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5 Delaware opinions name it 4 courts 1942–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Robertsongreen1 sentence2026Laws ch. 30, § 3). 347 See supra Section IV.A.5.a. 348 Williams, 496 P.3d at 299-300. 349 See Robertson, 54 A.2d at 850 (holding that transferring a prisoner from one facility to another would not violate the Cruel Punishment Clause, but that the prisoner could challenge the new conditions of confinement); see also Cannon II, 196 A.2d at 400-01 (holding that where pre-sentence report indicated that the prisoner was possibly mentally unstable and whipping might have a far-reaching and unwarranted adverse effect on him, a sentence involving whipping could be constitutionally excessive and remand | 1 | 1 |
Saunders v. Lightwave Logic, Inc.green1 sentence2026See Cannon II, 196 A.2d at 400 (agreeing that a sentence could be excessive in a specific case and remanding so that the parties could create a factual record on that issue); accord Gingerich v. State, 342 A.3d 401 (Del. 2025) (“When the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, we will not 85 Most significantly, when asked in Sanders to hold that the Cruel Punishment Clause had the same meaning as the Eighth Amendment for purposes of reviewing the proportionality of a capital sentence, the Delaware Supreme Court described as “untenable” the argument “that our Constitution must mean exa | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Laws ch. 30, § 3). 347 See supra Section IV.A.5.a. 348 Williams, 496 P.3d at 299-300. 349 See Robertson, 54 A.2d at 850 (holding that transferring a prisoner from one facility to another would not violate the Cruel Punishment Clause, but that the prisoner could challenge the new conditions of confinement); see also Cannon II, 196 A.2d at 400-01 (holding that where pre-sentence report indicated that the prisoner was possibly mentally unstable and whipping might have a far-reaching and unwarranted adverse effect on him, a sentence involving whipping could be constitutionally excessive and remand 2026See Cannon II, 196 A.2d at 400 (agreeing that a sentence could be excessive in a specific case and remanding so that the parties could create a factual record on that issue); accord Gingerich v. State, 342 A.3d 401 (Del. 2025) (“When the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, we will not 85 Most significantly, when asked in Sanders to hold that the Cruel Punishment Clause had the same meaning as the Eighth Amendment for purposes of reviewing the proportionality of a capital sentence, the Delaware Supreme Court described as “untenable” the argument “that our Constitution must mean exa | 1 | 1 |
Curran v. Woolleygreen2 sentences1957See Curran v. Woolley, 9 Terry 382, 104 A. 2d 771 . 1957See Curran v. Woolley, 9 Terry 382, 104 A. 2d 771 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Steigler v. Delaware
neutral
2 sentences1990Steigler v. State, Del.Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (1972), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 939 , 92 S.Ct. 2872 , 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972). 12 The applicable Delaware statute provides: When a juror is called in a capital case, he shall be first sworn or affirmed upon the voir dire and then asked, under the direction of the court, if he has formed or expressed any opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar ... 1990Steigler v. State, Del.Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (1972), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 939 , 92 S.Ct. 2872 , 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972). 12 The applicable Delaware statute provides: When a juror is called in a capital case, he shall be first sworn or affirmed upon the voir dire and then asked, under the direction of the court, if he has formed or expressed any opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar ... | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Steigler v. State
green
1 sentence1990Steigler v. State, Del.Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (1972), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 939 , 92 S.Ct. 2872 , 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972). 12 The applicable Delaware statute provides: When a juror is called in a capital case, he shall be first sworn or affirmed upon the voir dire and then asked, under the direction of the court, if he has formed or expressed any opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar ... | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Leland v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1976But ‘[i]ts procedure does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.’” 343 U.S. at 798-99 , 72 S.Ct. at 1007 , 96 L.Ed. at 1309. 1976But ‘[i]ts procedure does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.’” 343 U.S. at 798-99 , 72 S.Ct. at 1007 , 96 L.Ed. at 1309. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Roberts
green
2 sentences1942In one case (State v. Roberts, 2 Boyce 140, 78 A. 305, 309 ), the Attorney-General sought to change the form of the statutory question, asked of jurors by the prosecution, “Have you any objection to returning a verdict of guilty in a case where the punishment is death, if the evidence should so warrant,” by adding the words, “the evidence being circumstantial.” On objection the question was not allowed, the Court saying that it should adhere to the long prevailing practice and procedure and permit only such questions as the statute authorizes, “and in the language of the statute.” I, myself, h 1942In one case (State v. Roberts, 2 Boyce 140, 78 A. 305, 309 ), the Attorney-General sought to change the form of the statutory question, asked of jurors by the prosecution, “Have you any objection to returning a verdict of guilty in a case where the punishment is death, if the evidence should so warrant,” by adding the words, “the evidence being circumstantial.” On objection the question was not allowed, the Court saying that it should adhere to the long prevailing practice and procedure and permit only such questions as the statute authorizes, “and in the language of the statute.” I, myself, h | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.