32 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Siskindgreen2 sentences2011Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted). 2011Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted). | 5 | 6 |
Andrea Sardis v. Overhead Door Corporationgreen2 sentences2023These rulings are an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a).” Id.; see Sardis v. Overhead Door Corp., 10 F.4th 268, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2021) (observing that the then-proposed amendments to Federal Rule 702 would make explicit the preponderance of evidence standard of admissibility to the rule’s sufficiency of basis and reliability analyses; confirming that these rule revisions and clarifications “clearly echo[] the existing law on the issue” from Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Rule 702 itself). 2023These rulings are an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a).” Id.; see Sardis v. Overhead Door Corp., 10 F.4th 268 , 283-84 (4th Cir. 2021) (observing that the then-proposed amendments to Federal Rule 702 would make explicit the preponderance of evidence standard of admissibility to the rule’s sufficiency of basis and reliability analyses; confirming that these rule revisions and clarifications “clearly echo[] the existing law on the issue” from Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Rule 702 itself). | 2 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Edibgreen2 sentences2011Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted). 2011Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Wardgreen2 sentences2009We have omitted from our recitation of Judge Souder's conclusions of law the text of the various rule violations. 14 . " ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1,16 , 904 A.2d 477, 486 (2006)). 15 . 2009We have omitted from our recitation of Judge Souder's conclusions of law the text of the various rule violations. 14 . " ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1,16 , 904 A.2d 477, 486 (2006)). 15 . | 1 | 4 |
Hoffman v. Stampergreen2 sentences2021Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 16 , 867 A.2d 276, 285 (2005). 2021Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 16 , 867 A.2d 276, 285 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2021A motion for JNOV is reviewed “to determine whether it was legally correct, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determining whether the facts and circumstances only permit one inference with regard to the issue presented.” Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 , 118 A.3d 829, 844 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[I]f there is any evidence adduced, however slight, from which reasonable jurors[, applying the preponderance of evidence standard,] could find in favor of the plaintiff[,]” 2021A motion for JNOV is reviewed “to determine whether it was legally correct, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determining whether the facts and circumstances only permit one inference with regard to the issue presented.” Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 , 118 A.3d 829, 844 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[I]f there is any evidence adduced, however slight, from which reasonable jurors[, applying the preponderance of evidence standard,] could find in favor of the plaintiff[,]” | 1 | 1 |
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shepardgreen2 sentences2019This is not the same thing as a showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the individual was in fact driving (or attempting to drive) while impaired.” Id. at 608 , 158 A.3d at 550 . 11 cases, reasonable grounds equates to “reasonable articulable suspicion.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254 , 923 A.2d 100, 107 (2007). 2019This is not the same thing as a showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the individual was in fact driving (or attempting to drive) while impaired.” Id. at 608 , 158 A.3d at 550 . 11 cases, reasonable grounds equates to “reasonable articulable suspicion.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254 , 923 A.2d 100, 107 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
David A. Bramble, Inc. v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2009David A. Bramble, Inc. v. Thomas, 396 Md. 443, 467 , 914 A.2d 136, 150 (2007); Port East Transfer, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. 2009David A. Bramble, Inc. v. Thomas, 396 Md. 443, 467 , 914 A.2d 136, 150 (2007); Port East Transfer, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Guidagreen2 sentences2007The attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert “an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation[, but] has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Maryland Rule 16-757(b); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50-51 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). 2007The attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert “an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation[, but] has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Maryland Rule 16-757(b); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50-51 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garfieldgreen2 sentences2002See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85 , 99 n. 13, 797 A.2d 757 , 765 n. 13 (2002). 2002See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85 , 99 n. 13, 797 A.2d 757 , 765 n. 13 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bakasgreen2 sentences2002As to this, the preponderance of evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991), quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 285 Md. 631, 644 , 403 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1979). 2002As to this, the preponderance of evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991), quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 285 Md. 631, 644 , 403 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Baileygreen2 sentences2002As to this, the preponderance of evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991), quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 285 Md. 631, 644 , 403 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1979). 2002As to this, the preponderance of evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991), quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 285 Md. 631, 644 , 403 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Pelling v. Illinois Racing Boardgreen2 sentences2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); 2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); | 1 | 1 |
Matter of D'Angelogreen2 sentences2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); 2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); | 1 | 1 |
Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ.green2 sentences2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); 2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); 2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re: Adoption/guardianship of Rashawn H.
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2019Id. | 4 | 2018–2019 |
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Harris
green
2 sentences2007“The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which-is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.” Ward, 394 Md. at 16 , 904 A.2d at 486 (citing Harris, 366 Md. at 389 , 784 A.2d at 523 ). 2007“The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which-is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.” Ward, 394 Md. at 16 , 904 A.2d at 486 (citing Harris, 366 Md. at 389 , 784 A.2d at 523 ). | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2003The preponderance of evidence standard, the Court noted, indicates society’s “minimal concern with the outcome” and a conclusion that the litigants should “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 (quoting Addington, supra, at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 ). 2003The preponderance of evidence standard, the Court noted, indicates society’s “minimal concern with the outcome” and a conclusion that the litigants should “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 (quoting Addington, supra, at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 ). | 2 | 1979–2003 |
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Krafft
green
2 sentences2019This is not the same thing as a showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the individual was in fact driving (or attempting to drive) while impaired.” Id. at 608 , 158 A.3d at 550 . 11 cases, reasonable grounds equates to “reasonable articulable suspicion.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254 , 923 A.2d 100, 107 (2007). 2019This is not the same thing as a showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the individual was in fact driving (or attempting to drive) while impaired.” Id. at 608 , 158 A.3d at 550 . 11 cases, reasonable grounds equates to “reasonable articulable suspicion.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254 , 923 A.2d 100, 107 (2007). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Marcalus
green
1 sentence2010The Vanderlinde standard is applicable because Marcalus's flagship misconduct constituted a felony (Maj. op. at 520-21, 996 A.2d at 361-62 ) and is thus serious criminal conduct. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Fred L. Hatfield, Sr., D/B/A Hvac Construction Company, Incorporated
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 69 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Manck
green
2 sentences2005Citing two decisions in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County that, due to the unusual procedure used by that court to effect those decisions, we were precluded from reviewing (see State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581 , 870 A.2d 196 (2005)), he argued as well that, under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the indictment against him was deficient for failing to allege principal-ship or the aggravating factors. 2005Citing two decisions in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County that, due to the unusual procedure used by that court to effect those decisions, we were precluded from reviewing (see State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581 , 870 A.2d 196 (2005)), he argued as well that, under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the indictment against him was deficient for failing to allege principal-ship or the aggravating factors. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2003The preponderance of evidence standard, the Court noted, indicates society’s “minimal concern with the outcome” and a conclusion that the litigants should “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 (quoting Addington, supra, at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 ). 2003The preponderance of evidence standard, the Court noted, indicates society’s “minimal concern with the outcome” and a conclusion that the litigants should “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 (quoting Addington, supra, at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Heath William Burch v. Thomas R. Corcoran, Warden J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
green
2 sentences2001In Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577 (4th Cir.2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had before it the very issue raised here by BorchardtÔÇöwhether the preponderance of evidence standard mandated by 413(h) for the weighing process made the Maryland capital sentencing procedure invalid under Apprendi . 2001In Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577 (4th Cir.2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had before it the very issue raised here by Borchardt — whether the preponderance of evidence standard mandated by § 413(h) for the weighing process made the Maryland capital sentencing procedure invalid under Apprendi . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Board of Education v. State Board of Education
green
1 sentence2001Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173 , 100 Ill.Dec. 715, 720-24 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 989-93 (1986) (proper standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those where conduct that might constitute crime is charged, is preponderance of the evidence standard); In the Matter of D’Angelo, 105 N.M. 391 , 733 P.2d 360, 361-62 (1986) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, standard of proof in administrative hearing is preponderance of the evidence, absent allegation of fraud or statute or court rule requiring higher standard); | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McDonald v. State
green
2 sentences1989We granted Wink’s petition for certiorari which raises the following question: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the preponderance of evidence standard applied by the trial judge met the reasonably satisfied standard required in violation of probation proceedings?” After the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Wink , this Court decided McDonald v. State, 314 Md. 271 , 550 A.2d 696 (1988). 1989We granted Wink’s petition for certiorari which raises the following question: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the preponderance of evidence standard applied by the trial judge met the reasonably satisfied standard required in violation of probation proceedings?” After the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Wink , this Court decided McDonald v. State, 314 Md. 271 , 550 A.2d 696 (1988). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Tichnell v. State
green
2 sentences1985Instead, § 413 speaks in terms of requiring the sentencing authority to make findings that satisfy either the reasonable doubt or the preponderance of evidence standard ____” 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d 830 . 1985Instead, § 413 speaks in terms of requiring the sentencing authority to make findings that satisfy either the reasonable doubt or the preponderance of evidence standard...." 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d 830 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Davis v. Director, Patuxent Institution
green
2 sentences1979Davis v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 29 Md. 1979Davis v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 29 Md. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Mulligan v. State
green
2 sentences1977Therefore, inasmuch as the trial judge in the instant case did not articulate his reasons for admitting the appellant’s statement into evidence, we deduce that he applied the preponderance of evidence test set out by Lego and the third Mulligan. [ 18 Md. 1977App. 588 , 308 A. 2d 418 (1973)].” Absent the circumstances, hereinafter discussed, we might well hold in this case that the use of the word “satisfactory” was synonymous with proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 We are precluded, however, from making súch a finding in view of the trial judge’s grievous misstatement of the law at the conclusion of the State’s evidence wherein he said that the defendant had the burden of convincing the court it was an improper statement. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Dower v. Director, Patuxent green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Jackson v. Denno green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| The People v. Pearson green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Agneslane, Inc. v. Lucas green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.