natural presumption in California

1962Co., 185 Cal. 240, 252 [ 196 P. 884 ], where the court said, quoting 1 Perry on Trusts, section 126 : “ ‘This rule [as to resulting trusts] has its foundation in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of convenience and arrangement between the parties for collateral purposes, and this rule is vindicated by the experience of mankind. ’ ” In the ease before us the trial court found that plaintiff p

1962Co., 185 Cal. 240, 252 [ 196 P. 884 ], where the court said, quoting 1 Perry on Trusts, section 126 : “ ‘This rule [as to resulting trusts] has its foundation in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of convenience and arrangement between the parties for collateral purposes, and this rule is vindicated by the experience of mankind. ’ ” In the ease before us the trial court found that plaintiff p

2021(Yool, at p. 4 “A resulting trust arises by operation of law from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest. [Citations.] Such a resulting trust carries out and enforces the inferred intent of the parties. [Citations.] ‘Ordinarily a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another. [Citations.] “The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it

2007Resulting Trust Doctrine “A resulting trust arises by operation of law from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest. [Citations.] Such a resulting trust carries out and enforces the inferred intent of the parties. [Citations.] ‘Ordinarily a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another. [Citations.] “The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a cas

2021Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 834 , 847–848.) “ ‘The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.’ ” (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238 .) That is, a resulting trust is an obligation implied by law to carry out the presumed intentions of the parties under such circumstances.

1986Co. v. Cowan (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 875, 884-885 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 747 ].) “Ordinarily a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another. [Citations.] ‘The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.’ [Citations.]” (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 312 ].) Under

2013The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) In Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 355, 362 , the court stated that to establish a resulting trust, “[i]t is necessary to show that it was the intention of the parties to create the trust. . . .

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1983(Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 269 [ 158 P.2d 3 ]; Elliott v. Wood, supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 314, 317 .) “The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.” (Lezinsky v. Mason Malt W.

1965(Elliott v. Wood, 95 Cal.App.2d 314, 317 [ 212 P.2d 906 ].) A natural presumption arises that one who furnishes the purchase price intends that the purchase is to be for his benefit.

2015“The natural and probable consequences doctrine was recognized at common law and is firmly entrenched in California law as a theory of criminal liability.” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 163 .) “At common law, a person encouraging or facilitating the commission of a crime could be held criminally liable not only for that crime, but for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 [citing 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1993) Parties, § 35, p. 207].) While the doctrine has been criticized, “it

2015“The natural and probable consequences doctrine was recognized at common law and is firmly entrenched in California law as a theory of criminal liability.” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 163 .) “At common law, a person encouraging or facilitating the commission of a crime could be held criminally liable not only for that crime, but for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 [citing 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1993) Parties, § 35, p. 207].) While the doctrine has been criticized, “it

1986Co. v. Cowan (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 875, 884-885 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 747 ].) “Ordinarily a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another. [Citations.] ‘The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.’ [Citations.]” (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 312 ].) Under

1986Co. v. Cowan (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 875, 884-885 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 747 ].) “Ordinarily a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another. [Citations.] ‘The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.’ [Citations.]” (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 312 ].) Under

1983(Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 269 [ 158 P.2d 3 ]; Elliott v. Wood, supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 314, 317 .) “The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.” (Lezinsky v. Mason Malt W.

1983(Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 269 [ 158 P.2d 3 ]; Elliott v. Wood, supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 314, 317 .) “The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.” (Lezinsky v. Mason Malt W.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1970Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251 [ 198 P. 884 ], italics added; see also Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Seabury v. Costello (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 640, 645 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 248 ]; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 355, 362 [ 195 P.2d 39 ]; Treager v. Friedman (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 151, 167-168 [ 179 P.2d 387 ]; Owings v. Laugharn (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 789, 792 [ 128 P.2d 114 ].) (2b) Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any facts in the present record satisfying the requisite fact of intention.

1965See Emden v. Verdi (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 555 [ 269 P.2d 47 ], holding that “it is the natural presumption in such a case [payment by one person and the taking of title in the name of another] that it was the intention of the parties that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the title to the property for the one who furnished the purchase price. . . .

1965See Emden v. Verdi (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 555 [ 269 P.2d 47 ], holding that “it is the natural presumption in such a case [payment by one person and the taking of title in the name of another] that it was the intention of the parties that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the title to the property for the one who furnished the purchase price. . . .

1952The willful use of a deadly weapon without excuse or provocation, in such a manner as to imperil life, generally indicates a felonious intent.” (People v. Besold, 154 Cal. 363, 368 [ 97 P. 871 ].) In People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 889 [ 186 P.2d 405 ], the court declared that where 11 one assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon, and takes his life, the presumption is that the assailant intended death, or other great bodily harm. ’ ’ “If a person voluntarily or willfully does an act which has a direct tendency to destroy another’s life, the natural and *797 necessary conclusion from

1952The willful use of a deadly weapon without excuse or provocation, in such a manner as to imperil life, generally indicates a felonious intent.” (People v. Besold, 154 Cal. 363, 368 [ 97 P. 871 ].) In People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 889 [ 186 P.2d 405 ], the court declared that where 11 one assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon, and takes his life, the presumption is that the assailant intended death, or other great bodily harm. ’ ’ “If a person voluntarily or willfully does an act which has a direct tendency to destroy another’s life, the natural and *797 necessary conclusion from

1952The willful use of a deadly weapon without excuse or provocation, in such a manner as to imperil life, generally indicates a felonious intent.” (People v. Besold, 154 Cal. 363, 368 [ 97 P. 871 ].) In People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 889 [ 186 P.2d 405 ], the court declared that where 11 one assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon, and takes his life, the presumption is that the assailant intended death, or other great bodily harm. ’ ’ “If a person voluntarily or willfully does an act which has a direct tendency to destroy another’s life, the natural and *797 necessary conclusion from

1952The willful use of a deadly weapon without excuse or provocation, in such a manner as to imperil life, generally indicates a felonious intent.” (People v. Besold, 154 Cal. 363, 368 [ 97 P. 871 ].) In People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 889 [ 186 P.2d 405 ], the court declared that where 11 one assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon, and takes his life, the presumption is that the assailant intended death, or other great bodily harm. ’ ’ “If a person voluntarily or willfully does an act which has a direct tendency to destroy another’s life, the natural and *797 necessary conclusion from

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand

1947(Lamb v. Lamb, 171 Cal. 577, 581 [ 153 P. 913 ]; England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 271 [ 237 P. 542 ]; Leviston v. Tonningsen, 212 Cal. 656, 664-665 [ 299 P. 724 ]; Cohn v. Cohn, 7 Cal.2d 1, 8 [ 69 P.2d 969 ].) Equally pertinent here is the statement in Dillon v. Cross, 5 Cal.App. 766 , at page 769 [ 91 P. 439 ] : ££The case made by the pleadings and the evidence was a continuous trust, and the statute of limitations did not commence to run until demand [upon the trustee] and [his] refusal to account.” The record shows that prior to the commencement of this action there never had been a demand