natural presumption in Alabama

1929Lee v. Browder, 51 Ala. 288 .

1926Lee v. Browder, 51 Ala. 288 .

1944Perry on Trusts, 7th Ed., § 126, pages 190, 191; Montgomery v. McNutt, 214 Ala. 692 , 108 So. 752 .

1944Perry on Trusts, 7th Ed., § 126, pages 190, 191; Montgomery v. McNutt, 214 Ala. 692 , 108 So. 752 .

1921This view consists with the latest expression in Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala. 582, 588, 590, 592 , 69 South. 473 , where it was pronounced and decided that the inquiry was whether the natural presumption of dominance on the part of the parent was negatived (a question for the jury in proper cases), and, if so found from the evidence, the burden of proof shifted to those claiming in virtue of the parent’s act to show that the transaction was not affected with fraud or undue influence ; thus ■declining to reaffirm the erroneous statement of the rule announced in Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 54

1921This view consists with the latest expression in Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala. 582, 588, 590, 592 , 69 South. 473 , where it was pronounced and decided that the inquiry was whether the natural presumption of dominance on the part of the parent was negatived (a question for the jury in proper cases), and, if so found from the evidence, the burden of proof shifted to those claiming in virtue of the parent’s act to show that the transaction was not affected with fraud or undue influence ; thus ■declining to reaffirm the erroneous statement of the rule announced in Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 54

1921This view consists with the latest expression in Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala. 582, 588, 590, 592 , 69 South. 473 , where it was pronounced and decided that the inquiry was whether the natural presumption of dominance on the part of the parent was negatived (a question for the jury in proper cases), and, if so found from the evidence, the burden of proof shifted to those claiming in virtue of the parent’s act to show that the transaction was not affected with fraud or undue influence ; thus ■declining to reaffirm the erroneous statement of the rule announced in Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 54

1921This view consists with the latest expression in Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala. 582, 588, 590, 592 , 69 South. 473 , where it was pronounced and decided that the inquiry was whether the natural presumption of dominance on the part of the parent was negatived (a question for the jury in proper cases), and, if so found from the evidence, the burden of proof shifted to those claiming in virtue of the parent’s act to show that the transaction was not affected with fraud or undue influence ; thus ■declining to reaffirm the erroneous statement of the rule announced in Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 54

1913However this he, the court was in error in excluding, on motion of defendant, the answer of the plaintiff hereinbefore set out, for the simple reason that, even granting that it showed an.agreement in violation of the statute of frauds, it nowhere appears in the record that the defendant had on file any plea setting up and claiming the benefit of such a defense. — Webb v. Hawkins Lumber Co., 101 Ala. 632 , 14 South. 407 ; Strouse v. Elting, 110 Ala. 132 , 20 South. 123 ; 9 Ency.

1908Here, when the message was received for transmission, the defendant’s operator knew the relationship existing between the sender (plaintiff) and the deceased person referred to in the message was that of brotherhood ; and. we cannot doubt that the perusal of the message naturally suggested that the purpose was, not only that a grave might be opened and adequate preparations for the funeral, made, but that the friends and relatives of the sender might be notified to meet him at the train; and it is likewise not to be questioned that it was a natural presumption therefrom that plaintiff would su

1908Here, when the message was received for transmission, the defendant’s operator knew the relationship existing between the sender (plaintiff) and the deceased person referred to in the message was that of brotherhood ; and. we cannot doubt that the perusal of the message naturally suggested that the purpose was, not only that a grave might be opened and adequate preparations for the funeral, made, but that the friends and relatives of the sender might be notified to meet him at the train; and it is likewise not to be questioned that it was a natural presumption therefrom that plaintiff would su

1908Here, when the message was received for transmission, the defendant’s operator knew the relationship existing between the sender (plaintiff) and the deceased person referred to in the message was that of brotherhood ; and. we cannot doubt that the perusal of the message naturally suggested that the purpose was, not only that a grave might be opened and adequate preparations for the funeral, made, but that the friends and relatives of the sender might be notified to meet him at the train; and it is likewise not to be questioned that it was a natural presumption therefrom that plaintiff would su

1908Here, when the message was received for transmission, the defendant’s operator knew the relationship existing between the sender (plaintiff) and the deceased person referred to in the message was that of brotherhood ; and. we cannot doubt that the perusal of the message naturally suggested that the purpose was, not only that a grave might be opened and adequate preparations for the funeral, made, but that the friends and relatives of the sender might be notified to meet him at the train; and it is likewise not to be questioned that it was a natural presumption therefrom that plaintiff would su

1908Here, when the message was received for transmission, the defendant’s operator knew the relationship existing between the sender (plaintiff) and the deceased person referred to in the message was that of brotherhood ; and. we cannot doubt that the perusal of the message naturally suggested that the purpose was, not only that a grave might be opened and adequate preparations for the funeral, made, but that the friends and relatives of the sender might be notified to meet him at the train; and it is likewise not to be questioned that it was a natural presumption therefrom that plaintiff would su

1908Here, when the message was received for transmission, the defendant’s operator knew the relationship existing between the sender (plaintiff) and the deceased person referred to in the message was that of brotherhood ; and. we cannot doubt that the perusal of the message naturally suggested that the purpose was, not only that a grave might be opened and adequate preparations for the funeral, made, but that the friends and relatives of the sender might be notified to meet him at the train; and it is likewise not to be questioned that it was a natural presumption therefrom that plaintiff would su

1894As is said in Jones on Chattel Mortgages, p. 508, § 444: “The. mortgagee’s right of recovery is not affected by the fact that he has assigned, the mortgage as collateral security, if before suit is brought the assignee has surrendered the mortgage to him.” —Eddy v. McCall, 77 Mich. 242 .

1884In Clements v. Pearce, 63 Ala. 284 , this court said: “In grants and conveyances, there is often an incongruity between courses and distances as expressed, and monuments, or natural objects, capable of clear, accurate designation and description, such as marked trees, mountains, water-courses; and these control, because the natural presumption -is, that the parties are less liable to be mistaken about them, than about courses or distances.