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5 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1884–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sims v. Simsgreen1 sentence2010See Sims v. Sims, 515 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) (discussing the distinguishing factors between pendente lite orders and temporary custody orders and stating that “temporary custody orders are distinguishable from pendente lite orders because temporary orders constitute final orders from which an appeal will lie to this court, whereas pendente lite orders are not ap-pealable”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence2016As Justice Bolin, writing for the ' Court, noted in Hubbard : “Justice Stuart aptly explained [in Bolding ] the distinguishing principle between arbitration agreements signed on behalf of competent nursing-home residents and arbitration agreements signed on behalf' of mentally incompetent nursing-home residents, making clear this Court’s treatment of the two.” 189 So.3d at 34 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Rich v. Rich
green
2 sentences2010In Hodge v. Steinwinder, 919 So.2d 1179 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), this court, discussing Rich v. Rich, 887 So.2d 289 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (Murdock, J., with one Judge concurring and one Judge concurring in the result), stated: “[In Rich , ] this court explained the distinction between a pendente lite custody award and a custody award that, for lack of a better term, might be called a ‘trial’ or ‘experimental’ custody arrangement, made by the trial court in an attempt to ‘make it possible to base any subsequent change in custody on the history of the parties’ relationships that *937 developed during th 2010In Hodge v. Steinwinder, 919 So.2d 1179 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), this court, discussing Rich v. Rich, 887 So.2d 289 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (Murdock, J., with one Judge concurring and one Judge concurring in the result), stated: “[In Rich , ] this court explained the distinction between a pendente lite custody award and a custody award that, for lack of a better term, might be called a ‘trial’ or ‘experimental’ custody arrangement, made by the trial court in an attempt to ‘make it possible to base any subsequent change in custody on the history of the parties’ relationships that *937 developed during th | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hodge v. Steinwinder
green
1 sentence2010In Hodge v. Steinwinder, 919 So.2d 1179 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), this court, discussing Rich v. Rich, 887 So.2d 289 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (Murdock, J., with one Judge concurring and one Judge concurring in the result), stated: “[In Rich , ] this court explained the distinction between a pendente lite custody award and a custody award that, for lack of a better term, might be called a ‘trial’ or ‘experimental’ custody arrangement, made by the trial court in an attempt to ‘make it possible to base any subsequent change in custody on the history of the parties’ relationships that *937 developed during th | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Strickland v. State
green
2 sentences1959The foregoing part of this opinion was prepared with reference to the Supreme Court's opinion in Strickland v. State, Ala. Sup. 1959, 114 So.2d 407 , and we discerned a distinguishing principle in the facts established by the record in this case. 1959The foregoing part of this opinion was prepared with reference to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Strickland v. State, Ala. Sup.1959, 114 So.2d 407 , 1 and we discerned a distinguishing principle in the facts established by the record in this case. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
The Montello
green
1 sentence1886If of width, depth, and freedom from obstructions, sufficient for valuable floatage ; if in its natural condition and ordinary capacity, it is susceptible of public use, the public have an easement therein for the purposes of transportation. — Ellis v. Carey, 30 Ala. 725 ; Lewis v. Coffee County, 77 Ala. 190 ; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430 . | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Lewis v. Coffee County
neutral
1 sentence1886If of width, depth, and freedom from obstructions, sufficient for valuable floatage ; if in its natural condition and ordinary capacity, it is susceptible of public use, the public have an easement therein for the purposes of transportation. — Ellis v. Carey, 30 Ala. 725 ; Lewis v. Coffee County, 77 Ala. 190 ; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430 . | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Ellis v. Carey
neutral
1 sentence1886If of width, depth, and freedom from obstructions, sufficient for valuable floatage ; if in its natural condition and ordinary capacity, it is susceptible of public use, the public have an easement therein for the purposes of transportation. — Ellis v. Carey, 30 Ala. 725 ; Lewis v. Coffee County, 77 Ala. 190 ; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430 . | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Rhodes v. Otis
green
1 sentence1884A distinguishing test, approved by the conrt, was, whether a stream is “susceptible or not of use as a common passage by the public.” In Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578 , it was said : “ In determining the character of a stream, inquiry should be made as to the following points : whether it is fitted for valuable floatage; whether the public, or only a few individuals, are interested in transportation; whether any great public interests are involved in the use of it for transportation; whether the periods of its capacity for floatage are sufficiently long to make it susceptible of use beneficially | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.