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22 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zaldivar v. Prickettgreen2 sentences2024However, the phrase “substantial evidence” is defined in another provision of the act governing the certificate of need program, OCGA § 31-6-44.1 (a) (5), Northside contends that that definition is controlling, and “there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 592 (cleaned up). 2024However, the phrase “substantial evidence” is defined in another provision of the act governing the certificate of need program, OCGA § 31-6-44.1 (a) (5), Northside contends that that definition is controlling, and “there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 592 (cleaned up). | 3 | 4 |
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016After all, ‘there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’ Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 ( 52 S. Ct. 607 , 76 LEd 1204 ) (1932) (citation omitted). 9 Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 592 (1). 2016After all, ‘there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’ Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 ( 52 S. Ct. 607 , 76 LEd 1204 ) (1932) (citation omitted). 9 Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 592 (1). | 3 | 3 |
West v. City of Albanygreen2 sentences2022Thus, applying these statutory tools, “the case under this Code section” for which a UM claimant may be entitled to attorney fees could refer to either the underlying tort action outlined in subsection (d), or the separate bad faith action outlined in the next sentence of subsection (j). 8 See West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743, 745 (797 SE2d 809) (2017) (“courts should construe a statute to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of its provisions and should refrain, whenever possible, from construing the statute in a way that renders any part of it meaningless”) (citation and punctuatio 2022Thus, applying these statutory tools, “the case under this Code section” for which a UM claimant may be entitled to attorney fees could refer to either the underlying tort action outlined in subsection (d), or the separate bad faith action outlined in the next sentence of subsection (j). 8 See West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743, 745 (797 SE2d 809) (2017) (“courts should construe a statute to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of its provisions and should refrain, whenever possible, from construing the statute in a way that renders any part of it meaningless”) (citation and punctuatio | 1 | 1 |
Clarke v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2022See Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 164-165 (33 SE2d 425) (1945) (noting that the natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of a written law have the same meaning is rebutted when “it clearly appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning should be applied” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 22 defense applies. 2022See Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 164-165 (33 SE2d 425) (1945) (noting that the natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of a written law have the same meaning is rebutted when “it clearly appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning should be applied” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 22 defense applies. | 1 | 1 |
Chan v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2017See Chan v. Ellis , 296 Ga. 838 , 839 (1), 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015) ("[a] statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text"). 2017See Chan v. Ellis , 296 Ga. 838 , 839 (1), 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015) ("[a] statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text"). | 1 | 1 |
Mathis v. Cannongreen2 sentences2016See also Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 27 (4) ( 573 S.E.2d 376 ) (2002) (criticizing this Court for giving a single word different meanings within the same code section). 2016See also Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 27 (4) ( 573 S.E.2d 376 ) (2002) (criticizing this Court for giving a single word different meanings within the same code section). | 1 | 1 |
Southwire Co. v. Catogreen1 sentence1995See Southwire Co., supra at 896-897, 302 S.E.2d 91 ; LaVista Equip., supra at 587, 367 S.E.2d 811 ; Odom v. Transamerica Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Zippy Mart, Inc. v. Fendergreen2 sentences1995See Zippy Mart v. Fender, 170 Ga.App. 617 , 317 S.E.2d 575 (1984). [3] This "natural inference" rule is not the same as the natural presumption applicable in unexplained death cases. 1995See Zippy Mart v. Fender, 170 Ga.App. 617 , 317 S.E.2d 575 (1984). [3] This "natural inference" rule is not the same as the natural presumption applicable in unexplained death cases. | 1 | 1 |
Brown Transport Corp. v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences1988We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the Board of Workers' Compensation, and the superior court by affirmance, erred in application in an alleged heart attack case of the "natural presumption," by holding that "`where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, a natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.' Brown Transport Corp. v. Jenkins, 129 Ga. App. 457, 460 [ 199 SE2d 910 ]. 1988We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the Board of Workers' Compensation, and the superior court by affirmance, erred in application in an alleged heart attack case of the "natural presumption," by holding that "`where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, a natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.' Brown Transport Corp. v. Jenkins, 129 Ga. App. 457, 460 [ 199 SE2d 910 ]. | 1 | 1 |
New York Life Insurance v. Ittnergreen2 sentences1950Co. v. Ittner, 59 Ga. App. 89, 98 ( 200 S. E. 522 ), and New York Life Ins. 1950Co. v. Ittner, 59 Ga. App. 89, 98 ( 200 S. E. 522 ), and New York Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Standard Accident Insurance v. Kiker
green
2 sentences1959Co. v. Kiker, 45 Ga. App. 706 ( 165 S. E. 850 ), it was ruled that where an employee was found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the natural presumption arises that the death of such employee arose out of and in the course of his employment. 1959Co. v. Kiker, 45 Ga. App. 706 ( 165 S. E. 850 ), it was ruled that where an employee was found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the natural presumption arises that the death of such employee arose out of and in the course of his employment. | 4 | 1950–1983 |
Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conner
green
2 sentences1983Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 (1) ( 160 SE2d 436 ) (1968): “Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” 2 A prerequisite to application of this presumption is that the employee be found at a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties. 1983Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 (1) ( 160 SE2d 436 ) (1968): “Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” 2 A prerequisite to application of this presumption is that the employee be found at a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties. | 3 | 1973–1983 |
General Accident Fire & Life Insurance v. Sturgis
green
2 sentences1977Co. v. Sturgis, 136 Ga. App. 260 ( 221 SE2d 51 ), which held that when a person is found in a dead or dying condition at a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, a natural presumption arises that death arose out of and in the course of employment. 1977Co. v. Sturgis, 136 Ga. App. 260 ( 221 SE2d 51 ), which held that when a person is found in a dead or dying condition at a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, a natural presumption arises that death arose out of and in the course of employment. | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Scott v. Taylor
neutral
2 sentences1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co 1932This court said, in the case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506 , 508: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated eases, that when the purchase-money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundation in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that lie who supplies the purchase-money intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another and that the. conveyan | 2 | 1932–1957 |
LAVISTA EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, INC. v. Elliott
green
1 sentence1995See Southwire Co., supra at 896-897, 302 S.E.2d 91 ; LaVista Equip., supra at 587, 367 S.E.2d 811 ; Odom v. Transamerica Ins. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cox
green
2 sentences1974Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789 ( 115 SE2d 452 ). 1974Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789 ( 115 SE2d 452 ). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Ladson Motor Company v. Croft
green
2 sentences1973Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 ( 160 SE2d 436 ) and Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275 ( 92 SE2d 103 ) to take this case out of the protection of the presumption stated in the first headnote in Conner as follows: "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance *170 of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The presumption did not apply in Bush because (1) the board found against it; (2) Bush was not admittedly in the course of employment while going to or from h 1973Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 ( 160 SE2d 436 ) and Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275 ( 92 SE2d 103 ) to take this case out of the protection of the presumption stated in the first headnote in Conner as follows: "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance *170 of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The presumption did not apply in Bush because (1) the board found against it; (2) Bush was not admittedly in the course of employment while going to or from h | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Berry v. Brunson
green
2 sentences1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co 1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co | 1 | 1957–1957 |
McCollum v. McCollum
green
2 sentences1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co 1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Williams v. Porter
green
2 sentences1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co 1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Loggins v. Daves
green
2 sentences1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co 1957In the early case of Scott v. Taylor, 64 Ga. 506, 508 , it was stated: “The principle is well settled by the elementary writers, and numerous adjudicated cases, that when the purchase money is paid by one, and the legal title taken in the name of another, the person named in the conveyance is but a trustee of him who paid the consideration. ‘This rule,’ says Perry on Trusts, ‘has its foundations in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money, intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, [and that the co | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklin
green
1 sentence1941This court held that the suit was properly amended so as to proceed in the name of the original assured for the use of the purchaser, and also held: “There was a waiver of the forfeiture of the policy, or rather, the insurer was estopped from insisting on the forfeiture provision in the suit by the original assured for the use of the purchaser.” Citing Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644 , supra. The court said: “While it is not specifically alleged that such agent had possession of the policy for the purpose of having the endorsement entered, the natural presu | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Cottle v. Harrold, Johnson & Co.
neutral
1 sentence1932Jur., sec. 1201.” And in Cottle v. Harold, 72 Ga. 830 , it was said: “There is evidence that the land was bought for the firm, paid for with the money of the firm, and the title conveyed to Aaron and Isaac for the firm. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Walker
green
2 sentences1911But it is not necessary for us to pass upon this question, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Walker, 112 Ga. 725 (38 S. E. 107 ). 1911But it is not necessary for us to pass upon this question, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Walker, 112 Ga. 725 (38 S. E. 107 ). | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.