section 1983 sued in South Carolina

2020See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 , 27-28 (1980) ("Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of § 1983 action.").

2016No. 1, 314 S.C. 335 , 338, 444 S.E.2d 498, 499 (1994) ("[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 allows a civil action to recover damages for deprivation of a constitutionally protected right."); id. at 338, 444 S.E.2d at 500 ("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted by its employee or agent unless the injury was inflicted pursuant to official government policy."); Washington v. Whitaker, 317 S.C. 108, 113 , 451 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1994) ("The 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 We note that section 15-78-70(b) of the South Carolina Code (2005) d

2016No. 1, 314 S.C. 335 , 338, 444 S.E.2d 498, 499 (1994) ("[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 allows a civil action to recover damages for deprivation of a constitutionally protected right."); id. at 338, 444 S.E.2d at 500 ("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted by its employee or agent unless the injury was inflicted pursuant to official government policy."); Washington v. Whitaker, 317 S.C. 108, 113 , 451 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1994) ("The 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 We note that section 15-78-70(b) of the South Carolina Code (2005) d

2016See § 15-78-70(b) ("Nothing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude." (emphasis added)). plaintiff must show that such policy or custom amounted to a 'deliberate indifference' to their constitutional rights." (quoting Todd v. Smith, 305 S.C. 227, 233 , 407 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1991))).

2016See § 15-78-70(b) ("Nothing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude." (emphasis added)). plaintiff must show that such policy or custom amounted to a 'deliberate indifference' to their constitutional rights." (quoting Todd v. Smith, 305 S.C. 227, 233 , 407 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1991))).

2016No. 1, 314 S.C. 335 , 338, 444 S.E.2d 498, 499 (1994) ("[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 allows a civil action to recover damages for deprivation of a constitutionally protected right."); id. at 338, 444 S.E.2d at 500 ("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted by its employee or agent unless the injury was inflicted pursuant to official government policy."); Washington v. Whitaker, 317 S.C. 108, 113 , 451 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1994) ("The 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 We note that section 15-78-70(b) of the South Carolina Code (2005) d

2016No. 1, 314 S.C. 335 , 338, 444 S.E.2d 498, 499 (1994) ("[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 allows a civil action to recover damages for deprivation of a constitutionally protected right."); id. at 338, 444 S.E.2d at 500 ("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted by its employee or agent unless the injury was inflicted pursuant to official government policy."); Washington v. Whitaker, 317 S.C. 108, 113 , 451 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1994) ("The 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 We note that section 15-78-70(b) of the South Carolina Code (2005) d

2016No. 1, 314 S.C. 335 , 338, 444 S.E.2d 498, 499 (1994) ("[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 allows a civil action to recover damages for deprivation of a constitutionally protected right."); id. at 338, 444 S.E.2d at 500 ("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted by its employee or agent unless the injury was inflicted pursuant to official government policy."); Washington v. Whitaker, 317 S.C. 108, 113 , 451 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1994) ("The 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 We note that section 15-78-70(b) of the South Carolina Code (2005) d

1998"Law enforcement officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the ‘right’ they allegedly violated was not "clearly established” at the time of the violation, or (2) if a reasonable officer would have thought that the defendants’ actions were constitutional.” Palmer, 9 F.3d at 1435 . .

1998See Rule 226(d), SCACR (only questions raised in petition for rehearing may be properly considered in petition for writ of certiorari to this Court). [10] "Law enforcement officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the `right' they allegedly violated was not "clearly established" at the time of the violation, or (2) if a reasonable officer would have thought that the defendants' actions were constitutional." Palmer, 9 F.3d at 1435 . [11] We emphasize, however, that Palmer involved an issue and procedural posture somewhat different from that decided here today.

1996See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, — S.C. —, 461 S.E. (2d) 39 (1995) (finding no error in judge’s refusal to recuse himself in action in which counsel for one of the parties had represented judge in the past, where judge’s factual findings were supported by the Record); Rogers, 275 S.C. 28 , 267 S.E. (2d) 86 (finding no error in judge’s failure to recuse himself from action notwithstanding fact that defendant had, in the past, sued judge under § 1983; because Record was “totally void” of any evidence of bias or prejudice stemming from the § 1983 action, court found no error).