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7 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1930–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Saunders v. New England Collapsible Tube Co.green2 sentences2021Id., 43 ; see id. (‘‘[t]here is a natural presumption that one charged with the performance of a duty, and found injured at the place where duty may have required him to be, is injured in the course of and as a consequence of the employment’’); see also Keeler v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 121 Conn. 56, 59 , 183 A. 20 (1936) (same); Judd v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 2021Id., 43 ; see id. (‘‘[t]here is a natural presumption that one charged with the performance of a duty, and found injured at the place where duty may have required him to be, is injured in the course of and as a consequence of the employment’’); see also Keeler v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 121 Conn. 56, 59 , 183 A. 20 (1936) (same); Judd v. Metropolitan Life Ins. | 1 | 5 |
Keeler v. Sears, Roebuck Co.green2 sentences2021Id., 43 ; see id. (‘‘[t]here is a natural presumption that one charged with the performance of a duty, and found injured at the place where duty may have required him to be, is injured in the course of and as a consequence of the employment’’); see also Keeler v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 121 Conn. 56, 59 , 183 A. 20 (1936) (same); Judd v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 2021Id., 43 ; see id. (‘‘[t]here is a natural presumption that one charged with the performance of a duty, and found injured at the place where duty may have required him to be, is injured in the course of and as a consequence of the employment’’); see also Keeler v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 121 Conn. 56, 59 , 183 A. 20 (1936) (same); Judd v. Metropolitan Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Connelly v. Masonic Mutual Benefit Ass'ngreen2 sentences1999The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty.” Id., p. 248. 7 Older cases, such as Connelly v. Masonic Mutual Benefit Assn., 58 Conn. 552, 557, 20 A. 671 (1890), stress the long-standing reticence of courts to interfere in the internal affairs of voluntary societies or associations relating to admission, disciplining and expulsion of members. 1999The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty.” Id., p. 248. 7 Older cases, such as Connelly v. Masonic Mutual Benefit Assn., 58 Conn. 552, 557, 20 A. 671 (1890), stress the long-standing reticence of courts to interfere in the internal affairs of voluntary societies or associations relating to admission, disciplining and expulsion of members. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Judd v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
neutral
2 sentences2021Co., 111 Conn. 532, 536 , 150 A. 514 (1930) (same). ‘‘[T]he presumption is one resting on common experience and inherent probability [that] as such ceases to have force when countervailing evi- dence is produced, although the facts [that] gave rise to it remain in the case.’’ Labbe v. American Brass Co., 132 Conn. 606 , 611–12, 46 A.2d 339 (1946); see id., 608, 612 (when employee was found dead inside of grease tank, employer rebutted presumption that employee’s death arose out of employment with evidence that employee’s duties did not require him to be anywhere near tank, and he was not other 2021Co., 111 Conn. 532, 536 , 150 A. 514 (1930) (same). ‘‘[T]he presumption is one resting on common experience and inherent probability [that] as such ceases to have force when countervailing evi- dence is produced, although the facts [that] gave rise to it remain in the case.’’ Labbe v. American Brass Co., 132 Conn. 606 , 611–12, 46 A.2d 339 (1946); see id., 608, 612 (when employee was found dead inside of grease tank, employer rebutted presumption that employee’s death arose out of employment with evidence that employee’s duties did not require him to be anywhere near tank, and he was not other | 2 | 1936–2021 |
Labbe v. American Brass Co.
neutral
2 sentences2021Co., 111 Conn. 532, 536 , 150 A. 514 (1930) (same). ‘‘[T]he presumption is one resting on common experience and inherent probability [that] as such ceases to have force when countervailing evi- dence is produced, although the facts [that] gave rise to it remain in the case.’’ Labbe v. American Brass Co., 132 Conn. 606 , 611–12, 46 A.2d 339 (1946); see id., 608, 612 (when employee was found dead inside of grease tank, employer rebutted presumption that employee’s death arose out of employment with evidence that employee’s duties did not require him to be anywhere near tank, and he was not other 2021Co., 111 Conn. 532, 536 , 150 A. 514 (1930) (same). ‘‘[T]he presumption is one resting on common experience and inherent probability [that] as such ceases to have force when countervailing evi- dence is produced, although the facts [that] gave rise to it remain in the case.’’ Labbe v. American Brass Co., 132 Conn. 606 , 611–12, 46 A.2d 339 (1946); see id., 608, 612 (when employee was found dead inside of grease tank, employer rebutted presumption that employee’s death arose out of employment with evidence that employee’s duties did not require him to be anywhere near tank, and he was not other | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Reeves v. John A. Dady Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1946In Reeves v. Dady Corporation, 95 Conn. 627, 629 , 113 Atl. 162 , the employee was killed from a fall through an open door of the second story of a factory where he was working; we pointed out that, while his employment did not require, it permitted him to go to the open door, and we said (p. 629), citing the Saunders case, that if there had been no direct evidence of the cause of the injury it might have been inferred that he went there for some purpose connected with his employment; but, as it was found that he fell because of an attack of faintness due to the recital by a fellow employee of 1946In Reeves v. Dady Corporation, 95 Conn. 627, 629 , 113 Atl. 162 , the employee was killed from a fall through an open door of the second story of a factory where he was working; we pointed out that, while his employment did not require, it permitted him to go to the open door, and we said (p. 629), citing the Saunders case, that if there had been no direct evidence of the cause of the injury it might have been inferred that he went there for some purpose connected with his employment; but, as it was found that he fell because of an attack of faintness due to the recital by a fellow employee of | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Ward v. Ward
green
2 sentences1944A resulting trust, to prove which the evidence was offered, arising out of the payment of consideration for a purchase of land where title is taken in the name of another has its basis in “the natural presumption that a purchase will inure to him who furnishes the purchase price.” Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 195 , 22 Atl. 149 . 1944A resulting trust, to prove which the evidence was offered, arising out of the payment of consideration for a purchase of land where title is taken in the name of another has its basis in “the natural presumption that a purchase will inure to him who furnishes the purchase price.” Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 195 , 22 Atl. 149 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.