natural presumption in Texas

2022Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))). 11 doing, it relied on dictionary definitions of “operates”—“to cause to function usu[ally] by direct personal effort”—and “operation”—“doing or performing especially of action.” 393 S.W.3d at 428–30 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)).

2019Code § 305.2 (24) (defining “operator” for chapter 305). 14 2015) (“Generally, the law recognizes ‘a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))); Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, 172 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (noting that courts presume that same terms used in same connection in different statutes have same meaning); see also Rodriguez, 997 S.W.2d at 254 (“We construe administrative rules, which have the same force as

2022Co. v. The Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 126 (Tex. 2015) (“Generally, the law recognizes ‘a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Atl.

2021Co. v. Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 126 (Tex. 2015) (“Generally, the law recognizes ‘a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’”) (quoting Atl.

2021Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984); Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Morrison v. Farmer, 213 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1948); Tarpley v. Poage’s Adm’r, 2 Tex. 139, 150 (Tex. 1847) (“This [purchase money resulting trust] doctrine, according to Mr. Justice Story, has its ‘origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the money means the purchase to be for his own benefit, rather than that of another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of arrangement and convenience between the parties for co

2000This doctrine, according to Mr. Justice Story, has its 'origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the money, means the purchase to be for his own benefit, rather than that of another — and that the conveyance in the name of another, is a matter of arrangement and convenience between the parties for collateral purposes.’ ” Id. at 150 (citations omitted). 2 .

2016See First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ. ref’d) (“Likewise, if a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third party, the conduct becomes a negligent communication, which amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.”); see also Rincones v. WHM Custom Servs., Inc., 457 S.W.3d 221, 246 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2015, pet. granted) (“This Court, when faced with the question in Ake, determined that the rule announc

2015This Court, when faced with the question in Ake , determined that the rule announced in Lyle is' inapplicable in certain circumstances in which the defamatory communication was “surely to be brought out” and “would have been a natural inquiry” in an “employment interview or in an application for employment.” Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 702 .

2021Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984); Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Morrison v. Farmer, 213 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1948); Tarpley v. Poage’s Adm’r, 2 Tex. 139, 150 (Tex. 1847) (“This [purchase money resulting trust] doctrine, according to Mr. Justice Story, has its ‘origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the money means the purchase to be for his own benefit, rather than that of another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of arrangement and convenience between the parties for co

2021Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984); Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Morrison v. Farmer, 213 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1948); Tarpley v. Poage’s Adm’r, 2 Tex. 139, 150 (Tex. 1847) (“This [purchase money resulting trust] doctrine, according to Mr. Justice Story, has its ‘origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the money means the purchase to be for his own benefit, rather than that of another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of arrangement and convenience between the parties for co

2021Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984); Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Morrison v. Farmer, 213 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1948); Tarpley v. Poage’s Adm’r, 2 Tex. 139, 150 (Tex. 1847) (“This [purchase money resulting trust] doctrine, according to Mr. Justice Story, has its ‘origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the money means the purchase to be for his own benefit, rather than that of another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of arrangement and convenience between the parties for co

2019Code § 305.2 (24) (defining “operator” for chapter 305). 14 2015) (“Generally, the law recognizes ‘a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))); Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, 172 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (noting that courts presume that same terms used in same connection in different statutes have same meaning); see also Rodriguez, 997 S.W.2d at 254 (“We construe administrative rules, which have the same force as

2019Code § 305.2 (24) (defining “operator” for chapter 305). 14 2015) (“Generally, the law recognizes ‘a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))); Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, 172 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (noting that courts presume that same terms used in same connection in different statutes have same meaning); see also Rodriguez, 997 S.W.2d at 254 (“We construe administrative rules, which have the same force as

2016See First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ. ref’d) (“Likewise, if a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third party, the conduct becomes a negligent communication, which amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.”); see also Rincones v. WHM Custom Servs., Inc., 457 S.W.3d 221, 246 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2015, pet. granted) (“This Court, when faced with the question in Ake, determined that the rule announc

1878See, also, Dailey v. Starr, 26 Tex., 562 ; Johnson v. Shaw, 41 Tex., 428 .) If the heirs of Mrs. Bowie knew that the land was held and claimed under this bond of Colonel Bowie’s, their failure to assert their rights for so long a period, during which it seems the land has been improved so largely, tends to raise a natural presumption that they knew “that no wrong had been committed.” (Meaner v. Hamilton, 1 Casey, 143; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts, 216 .) After the lapse of near forty years, it is not to be expected that direct evidence could be produced of the existence of community debts.