principle underlying doctrine in Missouri

1998We held that the principle underlying this rule is “that repetition of a portion of trial testimony would cause that portion to be emphasized by reiteration, which in turn ‘might lead to interminable confusion or to an unwarranted advantage to one party over the other,’ and which further would invade a juror’s duty to solely determine the facts according to their memory alone.” Id. at 421 , quoting, Isreal v. Fanchon & Marco, 58 S.W.2d 774 , 778 (Mo.App.1933).

1911Supp. 296 ; Ritenour v. Matthews, 42 Ind. 7 .] And the principle underlying this rule is applicable to, and the rule is enforced in, that line of cases where a third party, in order to induce one to comply with his contract, has made a promise to him.” Two answers may be given to this argument, first: The rule invoked by defendant cannot apply in a case, such as the one in hand, where the common party to both contracts is not in default, in the performance of the first contract hut has elected to abandon it on account of the breach of its terms by the other contracting party.

1909In those circumstances, the defendant is regarded as having waived its right of demurrer as to the sufficiency of the allegations by answering thereto. [Hurst v. City of Ash Grove, 96 Mo. 168 ; Grove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672 ; Lycett v. Wolff, 45 Mo. App. 489 .] In such circumstances, if with all implications and intendments in aid therefor, the petition can he reasonably construed to have implied facts for the omission of which a demurrer would have been sustained in the first instance, it will suffice.

1909In those circumstances, the defendant is regarded as having waived its right of demurrer as to the sufficiency of the allegations by answering thereto. [Hurst v. City of Ash Grove, 96 Mo. 168 ; Grove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672 ; Lycett v. Wolff, 45 Mo. App. 489 .] In such circumstances, if with all implications and intendments in aid therefor, the petition can he reasonably construed to have implied facts for the omission of which a demurrer would have been sustained in the first instance, it will suffice.

1909In those circumstances, the defendant is regarded as having waived its right of demurrer as to the sufficiency of the allegations by answering thereto. [Hurst v. City of Ash Grove, 96 Mo. 168 ; Grove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672 ; Lycett v. Wolff, 45 Mo. App. 489 .] In such circumstances, if with all implications and intendments in aid therefor, the petition can he reasonably construed to have implied facts for the omission of which a demurrer would have been sustained in the first instance, it will suffice.

1908It has been so declared by the courts and asserted by the standard text-writers. [Hospes v. Almstedt, 13 Mo. App. 270 ; State ex rel.

1906The opinion generally prevails, and under the old law it was quite true, that those claims which are considered as demands against an estate arise only by virtue of some contract or undertaking of the deceased in his lifetime and were either demands against him at the time of his death or would have become such in due time had he lived, and such other claims as are specifically enumerated as such by the statute; for instance, funeral expenses, which are of course contracted after the demise. 'The principle underlying this doctrine of the old law results from the fact that all contracts, entere

1906The opinion generally prevails, and under the old law it was quite true, that those claims which are considered as demands against an estate arise only by virtue of some contract or undertaking of the deceased in his lifetime and were either demands against him at the time of his death or would have become such in due time had he lived, and such other claims as are specifically enumerated as such by the statute; for instance, funeral expenses, which are of course contracted after the demise. 'The principle underlying this doctrine of the old law results from the fact that all contracts, entere

1906The opinion generally prevails, and under the old law it was quite true, that those claims which are considered as demands against an estate arise only by virtue of some contract or undertaking of the deceased in his lifetime and were either demands against him at the time of his death or would have become such in due time had he lived, and such other claims as are specifically enumerated as such by the statute; for instance, funeral expenses, which are of course contracted after the demise. 'The principle underlying this doctrine of the old law results from the fact that all contracts, entere

1906The opinion generally prevails, and under the old law it was quite true, that those claims which are considered as demands against an estate arise only by virtue of some contract or undertaking of the deceased in his lifetime and were either demands against him at the time of his death or would have become such in due time had he lived, and such other claims as are specifically enumerated as such by the statute; for instance, funeral expenses, which are of course contracted after the demise. 'The principle underlying this doctrine of the old law results from the fact that all contracts, entere

1906The opinion generally prevails, and under the old law it was quite true, that those claims which are considered as demands against an estate arise only by virtue of some contract or undertaking of the deceased in his lifetime and were either demands against him at the time of his death or would have become such in due time had he lived, and such other claims as are specifically enumerated as such by the statute; for instance, funeral expenses, which are of course contracted after the demise. 'The principle underlying this doctrine of the old law results from the fact that all contracts, entere

1905Tbe courts therefore, in their wisdom, in making proper application of this principle, have sought out and seized upon the one reasonable and logical means of affording the proper measure of compensation for such wrong, and that is, by awarding to the injured party the value of that with which he has been induced to part under this unenforcible contract, and if it be money, then the measure of his recovery is the amount paid on account of the purchase and the remedy is a suit for money had and received, and in this State, a lien can be enforced on the land to the end of securing payment of the

1905Tbe courts therefore, in their wisdom, in making proper application of this principle, have sought out and seized upon the one reasonable and logical means of affording the proper measure of compensation for such wrong, and that is, by awarding to the injured party the value of that with which he has been induced to part under this unenforcible contract, and if it be money, then the measure of his recovery is the amount paid on account of the purchase and the remedy is a suit for money had and received, and in this State, a lien can be enforced on the land to the end of securing payment of the