Com., 75 Cal.App.2d 450, 458 [ 171 P.2d 500 ] : “The respondent frankly admits this rule but claims that this case comes within the exception stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31 [ 251 P. 784 ], as follows: ‘An important exception to the foregoing general rule is that if the facts as admitted or proved be susceptible of but one construction or conclusion the right to the writ becomes a matter of law and the officer may be compelled to act in accordance with the facts as admitted o | 2 | 2 |
County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc.green2 sentences2021(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 ; Daon Corp. v. Place Homeowners Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1456 ; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 .) The Callahans maintain that this case comes within the exception to the rule. 1989(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 [ 199 P.2d 668 ]; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 754 ]; Lemaire v. All City Employees Assn. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 507 ].) Daon maintains that this case comes within the exception to the rule. | 1 | 2 |
Sjoberg v. Hastorfgreen2 sentences2021(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 ; Daon Corp. v. Place Homeowners Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1456 ; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 .) The Callahans maintain that this case comes within the exception to the rule. 1989(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 [ 199 P.2d 668 ]; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 754 ]; Lemaire v. All City Employees Assn. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 507 ].) Daon maintains that this case comes within the exception to the rule. | 1 | 2 |
Muao v. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd.green2 sentences2012Proc., §§ 906, 1294.2; see Muao v. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1088-1089 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 ].) Nelsen claims this case comes within an exception to the general rule recognized in Franco based on the so-called “death knell” doctrine. 2012Proc., §§ 906, 1294.2; see Muao v. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1088-1089 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 ].) Nelsen claims this case comes within an exception to the general rule recognized in Franco based on the so-called “death knell” doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1993(See generally People v. Williams (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 36, 44 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 70 ].) Defendant also contends that this case comes within an exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment, citing United States v. Hines (9th Cir.1992) 963 F.2d 255 . 1993(See generally People v. Williams (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 36, 44 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 70 ].) Defendant also contends that this case comes within an exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment, citing United States v. Hines (9th Cir.1992) 963 F.2d 255 . | 1 | 1 |
Lemaire v. All City Employees Assn.green2 sentences1989(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 [ 199 P.2d 668 ]; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 754 ]; Lemaire v. All City Employees Assn. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 507 ].) Daon maintains that this case comes within the exception to the rule. 1989(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 [ 199 P.2d 668 ]; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 754 ]; Lemaire v. All City Employees Assn. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 507 ].) Daon maintains that this case comes within the exception to the rule. | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Maroneygreen2 sentences1984This case comes within the rule of Chambers v. Maroney (1971) 399 U.S. 42, 51 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 419 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ]. 1984This case comes within the rule of Chambers v. Maroney (1971) 399 U.S. 42, 51 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 419 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ]. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Venegasgreen2 sentences1973(People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As the evidence here clearly shows a possession of the weapon for a purpose other than an assault upon the guard, this case comes within the exception to the “modem rule” set forth in People v. Jurado, 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1033 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 498 ] prohibiting punishment both for the possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used. *859 In the concurring opinion in People v. Venegas, supra, this court, speaking through our presiding justice, commented that the “intent and objective” test requires us to 1973(People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As the evidence here clearly shows a possession of the weapon for a purpose other than an assault upon the guard, this case comes within the exception to the “modem rule” set forth in People v. Jurado, 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1033 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 498 ] prohibiting punishment both for the possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used. *859 In the concurring opinion in People v. Venegas, supra, this court, speaking through our presiding justice, commented that the “intent and objective” test requires us to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Juradogreen2 sentences1973(People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As the evidence here clearly shows a possession of the weapon for a purpose other than an assault upon the guard, this case comes within the exception to the “modem rule” set forth in People v. Jurado, 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1033 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 498 ] prohibiting punishment both for the possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used. *859 In the concurring opinion in People v. Venegas, supra, this court, speaking through our presiding justice, commented that the “intent and objective” test requires us to 1973(People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As the evidence here clearly shows a possession of the weapon for a purpose other than an assault upon the guard, this case comes within the exception to the “modem rule” set forth in People v. Jurado, 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1033 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 498 ] prohibiting punishment both for the possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used. *859 In the concurring opinion in People v. Venegas, supra, this court, speaking through our presiding justice, commented that the “intent and objective” test requires us to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Faingreen2 sentences1973To be sure, the court did instruct on manslaughter and a theoretical argument can be made that this case comes within the doctrine announced in People v. Kopp, 275 Cal.App.2d 38, 41-42 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 601 ], where Ireland error was held to be prejudicial, although there was no defense of diminished capacity (cf. People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 598 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 633 , 451 P.2d 65 ]), because the error relieved the jury of the burden of finding malice. 1973To be sure, the court did instruct on manslaughter and a theoretical argument can be made that this case comes within the doctrine announced in People v. Kopp, 275 Cal.App.2d 38, 41-42 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 601 ], where Ireland error was held to be prejudicial, although there was no defense of diminished capacity (cf. People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 598 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 633 , 451 P.2d 65 ]), because the error relieved the jury of the burden of finding malice. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Koppgreen2 sentences1973To be sure, the court did instruct on manslaughter and a theoretical argument can be made that this case comes within the doctrine announced in People v. Kopp, 275 Cal.App.2d 38, 41-42 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 601 ], where Ireland error was held to be prejudicial, although there was no defense of diminished capacity (cf. People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 598 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 633 , 451 P.2d 65 ]), because the error relieved the jury of the burden of finding malice. 1973To be sure, the court did instruct on manslaughter and a theoretical argument can be made that this case comes within the doctrine announced in People v. Kopp, 275 Cal.App.2d 38, 41-42 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 601 ], where Ireland error was held to be prejudicial, although there was no defense of diminished capacity (cf. People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 598 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 633 , 451 P.2d 65 ]), because the error relieved the jury of the burden of finding malice. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Mendonsagreen1 sentence1963As said in Smith v. Mendonsa (1952) 108 Cal.App. 2d 540, 543 [ 288 P.2d 1039 ], “The case comes within the rule stated in 25 Corpus Juris Secundum, ‘Damages,’ page 815, that when it clearly appears that a party has suffered damage a liberal rule should be applied in allowing a court or jury to determine the amount, and that, given proof of damage, uncertainty as to the exact amount is no reason for denying all recovery. ’ ’ The appeal from the order denying new trial is dismissed. | 1 | 1 |
| Robison v. Hanleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malinow v. Dorenbaumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conroy v. Civil Service Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oettinger v. Stewartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stanley v. Robert S. Odell and Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brooks v. Brooksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Palmergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lisenba v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malinski v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'BANION v. Borbagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Winterburn v. Chambersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gregory v. Gregorygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Feliz v. Felizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Akley v. Bassettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Klevesahl v. Byingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Covert
green
2 sentences1976(People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ]; People v. Covert, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 91 .) In this case we conclude that it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been in defendant’s favor if the prosecution had not implied, through improper cross-examination, that the defendant had previously engaged in similar illegal acts.” As in Wagner , when the issue turns upon the credibility of the defendant, and substantial divergence in testimony exists, we must find that error was “such as to have contributed materially to the ve 1976(People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ]; People v. Covert, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 91 .) In this case we conclude that it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been in defendant’s favor if the prosecution had not implied, through improper cross-examination, that the defendant had previously engaged in similar illegal acts.” As in Wagner , when the issue turns upon the credibility of the defendant, and substantial divergence in testimony exists, we must find that error was “such as to have contributed materially to the ve | 3 | 1975–1976 |
People v. Perez
green
2 sentences1976(People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ]; People v. Covert, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 91 .) In this case we conclude that it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been in defendant’s favor if the prosecution had not implied, through improper cross-examination, that the defendant had previously engaged in similar illegal acts.” As in Wagner , when the issue turns upon the credibility of the defendant, and substantial divergence in testimony exists, we must find that error was “such as to have contributed materially to the ve 1976(People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ]; People v. Covert, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 91 .) In this case we conclude that it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been in defendant’s favor if the prosecution had not implied, through improper cross-examination, that the defendant had previously engaged in similar illegal acts.” As in Wagner , when the issue turns upon the credibility of the defendant, and substantial divergence in testimony exists, we must find that error was “such as to have contributed materially to the ve | 3 | 1975–1976 |
Inglin v. Hoppin
green
2 sentences1961Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483 [ 105 P. 582 ]; 16 Cal.Jur., p. 812, § 30.) ” Conroy v. Civil Service Com., 75 Cal.App.2d 450, 458 [ 171 P.2d 500 ] : “The respondent frankly admits this rule but claims that this case comes within the exception stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31 [ 251 P. 784 ], as follows: ‘An important exception to the foregoing general rule is that if the facts as admitted or proved be susceptible of but one construction or conclusion the right to the writ becomes a matter of law and the officer may be compelled to act in accordance with the facts as admitted o 1961Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483 [ 105 P. 582 ]; 16 Cal.Jur., p. 812, § 30.) ” Conroy v. Civil Service Com., 75 Cal.App.2d 450, 458 [ 171 P.2d 500 ] : “The respondent frankly admits this rule but claims that this case comes within the exception stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31 [ 251 P. 784 ], as follows: ‘An important exception to the foregoing general rule is that if the facts as admitted or proved be susceptible of but one construction or conclusion the right to the writ becomes a matter of law and the officer may be compelled to act in accordance with the facts as admitted o | 2 | 1946–1961 |
Dufton v. Daniels
green
2 sentences1946Such boards are vested with a high discretion and its abuse must appear very clearly before the courts will interfere.’ ” (See, also, cases there cited.) *458 The respondent frankly admits this rule but claims that this case comes within the exception stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31 [ 251 P. 784 ], as follows: “An important exception to the foregoing general rule is that if the facts as admitted or proved be susceptible of but one construction or conclusion the right to the writ becomes a matter of law and the officer may be compelled to act in accordance with the facts as a 1946Such boards are vested with a high discretion and its abuse must appear very clearly before the courts will interfere.’ ” (See, also, cases there cited.) *458 The respondent frankly admits this rule but claims that this case comes within the exception stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31 [ 251 P. 784 ], as follows: “An important exception to the foregoing general rule is that if the facts as admitted or proved be susceptible of but one construction or conclusion the right to the writ becomes a matter of law and the officer may be compelled to act in accordance with the facts as a | 2 | 1946–1961 |
People v. Colón
neutral
2 sentences1921The case comes within the rule set forth in Tapscott v. Lyon, 103 Cal. 297 , [ 37 P. 225 ]. 1921The case comes within the rule set forth in Tapscott v. Lyon, 103 Cal. 297 , [ 37 Pac. 225 ]. | 2 | 1921–1921 |
Tapscott v. Lyon
green
2 sentences1921The case comes within the rule set forth in Tapscott v. Lyon, 103 Cal. 297 , [ 37 P. 225 ]. 1921The case comes within the rule set forth in Tapscott v. Lyon, 103 Cal. 297 , [ 37 Pac. 225 ]. | 2 | 1921–1921 |
Daon Corp. v. Place Homeowners Assn.
green
1 sentence2021(Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 ; Daon Corp. v. Place Homeowners Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1456 ; County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 703 .) The Callahans maintain that this case comes within the exception to the rule. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Castaneda
green
1 sentence2014Hence, this case comes within the rule that “[g]enerally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or 10 incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]” (People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1348 .) Defendant also notes that CALCRIM No. 522, dealing with provocation, referred explicitly to second degree murder. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Knight v. Jewett
green
2 sentences2002(Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 132 .) Before concluding that a case comes within the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a court must not only examine the nature of the sport, but also the “ ‘defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.’ ” (Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 , quoting Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 317 .) Indeed, the scope of the legal duty owed by the defendant will frequently depend on such role or relationship. 2002(Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 317-318.) The Knight court noted that many courts, in analyzing the duty of the owner of a sports facility or ski resort, had defined “the risks inherent in the sport not only by virtue of the nature of the sport itself, but also by reference to the steps the sponsoring business entity reasonably should be obligated to take in order to minimize the risks *179 without altering the nature of the sport.” (Id. at p. 317, italics added.) The court concluded “that in the sports setting, as elsewhere, the nature of the applicable duty or standard of care fre | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002(Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 132 .) Before concluding that a case comes within the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a court must not only examine the nature of the sport, but also the “ ‘defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.’ ” (Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 , quoting Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 317 .) Indeed, the scope of the legal duty owed by the defendant will frequently depend on such role or relationship. 2002(Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 132 .) Before concluding that a case comes within the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a court must not only examine the nature of the sport, but also the “ ‘defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.’ ” (Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 , quoting Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 317 .) Indeed, the scope of the legal duty owed by the defendant will frequently depend on such role or relationship. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Taylor v. United States
green
2 sentences1993There, the Ninth Circuit held that "[a]n exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment occurs when the pending charge is so inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense." ( Id. at p. 257.) This exception, however, does not aid appellant, because it does not apply when the uncharged offenses are "logically distinct" from the charged offense. ( Ibid. ) Here, the robberies were distinct from the charged offenses; the places 1993There, the Ninth Circuit held that "[a]n exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment occurs when the pending charge is so inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense." ( Id. at p. 257.) This exception, however, does not aid appellant, because it does not apply when the uncharged offenses are "logically distinct" from the charged offense. ( Ibid. ) Here, the robberies were distinct from the charged offenses; the places | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Irvin Quinn Hines
green
2 sentences1993(See generally People v. Williams (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 36, 44 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 70 ].) Defendant also contends that this case comes within an exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment, citing United States v. Hines (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 255 . 1993(See generally People v. Williams (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 36, 44 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 70 ].) Defendant also contends that this case comes within an exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment, citing United States v. Hines (9th Cir.1992) 963 F.2d 255 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Conley
green
2 sentences1967We do not find that this case comes within the rule set forth in Henderson . 5 CALJIC 305.1 was adopted as a response to People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ], decided after the trial of this case. 6 We note again that insanity was not pleaded by defendant. 7 “There has to be a period of amnesia or relative amnesia; and if that is missing, then you cannot have the dissociative reaction. ’ ’ 8 Deliberation and premeditation are, of course, not elements of the degree of murder of which defendant was convicted. 1967We do not find that this case comes within the rule set forth in Henderson . 5 CALJIC 305.1 was adopted as a response to People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ], decided after the trial of this case. 6 We note again that insanity was not pleaded by defendant. 7 “There has to be a period of amnesia or relative amnesia; and if that is missing, then you cannot have the dissociative reaction. ’ ’ 8 Deliberation and premeditation are, of course, not elements of the degree of murder of which defendant was convicted. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Hoxie
green
2 sentences1967(Cf. People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal.App.2d 901 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 37 ].) 1967(Cf. People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal.App.2d 901 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 37 ].) | 1 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Ibarra
green
2 sentences1966The Competence of the Defendant’s Trial Attorney Defendant’s argument here is that the case comes within the rule announced in People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ], In that case the defendant’s attorney, in response to a question of the trial judge, stated that he knew of no grounds to object to certain evidence. 1966The Competence of the Defendant’s Trial Attorney Defendant’s argument here is that the case comes within the rule announced in People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ], In that case the defendant’s attorney, in response to a question of the trial judge, stated that he knew of no grounds to object to certain evidence. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Pereira v. Pereira green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| In Re the Estate of De Laveaga green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| People v. Jaggers green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| People v. Floyd green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Hammel v. Neylan green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Walker v. Kingsbury neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Robert Marsh Co., Inc. v. Tremper green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Stevens v. Snow green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Mellen v. Times-Mirror Co. green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| People v. McGill green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Trout v. Taylor green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Rock v. Travelers' Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Dept. Nat. Resources v. Indus. Acc. Com. neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Makins v. Industrial Accident Commission green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Oxnard v. Varnum neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| People v. Plyler green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| People v. Elgar green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Thompson v. Toland green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Conniff v. City of San Francisco green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Lampe v. City & County of San Francisco neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Wilkerson v. Thorp green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Fowles v. National Bank of California green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| First National Bank v. Price green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.