natural presumption in Pennsylvania

2019See Jensen v. McCorkell , 154 Pa. 323 , 26 A. 366 , 367 (1893) ("[I]t is well settled that the fact of depositing in the post office a properly addressed, prepaid letter raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reached its destination by due course of mail; in other words, it is prima facie evidence that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed; but that prima facie proof may be rebutted by evidence showing it was not received." (emphasis added)); Whitmore v. Dwelling House Insurance , 148 Pa. 405 , 23 A. 1131 , 1131 (1892) (Detailed testimony from plai

2019See Jensen v. McCorkell , 154 Pa. 323 , 26 A. 366 , 367 (1893) ("[I]t is well settled that the fact of depositing in the post office a properly addressed, prepaid letter raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reached its destination by due course of mail; in other words, it is prima facie evidence that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed; but that prima facie proof may be rebutted by evidence showing it was not received." (emphasis added)); Whitmore v. Dwelling House Insurance , 148 Pa. 405 , 23 A. 1131 , 1131 (1892) (Detailed testimony from plai

1961In McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Company, 364 Pa. 504 , the court said: “It is elementary that ‘An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the [alleged] meaning of the defamatory statement, or operate as an averment, imparting into the statement anything which is not a usual and natural presumption from the precedent words’ ”: page 511.

1958The late Chief Justice Maxey who wrote the majority opinion in McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Company, 364 Pa. 504 , 72 A. 2d 780 (1950), at page 511 said: "It is elementary that `"An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the [alleged] meaning of the defamatory statement, or operate as an averment, imparting into the statement anything which *648 is not a usual and natural presumption from the precedent words.” ’. . .

1950Plaintiff in his statement of claim avers that the statement that Donlan “was trying to get sympathy votes with his uniform and carrying the flag” was equivalent to saying that he was charging Donlan with “trying to capitalize upon and get political support by the improper use of his service uniform, and by appealing to the sympathy of persons by an improper use of the United States flag, rather than by reason of his competency for the office to which he as candidate was aspiring, . . .” It is elementary that “ ‘An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the [alleged] meaning of the def

1929“An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the meaning of the defamatory statement, or operate as an averment, imparting into the statement anything which is not a usual and natural presumption from the precedent words......It is a question of fact for the jury as to whether the defamatory statement was used and understood in the sense charged”: Cunningham v. Underwood, 53 C.

1921While, with respect to commercial paper, “it is well settled that the fact of depositing in the post-office a properly addressed prepaid letter raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reaches its destination by due course of mail” and “is prima facie evidence that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed,” it “may be rebutted by evidence showing' that it was not received,” Phoenix Brewing Co. v. Weiss, 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 519 , that rule “establishes no such legal conclusion in other business relations,” Kenney v. Altvater, 77 Pa. 34 .

1909It is true, as stated in Phœnix Brewing Co. v. Weiss, 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 519 , that, “It is well settled that the fact of depositing in the post office a properly addressed prepaid letter raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reached its destination by due course of mail,” but it is clearly shown by the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant that the bills referred to were not properly addressed to the defendant’s post office.

2016As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: "The overwhelming weight of statistics clearly indicates that letters properly mailed and deposited in the post office are received by the addressees."8 Evidence that a letter has been mailed is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the letter was in fact received by the party to whom it was 4 See Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 423 Pa.Super. 251 , 620 A.2d 1206 (1993) (one day is timely); Alba v. Urology Associates of Kingston, 409 Pa.Super. 406 , 598 A.2d 57 (1991) (fourteen days is timely); Fink v. General Accident Ins.

2016As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: "The overwhelming weight of statistics clearly indicates that letters properly mailed and deposited in the post office are received by the addressees."8 Evidence that a letter has been mailed is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the letter was in fact received by the party to whom it was 4 See Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 423 Pa.Super. 251 , 620 A.2d 1206 (1993) (one day is timely); Alba v. Urology Associates of Kingston, 409 Pa.Super. 406 , 598 A.2d 57 (1991) (fourteen days is timely); Fink v. General Accident Ins.

2016As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: "The overwhelming weight of statistics clearly indicates that letters properly mailed and deposited in the post office are received by the addressees."8 Evidence that a letter has been mailed is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the letter was in fact received by the party to whom it was 4 See Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 423 Pa.Super. 251 , 620 A.2d 1206 (1993) (one day is timely); Alba v. Urology Associates of Kingston, 409 Pa.Super. 406 , 598 A.2d 57 (1991) (fourteen days is timely); Fink v. General Accident Ins.

2016As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: "The overwhelming weight of statistics clearly indicates that letters properly mailed and deposited in the post office are received by the addressees."8 Evidence that a letter has been mailed is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the letter was in fact received by the party to whom it was 4 See Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 423 Pa.Super. 251 , 620 A.2d 1206 (1993) (one day is timely); Alba v. Urology Associates of Kingston, 409 Pa.Super. 406 , 598 A.2d 57 (1991) (fourteen days is timely); Fink v. General Accident Ins.

2010In re Rural Route Neighbors, 960 A.2d 856 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), appeal denied, - Pa. -, 989 A.2d 10 (2010).

2002This evidentiary rale, succinctly stated, provides that “the depositing in the post office of a properly addressed letter with prepaid postage raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reached its destination by due course of mail.” In re Cameron’s Estate, 388 Pa. 25 , 130 A.2d 173, 177 (1957); Beeman v. Supreme Lodge, 215 Pa. 627 , 64 A. 792 (1906).

2002This evidentiary rale, succinctly stated, provides that “the depositing in the post office of a properly addressed letter with prepaid postage raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reached its destination by due course of mail.” In re Cameron’s Estate, 388 Pa. 25 , 130 A.2d 173, 177 (1957); Beeman v. Supreme Lodge, 215 Pa. 627 , 64 A. 792 (1906).

1965We further note that Baker’s counsel does not contest the validity of the ruling of the court below that the amendment seeking to introduce a new cause of action should not be permitted. 8 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller, 399 Pa. 607 , 161 A. 2d 6 , relied on by Baker, is presently inapposite.

1965We further note that Baker’s counsel does not contest the validity of the ruling of the court below that the amendment seeking to introduce a new cause of action should not be permitted. 8 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller, 399 Pa. 607 , 161 A. 2d 6 , relied on by Baker, is presently inapposite.

1961In Sarkees v. Warner-West Corporation, 349 Pa. 365 , the court said, at page 367: “The innuendo must be warranted, justified and supported by the publication.

1950Plaintiff in his statement of claim avers that the statement that Donlan “was trying to get sympathy votes with his uniform and carrying the flag” was equivalent to saying that he was charging Donlan with “trying to capitalize upon and get political support by the improper use of his service uniform, and by appealing to the sympathy of persons by an improper use of the United States flag, rather than by reason of his competency for the office to which he as candidate was aspiring, . . .” It is elementary that “ ‘An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the [alleged] meaning of the def

1950Plaintiff in his statement of claim avers that the statement that Donlan “was trying to get sympathy votes with his uniform and carrying the flag” was equivalent to saying that he was charging Donlan with “trying to capitalize upon and get political support by the improper use of his service uniform, and by appealing to the sympathy of persons by an improper use of the United States flag, rather than by reason of his competency for the office to which he as candidate was aspiring, . . .” It is elementary that “ ‘An innuendo, however, can never add to nor change the [alleged] meaning of the def

1936Stearne, J., — It has long been a rule that the precise literal signification of the words of a will will not be adhered to if it will lead to an intestacy or to the exclusion from the distribution of per sons having a natural claim to participate: see adjudication of Judge Penrose in Fox’s Estate, 222 Pa. 108 ; also Bacon’s Estate, 202 Pa. 535 , Vance’s Estate, 209 Pa. 561 , Judge Lamorelle in Gilmer’s Estate, 17 Dist.

1936Stearne, J., — It has long been a rule that the precise literal signification of the words of a will will not be adhered to if it will lead to an intestacy or to the exclusion from the distribution of per sons having a natural claim to participate: see adjudication of Judge Penrose in Fox’s Estate, 222 Pa. 108 ; also Bacon’s Estate, 202 Pa. 535 , Vance’s Estate, 209 Pa. 561 , Judge Lamorelle in Gilmer’s Estate, 17 Dist.

1934It is not “so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Brown v. Shock, 77 Pa. 471 , Commonwealth v. DuBoise, 269 Pa. 174 , (169), 112 A. 461 and Commonwealth v. Dudick, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 25 .

1934It is not “so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Brown v. Shock, 77 Pa. 471 , Commonwealth v. DuBoise, 269 Pa. 174 , (169), 112 A. 461 and Commonwealth v. Dudick, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 25 .

1934It is not “so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Brown v. Shock, 77 Pa. 471 , Commonwealth v. DuBoise, 269 Pa. 174 , (169), 112 A. 461 and Commonwealth v. Dudick, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 25 .

1921While, with respect to commercial paper, “it is well settled that the fact of depositing in the post-office a properly addressed prepaid letter raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that it reaches its destination by due course of mail” and “is prima facie evidence that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed,” it “may be rebutted by evidence showing' that it was not received,” Phoenix Brewing Co. v. Weiss, 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 519 , that rule “establishes no such legal conclusion in other business relations,” Kenney v. Altvater, 77 Pa. 34 .

1920Upon decedent’s investing the fund in the property first purchased and title taken in her name, a trust resulted for the benefit of herself and children in the same proportions as their ownership in the fund itself; upon the sale of that property, and the reinvesting of the proceeds, with the remainder of the original fund still on deposit, in another property and the title taken and held in the same manner, such change in the form of the investment did not affect the trust under the rule that equity will follow such, funds in every form for the benefit of those entitled: McLaughlin v. Fulton,

1920Upon decedent’s investing the fund in the property first purchased and title taken in her name, a trust resulted for the benefit of herself and children in the same proportions as their ownership in the fund itself; upon the sale of that property, and the reinvesting of the proceeds, with the remainder of the original fund still on deposit, in another property and the title taken and held in the same manner, such change in the form of the investment did not affect the trust under the rule that equity will follow such, funds in every form for the benefit of those entitled: McLaughlin v. Fulton,