preponderance of evidence standard in Texas

2003In re G.M. , 596 S.W.2d at 847 .

2003In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847 .

2016On appeal, the Commission asserts, that because the supreme court in City of Waco conducted a substantial-evidence review in the absence of a contested-case or adjudicative hearing, this Court should reverse the trial court’s order denying the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction and remand the case with a finding that the courts should review the Voda Order only under the substantial-evidence standard provided in Section 361.321 of the Act, not the preponderance-of-evidence standard provided in Section 361.322. 1 See Texas Comm’n on Envt’l Quality v. City of Waco, 413 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2013).

2016On appeal, the Commission asserts that because the supreme court in City of Waco conducted a substantial-evidence review in the absence of a contested-case or adjudicative hearing, this Court should reverse the trial court’s order denying the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction and remand the case with a finding that the courts should review the Voda Order only under the substantial-evidence standard provided in Section 361.321 of the Act, not the preponderance-of-evidence standard provided in Section 361.322.1 See Texas Comm’n on Envt’l Quality v. City of Waco, 413 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2013).

2004In that section, Professor McCormick notes that the federal rules are silent on the question of an admissibility burden of proof, but "[t]he most commonly accepted standard is the preponderance of evidence test." Id., § 53, at 136 n. 8. [14] 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [15] Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.

2004In that section, Professor McCormick notes that the federal rules are silent on the question of an admissibility burden of proof, but “[t]he most commonly accepted standard is the preponderance of evidence test.” Id., § 53, at 136 n. 8. . 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). .

2004In that section, Professor McCormick notes that the federal rules are silent on the question of an admissibility burden of proof, but "[t]he most commonly accepted standard is the preponderance of evidence test." Id., § 53, at 136 n. 8. [14] 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [15] Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.

2004Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). .

2004App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). [16] Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561 . [17] Rule 104(a) reads: Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).

2004Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). .

1999In Wright , the court stated: “Because such documents [which were not included in the record] are not as a matter of law insufficient to show a violation of the terms of probation, but to the contrary may have been sufficient (see McClure v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 588 ; Bennett v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 281 ; Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App. 410 S.W.2d 785 ; Smothermon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 383 S.W.2d 929 ), appellant’s failure to secure their presentation for review by this Court precludes us from any finding but that the evidence was sufficient.” Wright, 523 S.W.2d at 705 .

1999In Wright , the court stated: “Because such documents [which were not included in the record] are not as a matter of law insufficient to show a violation of the terms of probation, but to the contrary may have been sufficient (see McClure v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 588 ; Bennett v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 281 ; Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App. 410 S.W.2d 785 ; Smothermon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 383 S.W.2d 929 ), appellant’s failure to secure their presentation for review by this Court precludes us from any finding but that the evidence was sufficient.” Wright, 523 S.W.2d at 705 .

1999In Wright , the court stated: “Because such documents [which were not included in the record] are not as a matter of law insufficient to show a violation of the terms of probation, but to the contrary may have been sufficient (see McClure v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 588 ; Bennett v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 281 ; Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App. 410 S.W.2d 785 ; Smothermon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 383 S.W.2d 929 ), appellant’s failure to secure their presentation for review by this Court precludes us from any finding but that the evidence was sufficient.” Wright, 523 S.W.2d at 705 .

1999In Wright , the court stated: “Because such documents [which were not included in the record] are not as a matter of law insufficient to show a violation of the terms of probation, but to the contrary may have been sufficient (see McClure v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 588 ; Bennett v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 281 ; Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App. 410 S.W.2d 785 ; Smothermon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 383 S.W.2d 929 ), appellant’s failure to secure their presentation for review by this Court precludes us from any finding but that the evidence was sufficient.” Wright, 523 S.W.2d at 705 .

1999Battle v. State, supra, [ 571 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) ] and Wright v. State, 523 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).” The Battle opinion does not relate to documentary or record proof; it repeats the preponderance of evidence standard applicable to revocation proceedings.

1996Huddleston v. United States , 485 U.S. 681 , 687 n.5 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States , 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).

1990But because of the caution demanded by the Supreme Court in termination cases under Section 15.02, [Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.1985); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1976); Schiesser v. State, 544 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.1976); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1976)], we must sustain it.

1990But because of the caution demanded by the Supreme Court in termination cases under Section 15.02, [Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.1985); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1976); Schiesser v. State, 544 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.1976); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1976)], we must sustain it.

1990But because of the caution demanded by the Supreme Court in termination cases under Section 15.02, [Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.1985); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1976); Schiesser v. State, 544 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.1976); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1976)], we must sustain it.

1990But because of the caution demanded by the Supreme Court in termination cases under Section 15.02, [Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.1985); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1976); Schiesser v. State, 544 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.1976); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1976)], we must sustain it.

1983Freeman v. Texas Compensation Insurance Co., 586 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Civ.App.

1966In the case of Board of Firemen’s Relief & Retirement Fund Trustees of Houston v. Marks, supra, it is stated: “The party aggrieved by the administrative decision is not entitled to a trial de novo in court but must assume the burden of satisfying the courts that the administrative decision is illegal, arbitrary, or capricious; that is, that it is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence.” See also Texas State Board of Medical Examiners v. Scott, 377 S.W.2d 104 (Aus.Civ.App., Feb. 1964), where the cause was reversed and remanded for new trial because the trial court had submitted it to

1965This Court in Kee v. Baber, 157 Tex. 387 , 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957), in which three similar rules of general application promulgated by the Optometry Board were likewise under attack, recognized that broad regulatory powers, many of which are discretionary in nature, are delegated to the Board. 4 We said of that controversy: “It is not inaccurate to describe this as a dispute between two groups of optometrists, one of which emphasizes the merchandising factor of the profession or occupation and contends that the cost of suitable glasses for the using public may be greatly reduced by eliminating n

1965This Court in Kee v. Baber, 157 Tex. 387 , 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957), in which three similar rules of general application promulgated by the Optometry Board were likewise under attack, recognized that broad regulatory powers, many of which are discretionary in nature, are delegated to the Board. 4 We said of that controversy: “It is not inaccurate to describe this as a dispute between two groups of optometrists, one of which emphasizes the merchandising factor of the profession or occupation and contends that the cost of suitable glasses for the using public may be greatly reduced by eliminating n