case comes within rule in Kansas

1940(See, also, Bullington v. Grabow, 88 Colo. 561 .) The next question we shall consider has to do with a group of ballots which were cast for Lindley at the polling places in Graham county, but which Hansen argues should not have been counted for various reasons, which will be noted as each ballot is discussed.

1937The argument of plaintiff is that the case comes within the rule announced in Ballard v. Bank, 91 Kan. 91 , 136 Pac. 935 .

1937The argument of plaintiff is that the case comes within the rule announced in Ballard v. Bank, 91 Kan. 91 , 136 Pac. 935 .

1934The case comes within the rule laid down in Hinze v. City of Iola, 92 Kan. 779 , 142 Pac. 947 .

1934The case comes within the rule laid down in Hinze v. City of Iola, 92 Kan. 779 , 142 Pac. 947 .

1934(Hill v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 139 Kan. 19 , 29 P. 2d 1075 , and cases cited.) Defendant calls our attention to the fact that since the judgment the plaintiff has died; that before his death plaintiff had attempted to assign the judgment, and that while the appeal was pending in this court defendant filed a motion for a revivor, which has not been passed on.

1934(Hill v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 139 Kan. 19 , 29 P. 2d 1075 , and cases cited.) Defendant calls our attention to the fact that since the judgment the plaintiff has died; that before his death plaintiff had attempted to assign the judgment, and that while the appeal was pending in this court defendant filed a motion for a revivor, which has not been passed on.

1932Appellant acknowledges this rule as laid down in Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246 , 13 Pac. 398 , but argues that this case comes within the rule'further laid down in that case, where this court said: “It is not every promise made by one to another from the performance of which a benefit may inure to a third, which gives a right of action to such third person, he being neither privy to the contract nor to the consideration.

1932Appellant acknowledges this rule as laid down in Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246 , 13 Pac. 398 , but argues that this case comes within the rule'further laid down in that case, where this court said: “It is not every promise made by one to another from the performance of which a benefit may inure to a third, which gives a right of action to such third person, he being neither privy to the contract nor to the consideration.

1931This case comes within the rule laid down in Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760 , 293 Pac. 759 .

1931This case comes within the rule laid down in Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760 , 293 Pac. 759 .

1928This case comes within the principle declared in Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 , 153 Pac. 1194 ; Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 , 202 Pac. 89 ; and Slocum v. City of Wichita, 114 Kan. 260 , 217 Pac. 297 .

1928This case comes within the principle declared in Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 , 153 Pac. 1194 ; Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 , 202 Pac. 89 ; and Slocum v. City of Wichita, 114 Kan. 260 , 217 Pac. 297 .

1928This case comes within the principle declared in Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 , 153 Pac. 1194 ; Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 , 202 Pac. 89 ; and Slocum v. City of Wichita, 114 Kan. 260 , 217 Pac. 297 .

1928This case comes within the principle declared in Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 , 153 Pac. 1194 ; Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 , 202 Pac. 89 ; and Slocum v. City of Wichita, 114 Kan. 260 , 217 Pac. 297 .

1928This case comes within the principle declared in Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 , 153 Pac. 1194 ; Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 , 202 Pac. 89 ; and Slocum v. City of Wichita, 114 Kan. 260 , 217 Pac. 297 .

1928This case comes within the principle declared in Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 , 153 Pac. 1194 ; Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 , 202 Pac. 89 ; and Slocum v. City of Wichita, 114 Kan. 260 , 217 Pac. 297 .

1924This case comes within the rule declared in Railway Co. v. Columbia, 65 Kan. 390 , 69 Pac. 338 , where this court said: “In a case where two distinct, successive causes, wholly unrelated in operation, contribute toward the production of an accident resulting in injury and damage, one of such causes must be the proximate, and the other the remote, cause of the injury.

1924This case comes within the rule declared in Railway Co. v. Columbia, 65 Kan. 390 , 69 Pac. 338 , where this court said: “In a case where two distinct, successive causes, wholly unrelated in operation, contribute toward the production of an accident resulting in injury and damage, one of such causes must be the proximate, and the other the remote, cause of the injury.

1924“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action for the recovery of damages if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition, or give rise to the occasion, by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened, between such prior or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury.” (Syl. ¶[¶ 1, 2.) This rule was followed in Eberhardt v. Telephone Co., 91 Kan. 763 , 139 Pac. 416 , where the telephone company was held not liable in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in coming i

1924“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action for the recovery of damages if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition, or give rise to the occasion, by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened, between such prior or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury.” (Syl. ¶[¶ 1, 2.) This rule was followed in Eberhardt v. Telephone Co., 91 Kan. 763 , 139 Pac. 416 , where the telephone company was held not liable in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in coming i

1924This case comes within the principle declared in Landon v. Railway Co., 113 Kan. 628 , 216 Pac. 309 , where this court said: “Natural gas furnished, under a contract, by a gas company to a railway company for use in the latter’s freight and passenger depots and build'ngs appurtenant thereto, is not free or furnished without compensation where the railway company, in consideration for the gas furnished and the payment of a certain amount of money, agrees that the gas company may use a part of the right of way of the railway company on which to lay pipe lines for the transportatipn of gas.” (Syl

1924This case comes within the principle declared in Landon v. Railway Co., 113 Kan. 628 , 216 Pac. 309 , where this court said: “Natural gas furnished, under a contract, by a gas company to a railway company for use in the latter’s freight and passenger depots and build'ngs appurtenant thereto, is not free or furnished without compensation where the railway company, in consideration for the gas furnished and the payment of a certain amount of money, agrees that the gas company may use a part of the right of way of the railway company on which to lay pipe lines for the transportatipn of gas.” (Syl

1914We think the case comes within the doctrine of Dent v. Simpson, 81 Kan. 217, 221 , 105 Pac. 542 , a survey case where the main issue was the location of the original stone marking the government corner.

1914We think the case comes within the doctrine of Dent v. Simpson, 81 Kan. 217, 221 , 105 Pac. 542 , a survey case where the main issue was the location of the original stone marking the government corner.

1909(Neenan v. White, 50 Kan. 639 ; Penrose v. Cooper, 71 Kan. 720, 725 ; Havel v. Abstract Co., 76 Kan. 336 ; Fike v. Nagle, 74 Kan. 838 ; Robbins v. Brower, 74 Kan. 113 ; Rynearson v. Conn, 77 Kan. 160 .) We think this case comes within that rule, and we think the deed in question valid.

1909(Neenan v. White, 50 Kan. 639 ; Penrose v. Cooper, 71 Kan. 720, 725 ; Havel v. Abstract Co., 76 Kan. 336 ; Fike v. Nagle, 74 Kan. 838 ; Robbins v. Brower, 74 Kan. 113 ; Rynearson v. Conn, 77 Kan. 160 .) We think this case comes within that rule, and we think the deed in question valid.

1909(Neenan v. White, 50 Kan. 639 ; Penrose v. Cooper, 71 Kan. 720, 725 ; Havel v. Abstract Co., 76 Kan. 336 ; Fike v. Nagle, 74 Kan. 838 ; Robbins v. Brower, 74 Kan. 113 ; Rynearson v. Conn, 77 Kan. 160 .) We think this case comes within that rule, and we think the deed in question valid.

1909(Neenan v. White, 50 Kan. 639 ; Penrose v. Cooper, 71 Kan. 720, 725 ; Havel v. Abstract Co., 76 Kan. 336 ; Fike v. Nagle, 74 Kan. 838 ; Robbins v. Brower, 74 Kan. 113 ; Rynearson v. Conn, 77 Kan. 160 .) We think this case comes within that rule, and we think the deed in question valid.

1909(Neenan v. White, 50 Kan. 639 ; Penrose v. Cooper, 71 Kan. 720, 725 ; Havel v. Abstract Co., 76 Kan. 336 ; Fike v. Nagle, 74 Kan. 838 ; Robbins v. Brower, 74 Kan. 113 ; Rynearson v. Conn, 77 Kan. 160 .) We think this case comes within that rule, and we think the deed in question valid.

1909(Neenan v. White, 50 Kan. 639 ; Penrose v. Cooper, 71 Kan. 720, 725 ; Havel v. Abstract Co., 76 Kan. 336 ; Fike v. Nagle, 74 Kan. 838 ; Robbins v. Brower, 74 Kan. 113 ; Rynearson v. Conn, 77 Kan. 160 .) We think this case comes within that rule, and we think the deed in question valid.

1909(O’Conner v. Standard Theater Co., 17 Mo. App. 675 ; Delashman v. Berry, 21 Mich. 316 .) It was alleged in the petition that by reason of the facts stated therein and the statutes of the state of Kansas the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the 'defendant.

1903Holding this view of the law, a confirmation of the sheriff’s sale in the present case was an approval of that which as to the time of performance the court had power to order in the first instance, and the case comes within the rule stated in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Thompson v. Burge, 60 Kan. 549 , 57 Pac. 110 , 72 Am.

1903Holding this view of the law, a confirmation of the sheriff’s sale in the present case was an approval of that which as to the time of performance the court had power to order in the first instance, and the case comes within the rule stated in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Thompson v. Burge, 60 Kan. 549 , 57 Pac. 110 , 72 Am.

1897This case comes within the rule laid down in Comm’rs of Norton Co. v. Shoemaker, supra; Beach v. Leahy, Treas., supra; State of Kansas, ex rel., v. Hitchcock, supra; City of Wichita v. Burleigh, 36 Kan. 34 ; Knowles v. Board of Education, 33 id. 692.

1897This case comes within the rule laid down in Comm’rs of Norton Co. v. Shoemaker, supra; Beach v. Leahy, Treas., supra; State of Kansas, ex rel., v. Hitchcock, supra; City of Wichita v. Burleigh, 36 Kan. 34 ; Knowles v. Board of Education, 33 id. 692.

1897This case comes within the rule laid down in Comm’rs of Norton Co. v. Shoemaker, supra; Beach v. Leahy, Treas., supra; State of Kansas, ex rel., v. Hitchcock, supra; City of Wichita v. Burleigh, 36 Kan. 34 ; Knowles v. Board of Education, 33 id. 692.

1897This case comes within the rule laid down in Comm’rs of Norton Co. v. Shoemaker, supra; Beach v. Leahy, Treas., supra; State of Kansas, ex rel., v. Hitchcock, supra; City of Wichita v. Burleigh, 36 Kan. 34 ; Knowles v. Board of Education, 33 id. 692.

1897In the case of City of Wichita v. Burleigh, supra, the Supreme Court says : “The Legislature may pass a special act where a general law cannot be made applicable, and this although the special act may to some extent affect the uniform operation throughout the State of other laws; and, generally, it is a question for the Legislature to determine whether a general law can be made applicable, or not.” "We are, therefore, of the opinion that this objection cannot be sustained.

1894We think the case comes within the rule declared in The State v. Medlicott, 9 Kas. 257 ; The State v. Wells, 28 id. 321 .

1894We think the case comes within the rule declared in The State v. Medlicott, 9 Kas. 257 ; The State v. Wells, 28 id. 321 .

1883A. There was no stipulated price agreed upon.” It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this case comes within the doctrine established in Ayres v. Hull, 5 Kas. 419 , and especially within the authority of Gunther v. Birkicht, 22 Mo. 439 , and therefore that the verdict of the jury should be set aside.

1883A. There was no stipulated price agreed upon.” It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this case comes within the doctrine established in Ayres v. Hull, 5 Kas. 419 , and especially within the authority of Gunther v. Birkicht, 22 Mo. 439 , and therefore that the verdict of the jury should be set aside.