evaluation defense in California

2026Further still, an agency made up of a single department that receives only a handful of public record requests each Responding to this contention, the appellate court simply stated, “This latter finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 483.) Like Citizens, the lack of statutory interpretation analysis renders the statement unhelpful to us, and we decline to give it any weight. 23 The District, like the trial court, relies on Motorola, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 1340 , as support that section 7922.530 allows for an evaluation of factors when assessing whether record production has b

2026Further still, an agency made up of a single department that receives only a handful of public record requests each Responding to this contention, the appellate court simply stated, “This latter finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 483.) Like Citizens, the lack of statutory interpretation analysis renders the statement unhelpful to us, and we decline to give it any weight. 23 The District, like the trial court, relies on Motorola, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 1340 , as support that section 7922.530 allows for an evaluation of factors when assessing whether record production has b

2021Defendant raises one narrow claim: the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to order an evaluation or a hearing to assess [defendant’s] competence to represent himself.” The Sixth Amendment right to a defense necessarily includes the “right to self-representation.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 .) “In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), however, the United States Supreme Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to represent themselves at trial—persons

2021Defendant raises one narrow claim: the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to order an evaluation or a hearing to assess [defendant’s] competence to represent himself.” The Sixth Amendment right to a defense necessarily includes the “right to self-representation.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 .) “In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), however, the United States Supreme Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to represent themselves at trial—persons

2021Defendant raises one narrow claim: the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to order an evaluation or a hearing to assess [defendant’s] competence to represent himself.” The Sixth Amendment right to a defense necessarily includes the “right to self-representation.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 .) “In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), however, the United States Supreme Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to represent themselves at trial—persons

2021Defendant raises one narrow claim: the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to order an evaluation or a hearing to assess [defendant’s] competence to represent himself.” The Sixth Amendment right to a defense necessarily includes the “right to self-representation.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 .) “In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), however, the United States Supreme Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to represent themselves at trial—persons

2020However, “our issuance of the order to show cause determined, in effect, that petitioners’ remedy at law was inadequate [citation], thus making writ review proper.” (Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 476-477 ; accord, Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056 .) It will be up to Judge Mohr in the first instance to determine whether he can perform an evaluation of defense counsel’s justifications for his peremptory challenges.

2020However, “our issuance of the order to show cause determined, in effect, that petitioners’ remedy at law was inadequate [citation], thus making writ review proper.” (Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 476-477 ; accord, Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056 .) It will be up to Judge Mohr in the first instance to determine whether he can perform an evaluation of defense counsel’s justifications for his peremptory challenges.

2018(People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 873 .) Defendant contends that the confrontation clause violation requires reversal of the entire judgment because the People “cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not affect the jury’s evaluation of the defense argument that Sisoukchaleun and his companions were the aggressors and [defendant] only obtained the gun and then shot Sisoukchaleun in self-defense.” I agree with respect to the murder conviction.

2018(People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 873 .) Defendant contends that the confrontation clause violation requires reversal of the entire judgment because the People “cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not affect the jury’s evaluation of the defense argument that Sisoukchaleun and his companions were the aggressors and [defendant] only obtained the gun and then shot Sisoukchaleun in self-defense.” I agree with respect to the murder conviction.

2016(People v. Rivers, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051 .) Defendant has failed to refer to subsequent proceedings.

2016(People v. Rivers, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051 .) Defendant has failed to refer to subsequent proceedings.

2022(See Adams, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 946 .) She suggests that the court’s “failure to carefully consider whether [the owner’s] actions exceeded the limits of the shopkeeper’s privilege” precluded her from receiving a full evaluation of her defense, and this error “may well have been decisive.” 8 We read the record differently.

2022(See Adams, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 946 .) She suggests that the court’s “failure to carefully consider whether [the owner’s] actions exceeded the limits of the shopkeeper’s privilege” precluded her from receiving a full evaluation of her defense, and this error “may well have been decisive.” 8 We read the record differently.

2022(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 320 .) Pursuant to section 361.3, “the court is not to presume that a child should be placed with a relative, but is to determine whether such a placement is appropriate, taking into account the suitability of the relative's home and the best interest of the child.” (Id. at p. 321.) Thus, “regardless of the relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best interest of the child, whose bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a relative be rejected.” (Ibid.) On appeal, the Relatives contend that the juve

2022Appellants also argue that they were not afforded due process at both the BZA and BOS hearings based on an evaluation of factors enunciated in People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260 (Ramirez).) In Ramirez, our Supreme Court explained that “[the] identification of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 24 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest i

2021(See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212 ; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 ; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437 .) This is one of those instances where the evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will have to await a petition for writ of habeas corpus, should the defendant believe there is a viable claim that can be pursued. 11 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2021“An evaluation of whether the error was prejudicial must have as its foundation the defendant’s right to a jury trial by a fair and impartial jury, as provided by the California Constitution, article I, section 16.” (McNeal, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 840 .) In McNeal, the Court of Appeal, First District, Division Three held that “where the fact a of sworn juror’s impartiality comes into question as a result of that juror’s conduct or statements during the course of the trial or the deliberations, the failure of the court to make at least a preliminary inquiry into the facts of such 30 imparti

2021(See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212 ; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 ; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437 .) This is one of those instances where the evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will have to await a petition for writ of habeas corpus, should the defendant believe there is a viable claim that can be pursued. 11 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2021(See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212 ; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 ; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437 .) This is one of those instances where the evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will have to await a petition for writ of habeas corpus, should the defendant believe there is a viable claim that can be pursued. 11 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2020Citing substitute counsel’s statement that she did not know anything about the case, Cardoza argues substitute counsel “did not advocate for [Cardoza] and the evaluation and analysis of the nature of the jury impasse and of the agreed-upon course of action were never subjected to ‘adversarial testing.’” Cardoza asserts his substitute counsel “was not and, because of her lack of familiarity with his case, could never have been an effective advocate for [Cardoza] in these critical and adversarial proceedings.” Under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Cronic and Strickland, “the right

2020Citing substitute counsel’s statement that she did not know anything about the case, Cardoza argues substitute counsel “did not advocate for [Cardoza] and the evaluation and analysis of the nature of the jury impasse and of the agreed-upon course of action were never subjected to ‘adversarial testing.’” Cardoza asserts his substitute counsel “was not and, because of her lack of familiarity with his case, could never have been an effective advocate for [Cardoza] in these critical and adversarial proceedings.” Under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Cronic and Strickland, “the right

2020Citing substitute counsel’s statement that she did not know anything about the case, Cardoza argues substitute counsel “did not advocate for [Cardoza] and the evaluation and analysis of the nature of the jury impasse and of the agreed-upon course of action were never subjected to ‘adversarial testing.’” Cardoza asserts his substitute counsel “was not and, because of her lack of familiarity with his case, could never have been an effective advocate for [Cardoza] in these critical and adversarial proceedings.” Under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Cronic and Strickland, “the right

2020Citing substitute counsel’s statement that she did not know anything about the case, Cardoza argues substitute counsel “did not advocate for [Cardoza] and the evaluation and analysis of the nature of the jury impasse and of the agreed-upon course of action were never subjected to ‘adversarial testing.’” Cardoza asserts his substitute counsel “was not and, because of her lack of familiarity with his case, could never have been an effective advocate for [Cardoza] in these critical and adversarial proceedings.” Under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Cronic and Strickland, “the right

2018In response to the court’s inquiry about the status of the evaluation by the defense expert, 10 Under Reilly, “if an alleged SVP can demonstrate that a material error occurred in the evaluative process, for the purposes of section 6601, both concurring evaluations are invalid and are rendered a legal nullity.” (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) If the alleged SVP meets this burden, new evaluations must be prepared and the alleged SVP is entitled to a new probable cause hearing.

2015The showing of prejudice requires some evidence and cannot be presumed. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37 , disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535 , 543–544, fn. 5; accord, People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107 ; Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493 , 504–507.) The evaluation of a claim of precomplaint delay has been described as a three-step process: “First, the defendant must show he has been prejudiced by the delay.