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12 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1880–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Texas v. R.R.S., a Juvenilegreen1 sentence2022See id. at 837. | 1 | 1 |
Hudson v. Wakefieldgreen1 sentence1992Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.1986). 8 *107 In its first point of error, Hurd contends that the court erred in granting Bruni judgment for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing because there is no such duty in a lessor-lessee relationship, and there is no evidence to support the finding of a confidential relationship. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barnum v. State
green
2 sentences2006In Barnum v. State , 7 S.W.3d 782 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999, pet. ref'd), we discussed the distinguishing factors in determining whether a comment on a defendant's failure to testify required reversal. 2002In Barnum v. State , 7 S.W.3d 782 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999, pet. ref'd), we discussed the distinguishing factors in determining whether a comment on a defendant's failure to testify required reversal. | 5 | 2002–2006 |
CMH HOMES v. Perez
green
1 sentence2015In CMH Homes v. Perez, the Texas Supreme Court noted the similarities between interlocutory appeals and mandamus proceedings, and held there is no procedural reason not to treat an interlocutory appeal as a mandamus. 340 S.W.3d at 453-54 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Butler v. Hanson
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1998Further, they do not negate the other distinguishing factors discussed in Smith, supra. Appellant’s third point of error is overruled. 1998Further, they do not negate the other distinguishing factors discussed in Smith, supra . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Newberry v. State
green
1 sentence1979We also consider the factors mentioned in Newberry, supra, and Ancira, supra: subjective intent of the officer, subjective belief of the appellant, focus of the investigation, and probable cause to arrest. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Ancira v. State
green
1 sentence1979We also consider the factors mentioned in Newberry, supra, and Ancira, supra: subjective intent of the officer, subjective belief of the appellant, focus of the investigation, and probable cause to arrest. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Edwards v. Beavers
neutral
1 sentence1880Thus is sufficiently presented the distinguishing principle which separates two classes of cases; in the one, where the wife, as in Webb v. Webb, or the husband, as in Edwards v. Beavers, 19 Tex., 506 , died, without at the time of the death being entitled to demand the title from the government, and without possessing the equitable interest derived from a performance of such conditions prescribed by the law, as would have entitled him or her, as the case might be, to a right in law to demand the title that subsequently issued to the survivor as the head of a family, there would exist no commu | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.