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12 Louisiana opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bryant v. Giani Inv. Co.green1 sentence1998Co., 626 So.2d 390, 392 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993.) The preponderance of evidence standard requires a party to demonstrate that the existence of a disputed fact is highly probable, that is, much more probable than its nonexistence. | 1 | 1 |
Gauthier v. Matthewsgreen2 sentences1972In support of this contention he notes that the “harsh burden of proof arises from language in Hayes v. Hayes, 225 La. 374 , 73 So.2d 179 (1954)”, wherein the court said the following at page 180: “. . . the circumstantial proof in these cases must be so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.” Plaintiff asserts that this burden is too severe and urges this court to adopt the preponderance of evidence test as enunciated in Gauthier v. Matthews, 191 La. 326 , 185 So. 272, 273 (1938): “In actions for divorce, courts must take such evidence as the nature of the 1972In support of this contention he notes that the “harsh burden of proof arises from language in Hayes v. Hayes, 225 La. 374 , 73 So.2d 179 (1954)”, wherein the court said the following at page 180: “. . . the circumstantial proof in these cases must be so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.” Plaintiff asserts that this burden is too severe and urges this court to adopt the preponderance of evidence test as enunciated in Gauthier v. Matthews, 191 La. 326 , 185 So. 272, 273 (1938): “In actions for divorce, courts must take such evidence as the nature of the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mills
green
2 sentences1997State v. Mills, 505 So.2d 933 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 508 So.2d 65 (La. 1987). 1991State v. Mills, 505 So.2d 933 (La. | 2 | 1991–1997 |
Sevin v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty Inc.
green
2 sentences1985Sevin v. Shape Spa for Health and Beauty, Inc., 384 So.2d 1011 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980) and Burrell v. Kirkpatrick, 410 So.2d 1255 (La. 1982Sevin v. Shape Spa For Health & Beauty, Inc., 384 So.2d 1011 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980); Murray v. Haspel-Kansas Investments, 395 So.2d 453 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981). | 2 | 1982–1985 |
State v. BURTON & McCREARY
green
1 sentence2013In order to recover an amount in excess of the amount DOTD has deposited as just compensation for the taking of a landowner’s property, the property owner is required “to establish his claims by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence; speculation, conjecture, mere possibility and even unsupported probability are not sufficient to support a judgment.” State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Manuel, 93-269, p. 3 (La.App 3 Cir. 2/9/94), 640 So.2d 299, 301 , writ denied, 94-542 (La.4/29/94), 641 So.2d 203 . |7In addition, when only a portion of a defendant’s property is taken, the landowner is also | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State, Department of Transportation & Development v. Manuel
neutral
1 sentence2013In order to recover an amount in excess of the amount DOTD has deposited as just compensation for the taking of a landowner’s property, the property owner is required “to establish his claims by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence; speculation, conjecture, mere possibility and even unsupported probability are not sufficient to support a judgment.” State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Manuel, 93-269, p. 3 (La.App 3 Cir. 2/9/94), 640 So.2d 299, 301 , writ denied, 94-542 (La.4/29/94), 641 So.2d 203 . |7In addition, when only a portion of a defendant’s property is taken, the landowner is also | 1 | 2013–2013 |
STATE, DOTD v. Estate of Bickham
neutral
1 sentence2013State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Estate of Bickham, 93-1664 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/24/94) , 640 So.2d 841 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Morris v. Reve, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998Morris v. Reve, 95-310 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/18/95) , 662 So.2d 525 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Fuller
green
1 sentence1997This analysis is similar to that which would be undertaken in the context of an ineffective counsel claim wherein the defendant must meet the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Fuller, 454 So.2d 119 (La. 1984). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1997This analysis is similar to that which would be undertaken in the context of an ineffective counsel claim wherein the defendant must meet the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Fuller, 454 So.2d 119 (La. 1984). 1997This analysis is similar to that which would be undertaken in the context of an ineffective counsel claim wherein the defendant must meet the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Fuller, 454 So.2d 119 (La. 1984). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Mills
green
1 sentence1997State v. Mills, 505 So.2d 933 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 508 So.2d 65 (La. 1987). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Hall
neutral
1 sentence1997State v. Hall, 624 So.2d 927 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1182 (La.1993); State v. Moore, 575 So.2d 928 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence1997State v. Hall, 624 So.2d 927 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1182 (La.1993); State v. Moore, 575 So.2d 928 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Hall
green
1 sentence1997State v. Hall, 624 So.2d 927 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1182 (La.1993); State v. Moore, 575 So.2d 928 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
McLaughlin v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1996McLaughlin, 582 So.2d at 207 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State in Interest of AC
green
1 sentence1995State in the Interest of A.C., 93-1125 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 743 (on rehearing). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Guilbeau v. C & D Reprographics-Lafayette, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993See: Hines v. Williams, 567 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990), writ denied. 571 So.2d 653 (La.1990); DMJ v. BGB, supra. Appellants also complain that the trial judge erred in barring evidence of plaintiff's convictions. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hines v. Williams
green
1 sentence1993See: Hines v. Williams, 567 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990), writ denied. 571 So.2d 653 (La.1990); DMJ v. BGB, supra. Appellants also complain that the trial judge erred in barring evidence of plaintiff's convictions. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dmj v. Bgb
green
1 sentence1993See: Hines v. Williams, 567 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990), writ denied. 571 So.2d 653 (La.1990); DMJ v. BGB, supra. Appellants also complain that the trial judge erred in barring evidence of plaintiff's convictions. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Burrell v. Kirkpatrick
neutral
1 sentence1985Sevin v. Shape Spa for Health and Beauty, Inc., 384 So.2d 1011 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980) and Burrell v. Kirkpatrick, 410 So.2d 1255 (La. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Murray v. Haspel-Kansas Investments
green
1 sentence1982Sevin v. Shape Spa For Health & Beauty, Inc., 384 So.2d 1011 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980); Murray v. Haspel-Kansas Investments, 395 So.2d 453 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Hayes v. Hayes
green
2 sentences1972In support of this contention he notes that the “harsh burden of proof arises from language in Hayes v. Hayes, 225 La. 374 , 73 So.2d 179 (1954)”, wherein the court said the following at page 180: “. . . the circumstantial proof in these cases must be so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.” Plaintiff asserts that this burden is too severe and urges this court to adopt the preponderance of evidence test as enunciated in Gauthier v. Matthews, 191 La. 326 , 185 So. 272, 273 (1938): “In actions for divorce, courts must take such evidence as the nature of the 1972In support of this contention he notes that the “harsh burden of proof arises from language in Hayes v. Hayes, 225 La. 374 , 73 So.2d 179 (1954)”, wherein the court said the following at page 180: “. . . the circumstantial proof in these cases must be so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.” Plaintiff asserts that this burden is too severe and urges this court to adopt the preponderance of evidence test as enunciated in Gauthier v. Matthews, 191 La. 326 , 185 So. 272, 273 (1938): “In actions for divorce, courts must take such evidence as the nature of the | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.