section 1983 sued in New Mexico

2009Mitchell, 377 F.3d at 159 .

2009“In order to be entitled to absolute immunity under this test, the official must be engaged in acts that are integrally related not simply to the judicial process in general but to a concrete judicial case or controversy.” Id. at 174 . {15} In Mitchell, the plaintiff—an attorney—sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages based on the defendants’ refusal to re-certify the plaintiff to act as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants.

2008In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites Runge v. Fox, 110 N.M. 447 , 796 P.2d 1143 (Ct.App.1990), and Weinstein v. City of Santa Fe ex rel.

2008In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites Runge v. Fox, 110 N.M. 447 , 796 P.2d 1143 (Ct.App.1990), and Weinstein v. City of Santa Fe ex rel.

2002Interpreting the owner’s argument to be that she was entitled to release of the vehicle on demand, the court held the city was not required to provide a hearing before requiring the owner to pay the impoundment fees, id. at 360, approving the Ninth Circuit’s Stypmann holding that “the impoundment procedure was ... unconstitutional because no hearing was provided at which the validity of the seizure and detention could be determined, either before or after impoundment.” Weinrauch, 751 F.2d at 359 .

1999The Board does not contest this point. {12} Moreover, even though ordinarily state officials can be sued under § 1983 for injunctive or declaratory relief, see id. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304 , the United States Supreme Court held in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582 , 115 S.Ct. 2351 , 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995), that a § 1983 action for injunctive or declaratory relief (and an accompanying claim for attorney fees under § 1988) will not lie with respect to imposition of a state tax if the state provides an adequate remedy at law.

1999In Johnson, a governmental official being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that he did not participate in the conduct forming the basis of the claim. 515 U.S. at 307-08 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 .

1999In Johnson, a governmental official being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that he did not participate in the conduct forming the basis of the claim. 515 U.S. at 307-08 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 .

1999The Board does not contest this point. {12} Moreover, even though ordinarily state officials can be sued under § 1983 for injunctive or declaratory relief, see id. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304 , the United States Supreme Court held in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582 , 115 S.Ct. 2351 , 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995), that a § 1983 action for injunctive or declaratory relief (and an accompanying claim for attorney fees under § 1988) will not lie with respect to imposition of a state tax if the state provides an adequate remedy at law.

1999The Board does not contest this point. {12} Moreover, even though ordinarily state officials can be sued under § 1983 for injunctive or declaratory relief, see id. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304 , the United States Supreme Court held in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582 , 115 S.Ct. 2351 , 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995), that a § 1983 action for injunctive or declaratory relief (and an accompanying claim for attorney fees under § 1988) will not lie with respect to imposition of a state tax if the state provides an adequate remedy at law.

1997Plaintiff relies heavily on Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer could be sued under Section 1983 for a violation of the Fourth Amendment unless the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that his affidavit in support of an arrest warrant was sufficient to establish probable cause.

1997Plaintiff relies heavily on Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer could be sued under Section 1983 for a violation of the Fourth Amendment unless the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that his affidavit in support of an arrest warrant was sufficient to establish probable cause.

1997Id.

1995Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 , 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73 , 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

1995Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 , 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73 , 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

1992Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) for defendants’ alleged violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment right to speak at a public meeting. 1 The procedural question, which we must resolve first because it relates to our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, is whether the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on defendants’ qualified immunity defense is reviewable, before trial, under the collateral order doctrine adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

1992Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) for defendants’ alleged violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment right to speak at a public meeting. 1 The procedural question, which we must resolve first because it relates to our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, is whether the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on defendants’ qualified immunity defense is reviewable, before trial, under the collateral order doctrine adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

1991The court ruled, “[Plaintiff], in order to prevail, must show that the properly identified defendant has required him to take anti-psychotic drugs without exercising professional judgment.” Id. at 825 .

1991In Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff, an involuntarily-committed patient in a mental institution, sued a doctor under Section 1983 for forcing him to take antipsychotic medication.