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21 California opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.green2 sentences2023(Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690 .) But “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 2019(Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [because states and state officials are not "persons" under section 1983, they may not be sued under that statute in federal or state court]; McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1207 ["a state, an entity acting as an 'arm of the state,' or a state official sued in his official capacity may not be considered a 'person' who may be liable under section 1983"]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District 13 (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100 (Kirchmann) [public school district could not be sued under s | 3 | 8 |
Revene v. Charles County Commissionersgreen2 sentences2016Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348-349 .) Romero-Gold’s section 1983 claim primarily indicts the juvenile dependency system as being “unfair in its judgment of families” and “a wasteful bureaucracy with no clear leader and unclear policies,” while specifically alleging that her “rights of confrontation were 2015Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348-349 .) Romero-Gold’s section 1983 claim primarily indicts the juvenile dependency system as being “unfair in its judgment of families” and “a wasteful bureaucracy with no clear leader and unclear policies,” while specifically alleging that her “rights of confrontation were | 3 | 3 |
Arlene Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monicagreen2 sentences2023(Hignell-Stark, supra, 46 F.4th at p. 322 .) To succeed on a facial challenge like the one here, a plaintiff must establish that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [Ordinance] would be valid.’ (Rosenblatt, [supra,] 940 F.3d at 444 [].)” The City contends that Hignell-Stark did not apply this analysis. 2023(Hignell-Stark, supra, 46 F.4th at p. 322 .) To succeed on a facial challenge like the one here, a plaintiff must establish that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [Ordinance] would be valid.’ (Rosenblatt, [supra,] 940 F.3d at 444 [].)” The City contends that Hignell-Stark did not apply this analysis. | 2 | 2 |
Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2019(See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) [no Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of title VI].) But as the Board points out, plaintiffs "confuse sovereign immunity with whether a statute itself creates a cause of action against a state." "[W]hether an entity is a 'person' subject to suit under section 1983 is a matter of federal law and is not affected by whether the entity has sovereign immunity . . . " (Kirchmann, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 [rejecting argument that by enacting the California Tort Claims Act, school districts could be sued under section 1983], italics omitted.) Title VI ca 2019(Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [because states and state officials are not "persons" under section 1983, they may not be sued under that statute in federal or state court]; McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1207 ["a state, an entity acting as an 'arm of the state,' or a state official sued in his official capacity may not be considered a 'person' who may be liable under section 1983"]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District 13 (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100 (Kirchmann) [public school district could not be sued under s | 2 | 2 |
Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Browngreen2 sentences2014(Id. at p. 115.) He was subsequently transferred to another position and, later, “laid off.” (Id. at pp. 115-116.) The plaintiff sued the city under section 1983, alleging that the transfer was in retaliation for his earlier appeal and, therefore, in violation of his First Amendment rights, and that his discharge violated his constitutional right to due process. ( Praprotnik, supra, at p. 116 .) The Praprotnik court explained that the city could not “be held liable under [section] 1983 unless [the plaintiff] proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.” (Praprotnik, supra, 485 2014(Id. at p. 115.) He was subsequently transferred to another position and, later, “laid off.” (Id. at pp. 115-116.) The plaintiff sued the city under section 1983, alleging that the transfer was in retaliation for his earlier appeal and, therefore, in violation of his First Amendment rights, and that his discharge violated his constitutional right to due process. ( Praprotnik, supra, at p. 116 .) The Praprotnik court explained that the city could not “be held liable under [section] 1983 unless [the plaintiff] proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.” (Praprotnik, supra, 485 | 2 | 2 |
Owen v. City of Independencegreen2 sentences1990Sevr. (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694 , [ 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 638 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ]), and the T. family has not alleged an “injury inflicted by the ‘execution of a [County] policy or custom,’ ” (Owens v. City of Independence (1980) 445 U.S. 622, 657-658 [ 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 697 , 100 S.Ct. 1398 ]), the T. family has failed to state a section 1983 cause of action against the County. *882 c. 1990Sevr. (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694 , [ 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 638 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ]), and the T. family has not alleged an “injury inflicted by the ‘execution of a [County] policy or custom,’ ” (Owens v. City of Independence (1980) 445 U.S. 622, 657-658 [ 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 697 , 100 S.Ct. 1398 ]), the T. family has failed to state a section 1983 cause of action against the County. *882 c. | 2 | 2 |
Pitts v. County of Kerngreen2 sentences2019(Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [because states and state officials are not "persons" under section 1983, they may not be sued under that statute in federal or state court]; McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1207 ["a state, an entity acting as an 'arm of the state,' or a state official sued in his official capacity may not be considered a 'person' who may be liable under section 1983"]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District 13 (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100 (Kirchmann) [public school district could not be sued under s 2016Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348-349 .) Romero-Gold’s section 1983 claim primarily indicts the juvenile dependency system as being “unfair in its judgment of families” and “a wasteful bureaucracy with no clear leader and unclear policies,” while specifically alleging that her “rights of confrontation were | 1 | 4 |
McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen1 sentence2019(Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [because states and state officials are not "persons" under section 1983, they may not be sued under that statute in federal or state court]; McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1207 ["a state, an entity acting as an 'arm of the state,' or a state official sued in his official capacity may not be considered a 'person' who may be liable under section 1983"]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District 13 (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100 (Kirchmann) [public school district could not be sued under s | 1 | 1 |
Carey v. Piphusgreen2 sentences2004(Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 266 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 252 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 ].) The City argues that this cause of action is moot because it rescinded the notice of violation. 2004(Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 266 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 252 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 ].) The City argues that this cause of action is moot because it rescinded the notice of violation. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Obledogreen2 sentences2004(Green v. Obledo (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 678, 682 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Local governments may be sued under 42 United States Code section 1983 where their official policies or practices violate procedural due process rights. 2004(Green v. Obledo (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 678, 682 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Local governments may be sued under 42 United States Code section 1983 where their official policies or practices violate procedural due process rights. | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1986In that case the court held that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property.” (Id., 474 U.S. at p. 328 [ 88 L.Ed.2d at p. 666 , 106 S.Ct. at p. 663 ].) In that case a state prisoner sued under 42 United States Code section 1983 to recover damages for injuries sustained when he slipped on a pillow negligently left by state prison agents on a stairway. 1986In that case the court held that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property.” (Id., 474 U.S. at p. 328 [ 88 L.Ed.2d at p. 666 , 106 S.Ct. at p. 663 ].) In that case a state prisoner sued under 42 United States Code section 1983 to recover damages for injuries sustained when he slipped on a pillow negligently left by state prison agents on a stairway. | 1 | 1 |
Ingraham v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1986The petitioner argued that the state’s negligence “‘deprived’ petitioner of his ‘liberty’ interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham *1307 v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711, 731 , 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413 (1977); . . .” and that because the state maintained that it was entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, he was without an adequate state remedy. 1986The petitioner argued that the state’s negligence “‘deprived’ petitioner of his ‘liberty’ interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham *1307 v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711, 731 , 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413 (1977); . . .” and that because the state maintained that it was entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, he was without an adequate state remedy. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bissessur v. Indiana University Board of Trustees
green
2 sentences2016Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348-349 .) Romero-Gold’s section 1983 claim primarily indicts the juvenile dependency system as being “unfair in its judgment of families” and “a wasteful bureaucracy with no clear leader and unclear policies,” while specifically alleging that her “rights of confrontation were 2015Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348-349 .) Romero-Gold’s section 1983 claim primarily indicts the juvenile dependency system as being “unfair in its judgment of families” and “a wasteful bureaucracy with no clear leader and unclear policies,” while specifically alleging that her “rights of confrontation were | 3 | 2014–2016 |
Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans
green
2 sentences2023(Hignell-Stark, supra, 46 F.4th at p. 322 .) To succeed on a facial challenge like the one here, a plaintiff must establish that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [Ordinance] would be valid.’ (Rosenblatt, [supra,] 940 F.3d at 444 [].)” The City contends that Hignell-Stark did not apply this analysis. 2023(Hignell-Stark, supra, 46 F.4th at p. 322 .) To succeed on a facial challenge like the one here, a plaintiff must establish that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [Ordinance] would be valid.’ (Rosenblatt, [supra,] 940 F.3d at 444 [].)” The City contends that Hignell-Stark did not apply this analysis. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik
green
2 sentences2014(Id. at p. 115.) He was subsequently transferred to another position and, later, “laid off.” (Id. at pp. 115-116.) The plaintiff sued the city under section 1983, alleging that the transfer was in retaliation for his earlier appeal and, therefore, in violation of his First Amendment rights, and that his discharge violated his constitutional right to due process. ( Praprotnik, supra, at p. 116 .) The Praprotnik court explained that the city could not “be held liable under [section] 1983 unless [the plaintiff] proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.” (Praprotnik, supra, 485 2014(Id. at p. 115.) He was subsequently transferred to another position and, later, “laid off.” (Id. at pp. 115-116.) The plaintiff sued the city under section 1983, alleging that the transfer was in retaliation for his earlier appeal and, therefore, in violation of his First Amendment rights, and that his discharge violated his constitutional right to due process. ( Praprotnik, supra, at p. 116 .) The Praprotnik court explained that the city could not “be held liable under [section] 1983 unless [the plaintiff] proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.” (Praprotnik, supra, 485 | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff's Department
green
1 sentence2019(Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [because states and state officials are not "persons" under section 1983, they may not be sued under that statute in federal or state court]; McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1207 ["a state, an entity acting as an 'arm of the state,' or a state official sued in his official capacity may not be considered a 'person' who may be liable under section 1983"]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District 13 (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100 (Kirchmann) [public school district could not be sued under s | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pittman v. Oregon, Employment Department
green
1 sentence2019(Pittman v. Oregon, Employment Dept. (9th Cir. 2007) 509 F.3d 1065 , 1071–1073.) "[W]hile Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not apply in state court, the practical effect of the holding in Will is that actions against arms of the state under both [42 United States Code] § 1983 and § 1981 cannot be brought in either federal or state court, because the cause of action in § 1983 does not reach arms of the state." (Id. at p. 1072.) Although California courts have yet to consider this issue, we follow Pittman's approach. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cissell v. Hanover Insurance
green
1 sentence2016Co. (E.D.Ky. 1986) 647 F.Supp. 757 , the court granted summary judgment to state police officers who were sued under section 1983 for malicious prosecution because the plaintiff’s voluntary participation in the federal pretrial diversion program was not a favorable termination of the plaintiff’s underlying criminal proceeding. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Jerome Singleton v. City of New York, Ronald Salzer and Anthony Dellaventura
green
2 sentences2016The court, adopting the reasoning of Singleton, supra, 632 F.2d 185 , explained: “ ‘To hold otherwise would be to allow a criminal defendant to side-step criminal prosecution, to forego litigation of his guilt or innocence, to benefit from a rehabilitative program, and then to turn around and to use this process which was designed to help him as a sword against the state in a civil action.’ ” (Cissell, at p. 758, quoting Lindes v. Sutter (D.N.J. 1985) 621 F.Supp. 1197, 1201-1202 ). 2016The court, adopting the reasoning of Singleton, supra, 632 F.2d 185 , explained: “ ‘To hold otherwise would be to allow a criminal defendant to side-step criminal prosecution, to forego litigation of his guilt or innocence, to benefit from a rehabilitative program, and then to turn around and to use this process which was designed to help him as a sword against the state in a civil action.’ ” (Cissell, at p. 758, quoting Lindes v. Sutter (D.N.J. 1985) 621 F.Supp. 1197, 1201-1202 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lindes v. Sutter
green
1 sentence2016The court, adopting the reasoning of Singleton, supra, 632 F.2d 185 , explained: “ ‘To hold otherwise would be to allow a criminal defendant to side-step criminal prosecution, to forego litigation of his guilt or innocence, to benefit from a rehabilitative program, and then to turn around and to use this process which was designed to help him as a sword against the state in a civil action.’ ” (Cissell, at p. 758, quoting Lindes v. Sutter (D.N.J. 1985) 621 F.Supp. 1197, 1201-1202 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Perry v. County of Fresno
green
1 sentence2015The plaintiff must establish that: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the government entity had a policy; (3) this policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation." (Perry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 94, 105-106 .) Araceli has not established a probability of prevailing on a Monell claim against Palomar because, in addition to the absence of evidence that she was deprived of a constitutional right, there is no evidence that Palomar had a poli | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cooper v. Dupnik
green
1 sentence2013(Cooper v. Dupnik (9th Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 1520, 1526 .) In Monell, the court held that a government entity could not be sued under section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Quern v. Jordan
red
2 sentences1985In Quern v. Jordan (1979) 440 U.S. 332 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 358 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 ], the Supreme Court firmly held that states were not amenable to suit under section 1983 because of the immunity conferred upon them by the Eleventh Amendment. (440 U.S. at pp. 342-345 [59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 367-369].) Both Quern and its predecessor, Edelman v. Jordan (1974) 415 U.S. 651 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 662 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 ], involved an action brought against a state or its officials in federal court. 1985In Quern v. Jordan (1979) 440 U.S. 332 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 358 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 ], the Supreme Court firmly held that states were not amenable to suit under section 1983 because of the immunity conferred upon them by the Eleventh Amendment. (440 U.S. at pp. 342-345 [59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 367-369].) Both Quern and its predecessor, Edelman v. Jordan (1974) 415 U.S. 651 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 662 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 ], involved an action brought against a state or its officials in federal court. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Edelman v. Jordan
red
2 sentences1985In Quern v. Jordan (1979) 440 U.S. 332 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 358 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 ], the Supreme Court firmly held that states were not amenable to suit under section 1983 because of the immunity conferred upon them by the Eleventh Amendment. (440 U.S. at pp. 342-345 [59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 367-369].) Both Quern and its predecessor, Edelman v. Jordan (1974) 415 U.S. 651 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 662 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 ], involved an action brought against a state or its officials in federal court. 1985In Quern v. Jordan (1979) 440 U.S. 332 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 358 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 ], the Supreme Court firmly held that states were not amenable to suit under section 1983 because of the immunity conferred upon them by the Eleventh Amendment. (440 U.S. at pp. 342-345 [59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 367-369].) Both Quern and its predecessor, Edelman v. Jordan (1974) 415 U.S. 651 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 662 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 ], involved an action brought against a state or its officials in federal court. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.