preponderance of evidence standard (North Dakota) · Go Syfert
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preponderance of evidence standard in North Dakota

7 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Boardgreen
wisctapp · 1992 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Exam’rs, 329 S.C. 371 , 496 S.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1998); Gandhi v. Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295, 298-300 (Ct.App.1992). [¶24] In Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461-62 , the New Hampshire Supreme Court held there was no due process or equal protection violation in the use of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings against a psychologist.

2007Exam’rs, 329 S.C. 371 , 496 S.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1998); Gandhi v. Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295, 298-300 (Ct.App.1992). [¶24] In Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461-62 , the New Hampshire Supreme Court held there was no due process or equal protection violation in the use of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings against a psychologist.

33
Anonymous v. State Board of Medical Examinersgreen
sc · 1998 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Exam’rs, 329 S.C. 371 , 496 S.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1998); Gandhi v. Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295, 298-300 (Ct.App.1992). [¶24] In Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461-62 , the New Hampshire Supreme Court held there was no due process or equal protection violation in the use of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings against a psychologist.

2007Exam’rs, 329 S.C. 371 , 496 S.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1998); Gandhi v. Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295, 298-300 (Ct.App.1992). [¶24] In Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461-62 , the New Hampshire Supreme Court held there was no due process or equal protection violation in the use of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings against a psychologist.

33
In Re the Revocation of the License of Polkgreen
nj · 1982 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶ 31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline.

2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline.

33
Addington v. Texasgreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007He claims the preponderance of evidence standard violates minimum due process requirements because “a revocation proceeding potentially takes away a private property interest, prohibits a doctor from practicing his profession, and subjects a doctor to public embarrassment.” [¶ 16] For due process purposes, the function of a standard of proof is to “ ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ,

2007He claims the preponderance of evidence standard violates minimum due process requirements because “a revocation proceeding potentially takes away a private property interest, prohibits a doctor from practicing his profession, and subjects a doctor to public embarrassment.” [¶ 16] For due process purposes, the function of a standard of proof is to “ ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ,

33
In Re WINSHIPgreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007He claims the preponderance of evidence standard violates minimum due process requirements because “a revocation proceeding potentially takes away a private property interest, prohibits a doctor from practicing his profession, and subjects a doctor to public embarrassment.” [¶ 16] For due process purposes, the function of a standard of proof is to “ ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ,

2007He claims the preponderance of evidence standard violates minimum due process requirements because “a revocation proceeding potentially takes away a private property interest, prohibits a doctor from practicing his profession, and subjects a doctor to public embarrassment.” [¶ 16] For due process purposes, the function of a standard of proof is to “ ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ,

13
Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkingreen
nd · 1979 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981We have defined the preponderance of the evidence as “evidence more worthy of belief,” or “the greater weight of the evidence,” or “testimony that brings the greater conviction of truth.” See Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 219 (N.D. 1979). *329 Gramling asserts that the Bureau gave undue weight to a statement made by him that he could make more money on disability benefits than by working.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Painter v. Abels green
wyo · 2000
2 sentences

2007Id. [¶ 23] Other courts have applied the Mathews framework and held that due process is satisfied by the preponderance of evidence standard for medical disciplinary proceedings.

2007Id. [If 23] Other courts have applied the Mathews framework and held that due process is satisfied by the preponderance of evidence standard for medical disciplinary proceedings.

32007–2007
Sjostrand v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau green
nd · 2002
2 sentences

2007Bureau, 2002 ND 125, ¶ 24 , 649 N.W.2d 537 (stating N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46 provides both a standard of review and an eviden-tiary standard of' proof for agency decisions). 1 [¶ 15] Dr. Hsu argues the preponderance of evidence standard violates the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions under the three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

2007Bureau, 2002 ND 125, ¶ 24 , 649 N.W.2d 537 (stating N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46 provides both a standard of review and an eviden-tiary standard of' proof for agency decisions). 1 [¶ 15] Dr. Hsu argues the preponderance of evidence standard violates the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions under the three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

32007–2007
State v. Leppert green
nd · 2003
2 sentences

2007He argues it is wrong to impose one standard on the medical profession and a higher standard on attorneys. [¶ 29] In State v. Leppert, 2003 ND 15, ¶¶ 7-8 , 656 N.W.2d 718 , we recently outlined our standards for equal protection challenges: The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people.

2007He argues it is wrong to impose one standard on the medical profession and a higher standard on attorneys. [¶ 29] In State v. Leppert, 2003 ND 15, ¶¶ 7-8 , 656 N.W.2d 718 , we recently outlined our standards for equal protection challenges: The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people.

32007–2007
In re Grimm green
nh · 1993
2 sentences

2007A.2d at 17; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶ 31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline.

2007Exam’rs, 329 S.C. 371 , 496 S.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1998); Gandhi v. Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295, 298-300 (Ct.App.1992). [¶24] In Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461-62 , the New Hampshire Supreme Court held there was no due process or equal protection violation in the use of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings against a psychologist.

32007–2007
Mathews v. Eldridge green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

2007Bureau, 2002 ND 125, ¶ 24 , 649 N.W.2d 537 (stating N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46 provides both a standard of review and an eviden-tiary standard of' proof for agency decisions). 1 [¶ 15] Dr. Hsu argues the preponderance of evidence standard violates the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions under the three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

2007Bureau, 2002 ND 125, ¶ 24 , 649 N.W.2d 537 (stating N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46 provides both a standard of review and an eviden-tiary standard of' proof for agency decisions). 1 [¶ 15] Dr. Hsu argues the preponderance of evidence standard violates the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions under the three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

32007–2007
Sletten v. Briggs green
nd · 1989
1 sentence

1998Id.

11998–1998
O'Brien v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau neutral
nd · 1974
2 sentences

1983O’Brien v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 379 (N.D.1974).

1983O'Brien v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 379 (N.D.1974).

11983–1983
Geo. E. Haggart, Inc. v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau green
nd · 1969
1 sentence

1981Bur., 171 N.W.2d 104 (N.D.1969), and its progeny has been replaced by legislative amendment of Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., in 1977, providing for the preponderance of evidence rule.

11981–1981
Steele v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau green
nd · 1978
2 sentences

1979In Steele, supra 273 N.W.2d at 697 , this court considered the issue of which standard of review was to be applied on appeal where the substantial evidence standard was in effect when the Bureau made its initial decision, but the preponderance of evidence standard was in effect when the ease was appealed to the Supreme Court.

1979In Steele, supra 273 N.W.2d at 697 , this court considered the issue of which standard of review was to be applied on appeal where the substantial evidence standard was in effect when the Bureau made its initial decision, but the preponderance of evidence standard was in effect when the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

11979–1979

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-01 (4) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-32.1 (4) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-19 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-49 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-50 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-03 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-06 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-07.2 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-30.1 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-31 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 75 (1952–2026) TX 47 (1965–2022) PA 40 (1985–2026) MD 32 (1972–2023) GA 25 (1936–2026) WA 21 (1984–2026) NY 17 (1904–2026) NJ 16 (1981–2021) CO 14 (1982–2024) FL 14 (1958–2024) LA 12 (1972–2013) VT 10 (1977–2016) OH 9 (1969–2025) IA 9 (1976–2023) IL 8 (1978–2018) TN 8 (2001–2022) CT 8 (1988–2009) SC 8 (2007–2022) ND 7 (1979–2007) MA 7 (1998–2014) DE 6 (2018–2026) IN 6 (1983–2013) WY 5 (1977–2024) MO 5 (1996–2014) AK 5 (1987–2023) OR 4 (1960–2007) MS 4 (1953–2003) NE 4 (1987–1998) KY 4 (1992–2025) KS 4 (1989–2024) WV 4 (1955–2025) MI 3 (1980–2025) WI 3 (1978–2023) AZ 3 (1981–2022) NM 3 (1983–1997) UT 3 (1991–1995) DC 3 (1976–1999) HI 2 (1997–2025) AR 2 (1968–2025) NV 2 (1979–1992) ID 2 (1991–2021) VA 2 (2020–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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