natural factors in Illinois

2016Until the random element is eliminated in the application of architectural sciences, we think it fairer than the purchaser of the architect's services bear the risk of such unforeseeable difficulties." City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 424 . ¶ 21 Similar reasoning was applied in Board of Trustees of Union College v. Kennerly, Slomanson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J.

2015Until the random element is eliminated in the application of architectural sciences, we think it fairer than the purchaser of the architect's services bear the risk of such unforeseeable difficulties." City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 424 . ¶ 21 Similar reasoning was applied in Board of Trustees of Union College v. Kennerly, Slomanson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J.

2016Until the random element is eliminated in the application of architectural sciences, we think it fairer than the purchaser of the architect's services bear the risk of such unforeseeable difficulties." City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 424 . ¶ 21 Similar reasoning was applied in Board of Trustees of Union College v. Kennerly, Slomanson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J.

2015Until the random element is eliminated in the application of architectural sciences, we think it fairer than the purchaser of the architect's services bear the risk of such unforeseeable difficulties." City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 424 . ¶ 21 Similar reasoning was applied in Board of Trustees of Union College v. Kennerly, Slomanson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J.

2012In denying the doctor’s claim against the estate, the court cited with approval a Rhode Island case, Wright v. Sheldon, 53 A. 59 (R.I. 1902) (per curiam), in which the court refused to allow a claimant to recover for minor services rendered to the decedent over a 30-year period, stating: “When relations of this character have been so long continued without any contract for payment, *** the natural presumption is that the service was rendered as a friendly act, and it is too late to bring in a charge for such service after it has ended.” Id. at 59 .

2012In denying the doctor’s claim against the estate, the court cited with approval a Rhode Island case, Wright v. Sheldon, 53 A. 59 (R.I. 1902) (per curiam), in which the court refused to allow a claimant to recover for minor services rendered to the decedent over a 30-year period, stating: “When relations of this character have been so long continued without any contract for payment, *** the natural presumption is that the service was rendered as a friendly act, and it is too late to bring in a charge for such service after it has ended.” Id. at 59 .

1981We believe as stated by the Supreme Court in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477 , 86 S. Ct. at 1629 , ‘our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.’ A contrary result to that which we have here reached would perforce, in our opinion, have a substantially hampering effect.” 436 F.2d 364, 370 .

1981We believe as stated by the Supreme Court in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477 , 86 S. Ct. at 1629 , ‘our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.’ A contrary result to that which we have here reached would perforce, in our opinion, have a substantially hampering effect.” 436 F.2d 364, 370 .

1981We believe as stated by the Supreme Court in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477 , 86 S. Ct. at 1629 , ‘our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.’ A contrary result to that which we have here reached would perforce, in our opinion, have a substantially hampering effect.” 436 F.2d 364, 370 .

1981We believe as stated by the Supreme Court in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477 , 86 S.Ct. at 1629 , `our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.' A contrary result to that which we have here reached would perforce, in our opinion, have a substantially hampering effect." 436 F.2d 364, 370 .

1966In fact there was sufficient proof, if believed by the jurors, to justify a conviction of murder, People v. Davis, 35 Ill2d 55, 219 NE2d 468 .

1937(Martin v. Martin, 174 Ill. 371, 378 .) There is no presumption of undue influence where the gift is from husband to wife, and courts of equity will uphold gifts to a person who has a natural claim on the donor, unless strong evidence impels the opposite conclusion.

1937(White v. Willard, 232 Ill. 464 .) The master’s finding was approved by the chancellor and the gift of the last payment on the Hogland contract amounting to $230,000, and the gift of cash amounting either to $18,000 or $20,800, were held invalid.

1901In Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402 , it was said, quoting from Duncan v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169 : “Where a testator gives legacies, and so disposes of all his personal property that it cannot be made available for the payment of the legacies, the natural presumption is that he intended to charge the land with the payment of the legacies, since a different rule would attribute to him a purpose to make a gift in appearance and not in reality.” In Reid v. Corrigan, supra, it was also said: “If the residuary clause in this will had read, ‘all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate’ or ‘propert

1901In Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402 , it was said, quoting from Duncan v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169 : “Where a testator gives legacies, and so disposes of all his personal property that it cannot be made available for the payment of the legacies, the natural presumption is that he intended to charge the land with the payment of the legacies, since a different rule would attribute to him a purpose to make a gift in appearance and not in reality.” In Reid v. Corrigan, supra, it was also said: “If the residuary clause in this will had read, ‘all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate’ or ‘propert

1901In Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402 , it was said, quoting from Duncan v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169 : “Where a testator gives legacies, and so disposes of all his personal property that it cannot be made available for the payment of the legacies, the natural presumption is that he intended to charge the land with the payment of the legacies, since a different rule would attribute to him a purpose to make a gift in appearance and not in reality.” In Reid v. Corrigan, supra, it was also said: “If the residuary clause in this will had read, ‘all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate’ or ‘propert

1897In Adlard v. Adlard, supra, the husband had placed the title to property paid for by him in his wife, and as to one class of the property we said (p. 218): “It is, no doubt, as argued by appellant’s counsel, a natural presumption that a husband placing his money in the hands of his wife, to be invested in her name, intends it as a specific provision for her exclusive benefit; yet such a presumption would be unreasonable when a husband, a day laborer, deposits with his wife his daily, weekly or monthly, earnings as he receives them, with a view, as they accumulate, to a permanent investment, le

1896In Warnecke v. Lembca, 71 Ill. 91 , it was held that the “legal representative,” in the commonly accepted sense, means tlje executor or administrator, but that this is not the only definition, and that it may mean heirs, next of kin or descendants, and sometimes assignee or grantee, and that the sense in which the term is to be understood depends upon the intention of the parties using it, and is to be gathered, not always from the instrument itself, but as well from the surrounding circumstances.