covenant rule in Massachusetts

2013Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v. Barrington, 353 Mass. 585, 587-88 (1968). 4 The evidence that Muller has violated—or that she necessarily will violate—the covenants in her agreement with KNF&T, however, is somewhere between veiy weak and nonexistent.

2002To the same effect are Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 303, 306-10 (1982); Siles v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 13 Mass.App.Ct. 354, 358 (1982); and Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 F.2d 746, 747 (1987) (dictum) (applying Massachusetts law to a covenant claim of a terminated employee and observing, “Massachusetts does recognize a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when a claimant shows that an employer’s reason for discharge was contrary to public policy”).

2002To the same effect are Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 303, 306-10 (1982); Siles v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 13 Mass.App.Ct. 354, 358 (1982); and Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 F.2d 746, 747 (1987) (dictum) (applying Massachusetts law to a covenant claim of a terminated employee and observing, “Massachusetts does recognize a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when a claimant shows that an employer’s reason for discharge was contrary to public policy”).

2002To the same effect are Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 303, 306-10 (1982); Siles v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 13 Mass.App.Ct. 354, 358 (1982); and Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 F.2d 746, 747 (1987) (dictum) (applying Massachusetts law to a covenant claim of a terminated employee and observing, “Massachusetts does recognize a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when a claimant shows that an employer’s reason for discharge was contrary to public policy”).

1995See Holmes Realty Trust v. Granite City Storage Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 272 , 277 and n.2 (1988); Reed v. United States Postal Service, 660 F.Supp. 178 (D.

1995Subsequently, in Holmes Realty Trust v. Granite City Storage Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 272 (1988), the Massachusetts Appeals Court recognized that “there is great doubt whether the [independent covenants] formulation remains a correct statement of Massachusetts law,” and suggested that Massachusetts courts may ultimately follow the modem trend of viewing covenants in commercial leases as mutually dependent.

1995Mass. 1987), the court, applying Massachusetts law, disapproved of the use of the independent covenant rule in the In re J.A.G., Inc. decision (cited above) and held that “the rationale behind the decision in Hemingway applies with equal force to commercial leases.” Id. at 182.

1995See Holmes Realty Trust v. Granite City Storage Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 272 , 277 and n.2 (1988); Reed v. United States Postal Service, 660 F.Supp. 178 (D.

1988The Massachusetts cases say no more than that covenants in leases are independent “in the absence of clear indications to the contrary.” See, e.g., Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 201 (1934); Sniger v. Fentin, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217 (1976).

1988The Massachusetts cases say no more than that covenants in leases are independent “in the absence of clear indications to the contrary.” See, e.g., Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 201 (1934); Sniger v. Fentin, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217 (1976).