distinguishing principle (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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distinguishing principle in Pennsylvania

6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1909–1997 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Bucci v. Buccigreen
pa · 1986 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1992–1995
2 sentences

1995“The distinguishing factors between visitation and partial custody are the length, frequency, and place of visits and who has effective control of the child during the visits.” Bucci v. Bucci, 351 Pa.Super. 457, 467 , 506 A.2d 438, 443 (1986).

1995“The distinguishing factors between visitation and partial custody are the length, frequency, and place of visits and who has effective control of the child during the visits.” Bucci v. Bucci, 351 Pa.Super. 457, 467 , 506 A.2d 438, 443 (1986).

22

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Lucas green
washctapp · 1989
2 sentences

1997One case in which a distinguishing analysis was performed similar to that required by Edmunds was State v. Lucas, 56 Wash.App. 236 , 783 P.2d 121 (1989), review denied, 114 Wash.2d 1009 , 790 P.2d 167 (1990).

1997One case in which a distinguishing analysis was performed similar to that required by Edmunds was State v. Lucas, 56 Wash.App. 236 , 783 P.2d 121 (1989), review denied, 114 Wash.2d 1009 , 790 P.2d 167 (1990).

11997–1997
Miles v. District of Columbia green
dcd · 1973
1 sentence

1975Circumstances, where an argument similar to Keystone’s third theory was advanced with success, existed in Miles v. District of Columbia, 354 F.Supp. 577 (D.D.C.1973); but that case is not only factually distinguishable, the distinguishing factors fully support a rejection of Keystone’s third theory in the instant case.

11975–1975
Graham v. Philadelphia neutral
pasuperct · 1902
1 sentence

1911We need only cite as illustrative cases: Butcher v. Phila., 202 Pa. 1 ; McHugh v. Kerr, 208 Pa. 225 ; Graham v. Phila., 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 ; Brown v. Milligan, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 244 .

11911–1911
Brown v. Milligan neutral
pasuperct · 1907
1 sentence

1911We need only cite as illustrative cases: Butcher v. Phila., 202 Pa. 1 ; McHugh v. Kerr, 208 Pa. 225 ; Graham v. Phila., 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 ; Brown v. Milligan, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 244 .

11911–1911
Robb v. Connellsville Bor. green
pa · 1890
1 sentence

1911This distinguishing principle has been applied in a multitude of cases in which the general principle enunciated in Robb v. Connellsville Borough 137 Pa. 42 has been recognized.

11911–1911
Butcher v. Philadelphia green
pa · 1902
1 sentence

1911We need only cite as illustrative cases: Butcher v. Phila., 202 Pa. 1 ; McHugh v. Kerr, 208 Pa. 225 ; Graham v. Phila., 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 ; Brown v. Milligan, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 244 .

11911–1911
McHugh v. Kerr neutral
pa · 1904
1 sentence

1911We need only cite as illustrative cases: Butcher v. Phila., 202 Pa. 1 ; McHugh v. Kerr, 208 Pa. 225 ; Graham v. Phila., 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 ; Brown v. Milligan, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 244 .

11911–1911
Kunkle's Estate neutral
pasuperct · 1902
1 sentence

1909On a question of the construction or application of its own rules a court can be reversed only for manifest and material error: Webster v. Monongahela, etc., Coal & Coke Co., 201 Pa. 278 ; Trescott v. Co-operative Building Bank, 212 Pa. 47 ; Kunkle’s Estate, 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 200 , and cases cited on page 205.

11909–1909
Webster v. Monongahela River Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. neutral
pa · 1902
1 sentence

1909On a question of the construction or application of its own rules a court can be reversed only for manifest and material error: Webster v. Monongahela, etc., Coal & Coke Co., 201 Pa. 278 ; Trescott v. Co-operative Building Bank, 212 Pa. 47 ; Kunkle’s Estate, 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 200 , and cases cited on page 205.

11909–1909
Trescott v. Co-operative Building Bank neutral
pa · 1905
1 sentence

1909On a question of the construction or application of its own rules a court can be reversed only for manifest and material error: Webster v. Monongahela, etc., Coal & Coke Co., 201 Pa. 278 ; Trescott v. Co-operative Building Bank, 212 Pa. 47 ; Kunkle’s Estate, 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 200 , and cases cited on page 205.

11909–1909

Where else courts name it

IL 17 (1977–2021) CA 12 (1931–2023) TX 12 (1880–2022) NY 10 (1892–2010) LA 7 (1936–2017) PA 6 (1909–1997) TN 6 (1897–2024) WA 6 (1988–2019) MO 6 (1954–2019) NJ 5 (1949–1993) AL 5 (1884–2016) NC 5 (1893–2022) KS 4 (1954–2012) MS 4 (1981–2004) KY 3 (1961–2010) ID 3 (1985–2023) FL 2 (1980–2015) OH 2 (2006–2006) NV 2 (1910–1990) AZ 2 (1942–2012) WY 2 (1995–2008) DC 2 (1981–1996) UT 2 (1904–1987) VA 2 (1917–1918) MD 2 (1889–2001) MI 2 (1998–2026) AR 2 (1927–2002) VT 2 (1895–1914)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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