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14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Romerogreen2 sentences2002See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1016-18 (Colo.1987)(adopting the preponderance of evidence standard for resolving challenges to the reliability of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness). . 2002See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1016-18 (Colo.1987)(adopting the preponderance of evidence standard for resolving challenges to the reliability of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness). [4] Although Wagner testified at trial that she thought the first robber was approximately five feet eight inches tall, Detective Grose testified at the suppression hearing that during his investigation of the robbery Wagner told him the first robber was between five feet, eight inches and five feet, eleven inches tall. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Montoyagreen2 sentences1991For example, we held in People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729 (Colo.1988), that a trial court must apply the preponderance-of-evidence standard in determining whether the evidentia-ry antecedents for the admission of an out-of-court statement of an alleged co-conspirator under CRE 801(d)(2)(E) have been established. 1991The court of appeals also acknowledged this court’s adoption of the preponderance-of-evidence standard in People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729 (Colo.1988), as the appropriate standard for resolving preliminary questions of admissibility under the Colorado Rules of Evidence. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2024“The preponderance of evidence standard only requires proof that ‘the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.’” Dyson, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 1980)). 11 ¶ 25 The appropriate standard of review in restitution cases depends on the issue the trial court decided and that we are reviewing. | 1 | 1 |
Page v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2022As relevant here, the plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the speaker made the statements with “actual malice.” Lawson, ¶ 18. 16 ¶ 36 In contrast to the preponderance of evidence standard — which only requires proof that a fact is “more probable” than not, Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 318 , 592 P.2d 792, 800 (1979) (quoting Charles T. 2022As relevant here, the plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the speaker made the statements with “actual malice.” Lawson, ¶ 18. 16 ¶ 36 In contrast to the preponderance of evidence standard — which only requires proof that a fact is “more probable” than not, Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 318 , 592 P.2d 792, 800 (1979) (quoting Charles T. | 1 | 1 |
ion Maternity v. Burrengreen1 sentence2022McCormick, The Law of Evidence § 339 (2nd ed. 1972)) — the clear and convincing standard requires proof that a fact is “highly probable and free from serious or substantial doubt.” Destination Maternity v. Burren, 2020 CO 41, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). ¶ 37 A communication is made with actual malice if it is published with “actual knowledge that it was false” or “with reckless disregard for whether it was true.” L.S.S., ¶ 40. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kellygreen2 sentences2010As such, they are not subject to the preponderance of evidence standard, which is applicable here, but to the more stringent, beyond a reasonable doubt standard. § 16-11-206(8); see also People v. Kelly, 919 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.App.1996) (applying similar analysis to distinguish Thomas and T.M.H.). 2010As such, they are not subject to the preponderance of evidence standard, which is applicable here, but to the more stringent, beyond a reasonable doubt standard. § 16-11-206(3); see also People v. Kelly, 919 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.App. 1996) (applying similar analysis to distinguish Thomas and T.M.H. ). | 1 | 1 |
Huffman v. Westmoreland Coal Co.green1 sentence2009The court in Itin did not reach the issue of the burden of proof, but it noted "that a majority of federal cireuits have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] actions, which also provide civil remedies based on violations of criminal offenses," and that "the [United States] Supreme Court, while not expressly reaching this issue, appears to approve of the preponderance of evidence standard." 17 P.3d at 136 n. 12 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)); see also | 1 | 1 |
Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazziogreen1 sentence2005E.g., Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 552 (Colo.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2002See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1016-18 (Colo.1987)(adopting the preponderance of evidence standard for resolving challenges to the reliability of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness). [4] Although Wagner testified at trial that she thought the first robber was approximately five feet eight inches tall, Detective Grose testified at the suppression hearing that during his investigation of the robbery Wagner told him the first robber was between five feet, eight inches and five feet, eleven inches tall. 2002See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1016-18 (Colo.1987)(adopting the preponderance of evidence standard for resolving challenges to the reliability of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness). [4] Although Wagner testified at trial that she thought the first robber was approximately five feet eight inches tall, Detective Grose testified at the suppression hearing that during his investigation of the robbery Wagner told him the first robber was between five feet, eight inches and five feet, eleven inches tall. | 1 | 1 |
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Haydengreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981). 1987See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1982In Santosky v. Kramer, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a state may terminate the parent-child relationship upon proof of the alleged grounds for termination under a preponderance of evidence standard only. 1982In Santosky v. Kramer, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a state may terminate the parent-child relationship upon proof of the alleged grounds for termination under a preponderance of evidence standard only. | 4 | 1982–1982 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1982In approving the use of such an adjudication as a predicate for a termination proceeding, the court employed the three-factor balancing test basic to due process analysis, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and stated: "The product of this three-factor balancing process as applied to Colorado statutes is that the private interest affected will receive full protection, the risk of error in fact finding will not be appreciably increased, and the substantial governmental interest in providing assistance and treatment to help families with dependent or n 1982In approving the use of such an adjudication as a predicate for a termination proceeding, the court employed the three-factor balancing test basic to due process analysis, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and stated: "The product of this three-factor balancing process as applied to Colorado statutes is that the private interest affected will receive full protection, the risk of error in fact finding will not be appreciably increased, and the substantial governmental interest in providing assistance and treatment to help families with dependent or n | 2 | 1982–1982 |
People in Interest of AMD
green
2 sentences1982In People in the Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo.1982), this court considered whether a dependency adjudication determined under the preponderance of evidence standard may support an application for termination of parental rights under section 19-11-105, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8 and 1981 Supp.). 1982In People in the Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo.1982), this court considered whether a dependency adjudication determined under the preponderance of evidence standard may support an application for termination of parental rights under section 19-11-105, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8 and 1981 Supp.). | 2 | 1982–1982 |
v. Barbre
green
1 sentence2024People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Scott v. Scott Paper Company
green
2 sentences2009The only published decision we have found that has applied a different analysis in an employee theft case is Scott v. Scott Paper Co., 280 Ala. 486 , 195 So.2d 540 (1967), reversing 43 Ala.App. 532 , 195 So.2d 536 (1966). 2009The only published decision we have found that has applied a different analysis in an employee theft case is Scott v. Scott Paper Co., 280 Ala. 486 , 195 So.2d 540 (1967), reversing 43 Ala.App. 532 , 195 So.2d 536 (1966). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Scott v. Scott Paper Co.
neutral
2 sentences2009The only published decision we have found that has applied a different analysis in an employee theft case is Scott v. Scott Paper Co., 280 Ala. 486 , 195 So.2d 540 (1967), reversing 43 Ala.App. 532 , 195 So.2d 536 (1966). 2009The only published decision we have found that has applied a different analysis in an employee theft case is Scott v. Scott Paper Co., 280 Ala. 486 , 195 So.2d 540 (1967), reversing 43 Ala.App. 532 , 195 So.2d 536 (1966). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.
green
2 sentences2009The court in Itin did not reach the issue of the burden of proof, but it noted "that a majority of federal cireuits have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] actions, which also provide civil remedies based on violations of criminal offenses," and that "the [United States] Supreme Court, while not expressly reaching this issue, appears to approve of the preponderance of evidence standard." 17 P.3d at 136 n. 12 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)); see also 2009The court in Itin did not reach the issue of the burden of proof, but it noted "that a majority of federal cireuits have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] actions, which also provide civil remedies based on violations of criminal offenses," and that "the [United States] Supreme Court, while not expressly reaching this issue, appears to approve of the preponderance of evidence standard." 17 P.3d at 136 n. 12 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)); see also | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Itin v. Ungar
green
1 sentence2009The court in Itin did not reach the issue of the burden of proof, but it noted "that a majority of federal cireuits have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] actions, which also provide civil remedies based on violations of criminal offenses," and that "the [United States] Supreme Court, while not expressly reaching this issue, appears to approve of the preponderance of evidence standard." 17 P.3d at 136 n. 12 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)); see also | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Stull v. People
red
2 sentences1991The court, however, believed that this court’s adoption of the clear and convincing standard in People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981), as well as this court's decisions in People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979) and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278 , 344 P.2d 455 (1959), contained the controlling standards for ruling on the admissibility of other-crime evidence, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were not decided under the Colorado Rules of Evidence but rather were common law decisions predating the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. . 1991The court, however, believed that this court’s adoption of the clear and convincing standard in People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981), as well as this court's decisions in People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979) and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278 , 344 P.2d 455 (1959), contained the controlling standards for ruling on the admissibility of other-crime evidence, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were not decided under the Colorado Rules of Evidence but rather were common law decisions predating the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Honey
red
2 sentences1991The court, however, believed that this court’s adoption of the clear and convincing standard in People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981), as well as this court's decisions in People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979) and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278 , 344 P.2d 455 (1959), contained the controlling standards for ruling on the admissibility of other-crime evidence, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were not decided under the Colorado Rules of Evidence but rather were common law decisions predating the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. . 1991The court, however, believed that this court’s adoption of the clear and convincing standard in People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981), as well as this court's decisions in People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979) and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278 , 344 P.2d 455 (1959), contained the controlling standards for ruling on the admissibility of other-crime evidence, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were not decided under the Colorado Rules of Evidence but rather were common law decisions predating the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Botham
red
1 sentence1991The court, however, believed that this court’s adoption of the clear and convincing standard in People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981), as well as this court's decisions in People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979) and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278 , 344 P.2d 455 (1959), contained the controlling standards for ruling on the admissibility of other-crime evidence, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were not decided under the Colorado Rules of Evidence but rather were common law decisions predating the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bourjaily v. United States
green
2 sentences1988In this respect we adhere to the analysis recently employed by the United States Supreme Court in Bourjaily v. United States, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). 1988In this respect we adhere to the analysis recently employed by the United States Supreme Court in Bourjaily v. United States, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McCall v. People
green
1 sentence1987See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Guenther
green
1 sentence1987Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980-81 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.