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32 California opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reid v. Google, Inc.green2 sentences2023(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 526 .) The reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review to evidentiary objections that the trial court failed to rule upon which are raised again on appeal. 2021(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 [renewed objections on appeal when the trial court failed to rule on the objections]; Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1089 [same].) The County asserts that the Family relies almost exclusively on Goodman’s and Zafren’s declarations in the Family’s appellants’ opening brief, so if the declarations are inadmissible then the Family’s appellate argument fails. | 2 | 3 |
Biscaro v. Sterngreen2 sentences2024(See Biscaro, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 705 [reversing and remanding for further consideration where the court failed to rule on a rule 1.100 request].) But the fact that a trial court’s discretion under rule 1.100 is structured and limited does not mean it is left with no discretion at all once a participant in litigation presents a qualifying disability. 2024(See Biscaro, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 705 [reversing and remanding for further consideration where the court failed to rule on a rule 1.100 request].) But the fact that a trial court’s discretion under rule 1.100 is structured and limited does not mean it is left with no discretion at all once a participant in litigation presents a qualifying disability, as FSFG would have it. | 2 | 2 |
Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Corp.green2 sentences2022(See Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794, 800 [notwithstanding the existence of an actual controversy, a claim for declaratory relief that is “ ‘wholly derivative’ ” of a failed claim cannot stand].) 22 _________________________ Petrou, J. 2022(See Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Group (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794, 800 .) The declaratory relief Sandpebble 2 requested in the operative complaint was “a judicial determination that Nevada Capital is obligated under the express and implied terms of the Policies [sic] to reimburse Plaintiff with respect to the remaining cost of the fire loss.” This is in essence a restatement of the cause of action for breach of contract: Sandpebble 2 requested a declaration that Nevada Capital breached the policy. | 1 | 2 |
Serri v. Santa Clara Universitygreen1 sentence2025Donna cites Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 , 255 and footnote 4 (Nazir) and Serri 9. v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 857 (Serri), for the proposition that blanket rulings, sustaining objections without explanation, constitute an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLCgreen1 sentence2024A. General Arbitration Law “ ‘[T]he Legislature has expressed a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.” ’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 .) “ ‘Arbitration is favored in this state as a voluntary means of resolving disputes, and this voluntariness has been its bedrock justification.’ [Citations.] Arbitration contracts are vigorously enforced out of respect for the parties’ mutual and voluntary agreement to resolve disputes by this alternative means.” (Id. at p. 129; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacl | 1 | 1 |
Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Servicesgreen1 sentence2024A. General Arbitration Law “ ‘[T]he Legislature has expressed a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.” ’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 .) “ ‘Arbitration is favored in this state as a voluntary means of resolving disputes, and this voluntariness has been its bedrock justification.’ [Citations.] Arbitration contracts are vigorously enforced out of respect for the parties’ mutual and voluntary agreement to resolve disputes by this alternative means.” (Id. at p. 129; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacl | 1 | 1 |
Cruz v. County of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2021(Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134 [under Evid. | 1 | 1 |
Chacon v. Litkegreen1 sentence2021The trial court failed to rule on the request and did not indicate whether it considered the Orders in sustaining the demurrer. “[W]e as a reviewing court may take notice of matters properly subject to judicial notice, despite the failure of the trial court to do so.” (Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1251, fn. 10 .) We hereby take judicial notice of the Orders pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Arceneauxgreen1 sentence2021(In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux).) Appellant has not overcome this presumption by affirmatively demonstrating the trial court failed to rule on her request. | 1 | 1 |
Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Grp., LLCgreen1 sentence2021(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 [renewed objections on appeal when the trial court failed to rule on the objections]; Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1089 [same].) The County asserts that the Family relies almost exclusively on Goodman’s and Zafren’s declarations in the Family’s appellants’ opening brief, so if the declarations are inadmissible then the Family’s appellate argument fails. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramosgreen1 sentence2014Nor is this a case where the court failed to rule upon an objection or request to admit or exclude evidence and the aggrieved party did not ask the court for a ruling (cf. People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171 [defendant failed to obtain express ruling on motion in limine to exclude rifle], and cases cited therein). | 1 | 1 |
Golden West Baseball Co. v. Talleygreen1 sentence2010(Golden West Baseball Co. v. Talley, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1301, fn. 4 .) Instead of relying on section 437c, subdivision (b)(5), the court relied on section 437c, subdivision (c). | 1 | 1 |
People v. McHughgreen2 sentences2007Simply stated, one offer plus one rejection equals one refusal; and, one suspension.” (Dunlap v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 729 ], italics omitted; see People v. McHugh (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 202, 212 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 ] (McHugh).) Here, prior to completing or attempting any test, Officer Samoncik told Hildebrand that he had a choice of tests—“Mr. Hildebrand chose a breath test but was unable to complete the test.” After the failed test, Samoncik read him the admonishment about implied consent. 2007Simply stated, one offer plus one rejection equals one refusal; and, one suspension.” (Dunlap v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 729 ], italics omitted; see People v. McHugh (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 202, 212 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 ] (McHugh).) Here, prior to completing or attempting any test, Officer Samoncik told Hildebrand that he had a choice of tests—“Mr. Hildebrand chose a breath test but was unable to complete the test.” After the failed test, Samoncik read him the admonishment about implied consent. | 1 | 1 |
Dunlap v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2007Simply stated, one offer plus one rejection equals one refusal; and, one suspension.” (Dunlap v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 729 ], italics omitted; see People v. McHugh (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 202, 212 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 ] (McHugh).) Here, prior to completing or attempting any test, Officer Samoncik told Hildebrand that he had a choice of tests—“Mr. Hildebrand chose a breath test but was unable to complete the test.” After the failed test, Samoncik read him the admonishment about implied consent. 2007Simply stated, one offer plus one rejection equals one refusal; and, one suspension.” (Dunlap v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 729 ], italics omitted; see People v. McHugh (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 202, 212 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 ] (McHugh).) Here, prior to completing or attempting any test, Officer Samoncik told Hildebrand that he had a choice of tests—“Mr. Hildebrand chose a breath test but was unable to complete the test.” After the failed test, Samoncik read him the admonishment about implied consent. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kacy S.green2 sentences2006(See, e.g., In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 710 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 ] [drug testing condition of probation under § 729.3 “is designed to detect the presence of substances whose use by minors is unlawful. . . . 2006(See, e.g., In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 710 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 ] [drug testing condition of probation under § 729.3 “is designed to detect the presence of substances whose use by minors is unlawful. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu 1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu | 1 | 1 |
People v. Langgreen2 sentences1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu 1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu | 1 | 1 |
Tejada v. Blasgreen2 sentences1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu 1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. County of Orangegreen2 sentences1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu 1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu | 1 | 1 |
People v. Allengreen2 sentences1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu 1995(People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1260, fn. 18 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] [trial court’s failure to rule on motion not prejudicial as motion had no merit]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1011 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [trial court’s failure to exercise discretion harmless]; Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 285, fn. 4 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 645 ] [ruling which is correct on any theory will not be overturned merely because trial court applied wrong theory].) Under the doctrine of estoppel, “ ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of secu | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DeVaughngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Braesekegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Slaydengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Newlandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gibsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hillardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Freeman v. Sullivant
green
2 sentences2014The June 25, 2012 minute order states that the court considered the parties’ papers and arguments, denied Moline’s motion to continue the hearing, and granted CBS’s anti-SLAPP motion “for the reasons contained in defendant’s moving papers.” The denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and requires reversal only if it “results in the denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudices a party. [Citation.]” (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 .) This record does not demonstrate that Moline was prejudiced or denied a fair hearing, despite the problems she may h 2014The June 25, 2012 minute order states that the court considered the parties’ papers and arguments, denied Moline’s motion to continue the hearing, and granted CBS’s anti-SLAPP motion “for the reasons contained in defendant’s moving papers.” The denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and requires reversal only if it “results in the denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudices a party. [Citation.]” (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 .) This record does not demonstrate that Moline was prejudiced or denied a fair hearing, despite the problems she may h | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Donna cites Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 , 255 and footnote 4 (Nazir) and Serri 9. v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 857 (Serri), for the proposition that blanket rulings, sustaining objections without explanation, constitute an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025Although the court’s analysis focused more on conduct of Edie and Eileen than on conduct of Mary Jane, its order denying the motion applied equally to each of the three members of the Mary Jane Faction. 6 creature of statute [that] distributes the loss equally among all tortfeasors.” (Coca-Cola, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1378 , italics added, fn. omitted.) Whereas the equitable indemnity cause of action enables a defendant “ ‘to bring in other tortfeasors who are allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s action through a cross-complaint . . . for equitable indemnification’ ” (Platt v. Coldwell B 2025Although the court’s analysis focused more on conduct of Edie and Eileen than on conduct of Mary Jane, its order denying the motion applied equally to each of the three members of the Mary Jane Faction. 6 creature of statute [that] distributes the loss equally among all tortfeasors.” (Coca-Cola, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1378 , italics added, fn. omitted.) Whereas the equitable indemnity cause of action enables a defendant “ ‘to bring in other tortfeasors who are allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s action through a cross-complaint . . . for equitable indemnification’ ” (Platt v. Coldwell B | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin
green
1 sentence2025For example, whereas equitable indemnity is a creature of equity that allows “responsibility among tortfeasors responsible for the same indivisible injury” to be “apportion[ed] . . . on a comparative fault basis” ( Fremont, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1176–1177, italics added), “[c]ontribution . . . is a 4 Lydia contends “the trial court failed to rule on the anti-SLAPP motion as to Mary Jane”; however, this contention is incorrect. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Vandenberg v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024A. General Arbitration Law “ ‘[T]he Legislature has expressed a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.” ’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 .) “ ‘Arbitration is favored in this state as a voluntary means of resolving disputes, and this voluntariness has been its bedrock justification.’ [Citations.] Arbitration contracts are vigorously enforced out of respect for the parties’ mutual and voluntary agreement to resolve disputes by this alternative means.” (Id. at p. 129; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacl | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Oto, L. L.C. v. Kho
green
1 sentence2024A. General Arbitration Law “ ‘[T]he Legislature has expressed a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.” ’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 .) “ ‘Arbitration is favored in this state as a voluntary means of resolving disputes, and this voluntariness has been its bedrock justification.’ [Citations.] Arbitration contracts are vigorously enforced out of respect for the parties’ mutual and voluntary agreement to resolve disputes by this alternative means.” (Id. at p. 129; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacl | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Marsden
green
1 sentence2022Seeing no reversible error, we affirm. 1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 1 I. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014(Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 .) C. 2002 Refinance Husband contends the trial court failed to rule on whether he was entitled to reimbursement based on proceeds from the 2002 refinance of his separate property residence that he asserts were used to pay for Wife’s attorney and travel expenses in connection with her custody dispute in Canada, vocational education she received, a Mitsubishi automobile purchased for her use, and general family expenses. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura
green
1 sentence2013(Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117 .) Validity of the 1994 Proprietary Lease Appellant argues that the trial court failed to rule on whether the 1994 Proprietary Lease was superseded by the amended governing documents which were approved by Vista's board and shareholders. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Hildebrand v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2010(Hildebrand, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573 .) The court concluded that adequate admonishments were given because the officer told the arrestee he had a choice of tests before the breath test was attempted and, after the failed test, the arresting officer informed the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Blair green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Henry green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Rios green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Kanos green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Sesslin green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Cowee v. Marsh green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Means green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| In Re Boatwright green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| City of Los Angeles v. McCollum green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Raymond v. Glover green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.