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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Simsred2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 2 | 2 |
Record v. Reasongreen2 sentences2007After examining the case law applying primary assumption of risk to a variety of activities, the court stated that "[compiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of `sport' if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury." (Id. at p. 482, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 .) The court observed that holding on to a tube while being pulled behind a boat involved "[c]ombating centrifugal force with a white-knuckled grip" and therefore fell 2003As the court in Record v. Reason, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at page 482 , said upon “[compiling all of the distinguishing factors” from the cases, an activity is a “sport” to which the primary assumption of risk doctrine applies if that activity “is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury.” That delineation is a useful one and covers the bicycle ride here. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Edelbacherred2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Blackshergreen2 sentences2016(Ibid.; see People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 816-818 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 259 P.3d 370 ].) A majority in Davis, Hammon, and Bryant adopted the distinguishing principle of primary purpose. 2016(Ibid.; see People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 816-818 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 259 P.3d 370 ].) A majority in Davis, Hammon, and Bryant adopted the distinguishing principle of primary purpose. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moralesred2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crittendenred1 sentence2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 1 |
Stimson v. Carlsongreen2 sentences2008After reviewing a substantial number of cases applying primary assumption of risk to a variety of activities, the court concluded that "[c]ompiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of `sport' if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury." ( Id. at p. 482.) Although we agree with the result in Record its reliance on a plaintiff's subjective reasons for participating in a sport seems inconsistent with Knight 's test, wh 2008After reviewing a substantial number of cases applying primary assumption of risk to a variety of activities, the court concluded that "[c]ompiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of `sport' if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury." ( Id. at p. 482.) Although we agree with the result in Record its reliance on a plaintiff's subjective reasons for participating in a sport seems inconsistent with Knight 's test, wh | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wadergreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Edwardsred2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 2008(See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1089; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 434 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 , 853 P.2d 992 ] (Sims); People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 ]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557-558 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 24 | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. Jewettgreen2 sentences2008After reviewing a substantial number of cases applying primary assumption of risk to a variety of activities, the court concluded that "[c]ompiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of `sport' if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury." ( Id. at p. 482.) Although we agree with the result in Record its reliance on a plaintiff's subjective reasons for participating in a sport seems inconsistent with Knight 's test, wh 2008(Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 319.) Stimson v. Carlson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1205 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 ] applied primary assumption of risk to sailing where the plaintiff was one of the crew operating the boat; the court noted that sailing involves swinging booms and physical participation of crew. | 1 | 1 |
Bush v. Parents Without Partnersgreen2 sentences1999Consequently, this case involves what the Knight court calls ‘secondary assumption of risk.’ ” (Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 ].) Compiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of “sport” if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury. 1999Consequently, this case involves what the Knight court calls ‘secondary assumption of risk.’ ” (Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 ].) Compiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of “sport” if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Barbikasgreen1 sentence1977The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court distinguishing the standard of care applicable to an executor from the standard applicable to a bank executor. "[T]he standard of care generally applicable to executors is `that degree of prudence and diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected to bestow upon his own affairs of a like nature.' ( Estate of Moore (1892) 96 Cal. 522, 525 [ 31 P. 584 ]; Estate of Barbikas (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 452, 457-458 [ 341 P.2d 32 ].) However, as a bank engaged in the business of acting as a fiduciary for estates and trusts (see Fin. | 1 | 1 |
Gagne v. Bertrangreen2 sentences1977Code, §§ 106-107, 1502), the executor could be held liable for negligence if it failed to exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by such professional fiduciaries. ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 489 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Rest.2d Torts, § 299A.)" ( Estate of Beach, supra, 15 Cal.3d 623, 631 .) The court further concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the bank fulfilled the applicable standard of care. *111 The court further concluded that the bank acting as executor was not held to the same standard as a trustee, despite the fact that it was named trustee under the will 1977Code, §§ 106-107, 1502), the executor could be held liable for negligence if it failed to exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by such professional fiduciaries. ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 489 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Rest.2d Torts, § 299A.)" ( Estate of Beach, supra, 15 Cal.3d 623, 631 .) The court further concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the bank fulfilled the applicable standard of care. *111 The court further concluded that the bank acting as executor was not held to the same standard as a trustee, despite the fact that it was named trustee under the will | 1 | 1 |
In re the estate of Mooregreen2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court distinguishing the standard of care applicable to an executor from the standard applicable to a bank executor. "[T]he standard of care generally applicable to executors is `that degree of prudence and diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected to bestow upon his own affairs of a like nature.' ( Estate of Moore (1892) 96 Cal. 522, 525 [ 31 P. 584 ]; Estate of Barbikas (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 452, 457-458 [ 341 P.2d 32 ].) However, as a bank engaged in the business of acting as a fiduciary for estates and trusts (see Fin. 1977The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court distinguishing the standard of care applicable to an executor from the standard applicable to a bank executor. "[T]he standard of care generally applicable to executors is `that degree of prudence and diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected to bestow upon his own affairs of a like nature.' ( Estate of Moore (1892) 96 Cal. 522, 525 [ 31 P. 584 ]; Estate of Barbikas (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 452, 457-458 [ 341 P.2d 32 ].) However, as a bank engaged in the business of acting as a fiduciary for estates and trusts (see Fin. | 1 | 1 |
Larkin v. Paughgreen2 sentences1958It is argued that these are the distinguishing factors; that to obtain such consent the Indian must petition the Secretary of the Interior in writing and that it is necessary as a condition precedent to so doing that he have an identified purchaser, identified property which is to be sold, a fixed price, and the terms and conditions of the sale, because it is his duty to exercise discretion as to whether the sale shall be permitted, citing 27 Opinions United States Attorney General, 530 and 541; that there is an alternate method of obtaining the right to sell, to wit: By convincing the Secreta 1958It is argued that these are the distinguishing factors; that to obtain such consent the Indian must petition the Secretary of the Interior in writing and that it is necessary as a condition precedent to so doing that he have an identified purchaser, identified property which is to be sold, a fixed price, and the terms and conditions of the sale, because it is his duty to exercise discretion as to whether the sale shall be permitted, citing 27 Opinions United States Attorney General, 530 and 541; that there is an alternate method of obtaining the right to sell, to wit: By convincing the Secreta | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roe v. State of California
green
1 sentence2023If based on breach of promise it is contractual; if based on breach of a noncontractual duty it is tortious.’ ” ’ ” (Santa Clara, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033, quoting Roe v. State of California (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 .) Although this distinguishing principle may be useful in other contexts, we regard it as unhelpful in ascertaining the nature of the Hospitals’ quantum meruit claim, which is premised on a theory of a promise implied in law (see Huskinson & Brown, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458 ), and, more specifically, on a reimbursement duty imposed by statute. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Huskinson & Brown, Limited Liability Partnership v. Wolf
green
1 sentence2023If based on breach of promise it is contractual; if based on breach of a noncontractual duty it is tortious.’ ” ’ ” (Santa Clara, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033, quoting Roe v. State of California (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 .) Although this distinguishing principle may be useful in other contexts, we regard it as unhelpful in ascertaining the nature of the Hospitals’ quantum meruit claim, which is premised on a theory of a promise implied in law (see Huskinson & Brown, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458 ), and, more specifically, on a reimbursement duty imposed by statute. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Shannon v. Rhodes
green
2 sentences2007After examining the case law applying primary assumption of risk to a variety of activities, the court stated that "[compiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of `sport' if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury." (Id. at p. 482, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 .) The court observed that holding on to a tube while being pulled behind a boat involved "[c]ombating centrifugal force with a white-knuckled grip" and therefore fell 2007After examining the case law applying primary assumption of risk to a variety of activities, the court stated that “[cjompiling all of the distinguishing factors, it appears that an activity falls within the meaning of ‘sport’ if the activity is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury.” (Id. at p. 482.) The court observed that holding on to a tube while being pulled behind a boat involved “[cjombating centrifugal force with a white-knuckled grip” and therefore fell within the meaning o | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Vytina Society v. Phillips
green
1 sentence1977The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court distinguishing the standard of care applicable to an executor from the standard applicable to a bank executor. "[T]he standard of care generally applicable to executors is `that degree of prudence and diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected to bestow upon his own affairs of a like nature.' ( Estate of Moore (1892) 96 Cal. 522, 525 [ 31 P. 584 ]; Estate of Barbikas (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 452, 457-458 [ 341 P.2d 32 ].) However, as a bank engaged in the business of acting as a fiduciary for estates and trusts (see Fin. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Estate of Beach
green
1 sentence1977Code, §§ 106-107, 1502), the executor could be held liable for negligence if it failed to exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by such professional fiduciaries. ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 489 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Rest.2d Torts, § 299A.)" ( Estate of Beach, supra, 15 Cal.3d 623, 631 .) The court further concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the bank fulfilled the applicable standard of care. *111 The court further concluded that the bank acting as executor was not held to the same standard as a trustee, despite the fact that it was named trustee under the will | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Oates v. Freeman
green
2 sentences1958It is argued that these are the distinguishing factors; that to obtain such consent the Indian must petition the Secretary of the Interior in writing and that it is necessary as a condition precedent to so doing that he have an identified purchaser, identified property which is to be sold, a fixed price, and the terms and conditions of the sale, because it is his duty to exercise discretion as to whether the sale shall be permitted, citing 27 Opinions United States Attorney General, 530 and 541; that there is an alternate method of obtaining the right to sell, to wit: By convincing the Secreta 1958It is argued that these are the distinguishing factors; that to obtain such consent the Indian must petition the Secretary of the Interior in writing and that it is necessary as a condition precedent to so doing that he have an identified purchaser, identified property which is to be sold, a fixed price, and the terms and conditions of the sale, because it is his duty to exercise discretion as to whether the sale shall be permitted, citing 27 Opinions United States Attorney General, 530 and 541; that there is an alternate method of obtaining the right to sell, to wit: By convincing the Secreta | 1 | 1958–1958 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1931As is said in People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289, 293 , and repeated in People v. Shea, 125 Cal. 151 , 152 : ‘This class of evidence is admissible for the purpose of tending to show the nonprobability of resistance upon the part of the prosecutrix. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
People v. Shea
green
1 sentence1931As is said in People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289, 293 , and repeated in People v. Shea, 125 Cal. 151 , 152 : ‘This class of evidence is admissible for the purpose of tending to show the nonprobability of resistance upon the part of the prosecutrix. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.