7 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re CWWgreen2 sentences2018Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-213 provides that judicial review of forfeiture proceedings “shall be conducted in the same manner as is provided in § 4-5-322,” but reviewing courts “shall use the preponderance of evidence standard” rather than the substantial and material evidence standard “in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.” To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, the proof must “show[] that the truth of the matter asserted is more probable than not.” Urquhart, 2008 WL 2019458 , *5 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2 2005See, e.g., In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 473-74 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000), perm app denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2000). | 2 | 2 |
Lettner v. Plummergreen1 sentence2018Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-213 provides that judicial review of forfeiture proceedings “shall be conducted in the same manner as is provided in § 4-5-322,” but reviewing courts “shall use the preponderance of evidence standard” rather than the substantial and material evidence standard “in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.” To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, the proof must “show[] that the truth of the matter asserted is more probable than not.” Urquhart, 2008 WL 2019458 , *5 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2 | 1 | 1 |
State Bar Grievance Administrator v. Poslergreen2 sentences2015Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Li gon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510 ,231 *170 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 157 Ky. 92 , 162 S.W, 566, 567 (1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581 , 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standar 2015Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Li gon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510 ,231 *170 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 157 Ky. 92 , 162 S.W, 566, 567 (1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581 , 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standar | 1 | 1 |
In Re Howardgreen1 sentence2015Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Li gon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510 ,231 *170 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 157 Ky. 92 , 162 S.W, 566, 567 (1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581 , 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standar | 1 | 1 |
O'DANIEL v. Messiergreen1 sentence2003See O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Odomgreen1 sentence2001See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McEwen v. Tennessee Department of Safety
green
2 sentences2022McEwen, 173 S.W.3d at 819 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-213 (a) (“The reviewing court shall use the preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.”)). 2022McEwen, 173 S.W.3d at 819 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-213 (a) (“The reviewing court shall use the preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.”)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2015In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that' “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). 2015In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that' “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Barach
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 85 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Ruffalo
green
2 sentences2015Other Due Process Issues Relying on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 8 . 8 S.Ct. 1222 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), Mr. Walwyn asserts that, the attorney disciplinary process is “quasircriminal” in nature, and therefore, he is entitled to the same due process rights afforded criminal defendants. 2015Other Due Process Issues Relying on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 8 . 8 S.Ct. 1222 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), Mr. Walwyn asserts that, the attorney disciplinary process is “quasircriminal” in nature, and therefore, he is entitled to the same due process rights afforded criminal defendants. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Curtis v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
green
1 sentence2015Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Li gon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510 ,231 *170 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 157 Ky. 92 , 162 S.W, 566, 567 (1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581 , 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ligon v. Newman
green
1 sentence2015Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Li gon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510 ,231 *170 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 157 Ky. 92 , 162 S.W, 566, 567 (1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581 , 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In re McDonald
neutral
1 sentence2015Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Li gon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510 ,231 *170 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 157 Ky. 92 , 162 S.W, 566, 567 (1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer’s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581 , 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Estate of Acuff v. O'Linger
green
1 sentence2005CMP contends that the proper standard of proof is the preponderance of evidence standard, and as authority for this contention CMP relies principally upon the case of Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.