30 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foskey v. Foskeygreen2 sentences2000Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 737 (2), 363 S.E.2d 547 (1988); Barton v. State, 79 Ga.App. 380, 387-388 (2), 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949). 2000Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 737 (2), 363 S.E.2d 547 (1988); Barton v. State, 79 Ga.App. 380, 387-388 (2), 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949). | 5 | 5 |
Barton v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 737 (2), 363 S.E.2d 547 (1988); Barton v. State, 79 Ga.App. 380, 387-388 (2), 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949). 2000Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 737 (2), 363 S.E.2d 547 (1988); Barton v. State, 79 Ga.App. 380, 387-388 (2), 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949). | 3 | 3 |
Oehlerich v. Llewellyngreen2 sentences2013We conclude that Jones is entitled to summary judgment for the reasons explained in Division 1, supra. Oehlerich v. Llewellyn, 285 Ga. App. 738, 740-741 (2) ( 647 SE2d 399 ) (2007) (affirming summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, which called into question the degree of professional skill exercised by the defendant attorney and therefore merely duplicated the plaintiff’s unsupported claim for legal malpractice). 3. 2013We conclude that Jones is entitled to summary judgment for the reasons explained in Division 1, supra. Oehlerich v. Llewellyn, 285 Ga. App. 738, 740-741 (2) ( 647 SE2d 399 ) (2007) (affirming summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, which called into question the degree of professional skill exercised by the defendant attorney and therefore merely duplicated the plaintiff’s unsupported claim for legal malpractice). 3. | 2 | 2 |
Griffin v. Stategreen1 sentence2025“For purposes of plain error review, an affirmative waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right[.]” Griffin, 309 Ga. at 865 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Grullon v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See also Grullon v. State, 313 Ga. 40, 46-47 (2) (867 SE2d 95) (2021) (in connection with plain error standard, discussing distinction between mere failure to object and affirmative waiver of the error on appeal). 2025See also Grullon v. State, 313 Ga. 40, 46-47 (2) (867 SE2d 95) (2021) (in connection with plain error standard, discussing distinction between mere failure to object and affirmative waiver of the error on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stabilegreen1 sentence2023Rickman and Gobeil, JJ. concur. 34 See, e.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 236 (III) (A) (3) (3d Cir. 2011) (applying “‘a rule of reasonableness’” and holding that a three-month delay was not unreasonable under the circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 236 (2) (b) (“Whether the defendant or the State bears the primary responsibility for delay in reaching trial is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy[-]trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Redding v. Stategreen2 sentences2022This is likely a typographical error as Appellant filed his speedy-trial motion in September 2017, and in Redding I, we acknowledged that “[t]he trial court held a hearing — apparently on May 9, 2018 — but did not make any ruling at the time of the hearing.” 309 Ga. at 128 (3). 5 In Redding I, we noted that “[t]he trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for November 30, 2017, but, as the State concedes, there is no record that a hearing was held that day.” 309 Ga. at 128 (3). 6 Although the trial court said only that a hearing took place in October 2018, the record shows that the hearing 2022Additionally, the trial court failed to address the amount of time involved in each delay, i.e., whether Appellant or the State or both requested a one- day delay or a two-month delay to “research issues.” Similarly, in the portion of the order addressing the length-of- 5 In Redding I, we noted that “[t]he trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for November 30, 2017, but, as the State concedes, there is no record that a hearing was held that day.” 309 Ga. at 128 (2). 6 Although the trial court said only that a hearing took place in October 2018, the record shows that the hearing occurre | 1 | 1 |
Abba Gana v. Abba Ganagreen1 sentence2022Abba Gana, 251 Ga. at 343 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2021The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantees to the defendant the right to inquire about a witness’s . . . pending criminal charges in an effort to show that the witness has ‘possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives’ that may influence his testimony.” Wright v. State, 279 Ga. 498, 499 (614 SE2d 56) (2005) (citation omitted). 2021The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantees to the defendant the right to inquire about a witness’s . . . pending criminal charges in an effort to show that the witness has ‘possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives’ that may influence his testimony.” Wright v. State, 279 Ga. 498, 499 (614 SE2d 56) (2005) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Staceygreen2 sentences2016Accordingly, this issue has not been preserved for our review.” Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 602-603 (2) ( 642 SE2d 28 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2016Accordingly, this issue has not been preserved for our review.” Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 602-603 (2) ( 642 SE2d 28 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 891 , 692 S.E.2d 384 (2010). 2010See Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 891 , 692 S.E.2d 384 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Bynum v. Horizon Staffinggreen2 sentences2010“Where[, as here,] the transcript is necessary for review and [Hunt] omits it from the record on appeal, the appellate court must presume the judgment below was correct and affirm.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co., 274 Ga. 745, 747 (1) ( 559 SE2d 450 ) (2002); Bynum v. Horizon Staffing, 266 Ga. App. 337, 339 ( 596 SE2d 648 ) (2004) (burden is on appellant to show error from the record, not from assertions in his appellate brief). 2010“Where[, as here,] the transcript is necessary for review and [Hunt] omits it from the record on appeal, the appellate court must presume the judgment below was correct and affirm.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co., 274 Ga. 745, 747 (1) ( 559 SE2d 450 ) (2002); Bynum v. Horizon Staffing, 266 Ga. App. 337, 339 ( 596 SE2d 648 ) (2004) (burden is on appellant to show error from the record, not from assertions in his appellate brief). | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co.green2 sentences2010“Where[, as here,] the transcript is necessary for review and [Hunt] omits it from the record on appeal, the appellate court must presume the judgment below was correct and affirm.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co., 274 Ga. 745, 747 (1) ( 559 SE2d 450 ) (2002); Bynum v. Horizon Staffing, 266 Ga. App. 337, 339 ( 596 SE2d 648 ) (2004) (burden is on appellant to show error from the record, not from assertions in his appellate brief). 2010“Where[, as here,] the transcript is necessary for review and [Hunt] omits it from the record on appeal, the appellate court must presume the judgment below was correct and affirm.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co., 274 Ga. 745, 747 (1) ( 559 SE2d 450 ) (2002); Bynum v. Horizon Staffing, 266 Ga. App. 337, 339 ( 596 SE2d 648 ) (2004) (burden is on appellant to show error from the record, not from assertions in his appellate brief). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2002“One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 122, 124 (3) ( 404 SE2d 296 ) (1991). 2002“One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 122, 124 (3) ( 404 SE2d 296 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences1998The rule is that the scope of review is limited to the scope of the ruling in the trial court as shown by the trial record and cannot be enlarged or transformed through a process of switching, shifting.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robin *868 son v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 530-531 ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993). 3 (b) Appellant did not register an objection that “there is no way to determine which of the reports concerns the alleged illegal substance seized in the case on trial.” In fact, the record shows that defense counsel had no difficulty in recognizing the crime lab report on the inst 1998The rule is that the scope of review is limited to the scope of the ruling in the trial court as shown by the trial record and cannot be enlarged or transformed through a process of switching, shifting.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robin *868 son v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 530-531 ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993). 3 (b) Appellant did not register an objection that “there is no way to determine which of the reports concerns the alleged illegal substance seized in the case on trial.” In fact, the record shows that defense counsel had no difficulty in recognizing the crime lab report on the inst | 1 | 1 |
Siegel v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Although we are satisfied that the error appears to be the result of a slip of the tongue (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 258 ( 439 SE2d 510 )), we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury (see Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 ( 278 SE2d 386 ); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 253-254 ( 56 SE2d 512 )), particularly as all charging errors are presumed to be harmful and prejudicial unless the record shows the error to be harmless. 1995Although we are satisfied that the error appears to be the result of a slip of the tongue (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 258 ( 439 SE2d 510 )), we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury (see Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 ( 278 SE2d 386 ); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 253-254 ( 56 SE2d 512 )), particularly as all charging errors are presumed to be harmful and prejudicial unless the record shows the error to be harmless. | 1 | 1 |
Gober v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Although we are satisfied that the error appears to be the result of a slip of the tongue (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 258 ( 439 SE2d 510 )), we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury (see Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 ( 278 SE2d 386 ); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 253-254 ( 56 SE2d 512 )), particularly as all charging errors are presumed to be harmful and prejudicial unless the record shows the error to be harmless. 1995Although we are satisfied that the error appears to be the result of a slip of the tongue (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 258 ( 439 SE2d 510 )), we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury (see Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 ( 278 SE2d 386 ); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 253-254 ( 56 SE2d 512 )), particularly as all charging errors are presumed to be harmful and prejudicial unless the record shows the error to be harmless. | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Although we are satisfied that the error appears to be the result of a slip of the tongue (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 258 ( 439 SE2d 510 )), we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury (see Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 ( 278 SE2d 386 ); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 253-254 ( 56 SE2d 512 )), particularly as all charging errors are presumed to be harmful and prejudicial unless the record shows the error to be harmless. 1995Although we are satisfied that the error appears to be the result of a slip of the tongue (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 256, 258 ( 439 SE2d 510 )), we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury (see Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 ( 278 SE2d 386 ); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 253-254 ( 56 SE2d 512 )), particularly as all charging errors are presumed to be harmful and prejudicial unless the record shows the error to be harmless. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1993While ordinarily under this posture of the case we would remand for an evidentiary hearing and ruling by the trial court (see Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. 428, 430 ( 383 SE2d 115 )), under the facts of this appeal it would serve no useful purpose. 1993While ordinarily under this posture of the case we would remand for an evidentiary hearing and ruling by the trial court (see Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. 428, 430 ( 383 SE2d 115 )), under the facts of this appeal it would serve no useful purpose. | 1 | 1 |
Dye v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ). 5. 1989Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ). 5. | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brumbelow v. Hopkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ussery v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018COURT OF APPEALS RULE 33.2 (a). 1 Ussery v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta , 289 Ga. App. 255 , 258, 656 S.E.2d 882 (2008) (citation and footnote omitted). 2 During his deposition taken in 2016, the Appellee testified that he no longer had an active license to practice psychology in Georgia. 3 During the course of their sexual relationship, the Appellee provided Huddle with marijuana and the two consumed alcohol together. 4 See OCGA § 51-1-17. 5 The record shows that the hearing was to address several of the Appellee's motions including the motion for summary judgment. 2018COURT OF APPEALS RULE 33.2 (a). 1 Ussery v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta , 289 Ga. App. 255 , 258, 656 S.E.2d 882 (2008) (citation and footnote omitted). 2 During his deposition taken in 2016, the Appellee testified that he no longer had an active license to practice psychology in Georgia. 3 During the course of their sexual relationship, the Appellee provided Huddle with marijuana and the two consumed alcohol together. 4 See OCGA § 51-1-17. 5 The record shows that the hearing was to address several of the Appellee's motions including the motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Banks v. State
green
2 sentences1998Banks v. State, 230 Ga. App. 881 ( 497 SE2d 821 ) (1998). 6. 1998Banks v. State, 230 Ga. App. 881 ( 497 SE2d 821 ) (1998). 6. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1995Even though there was not detailed testimony in this regard, the rights of which defendant was advised were apparently those set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) and thus included the advising of defendant’s right to remain silent and a warning that any statement he made could and would be used against him. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bentley v. State
green
2 sentences1994Martin’s claim on appeal that allowing the added witness to testify was reversible error under Bentley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 862 ( 438 SE2d 110 ) (1993) is patently frivolous. 5. 1994Martin’s claim on appeal that allowing the added witness to testify was reversible error under Bentley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 862 ( 438 SE2d 110 ) (1993) is patently frivolous. 5. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Snyder v. State
green
2 sentences1992“We do not consider .this trial strategy to be a deficient performance which prejudiced appellant’s defense. . . .” Snyder v. State, 201 Ga. App. 66 (8) (d) ( 410 SE2d 173 ) (1991). “ ‘ “Trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel. 1992“We do not consider .this trial strategy to be a deficient performance which prejudiced appellant’s defense. . . .” Snyder v. State, 201 Ga. App. 66 (8) (d) ( 410 SE2d 173 ) (1991). “ ‘ “Trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences1986Although a different result might obtain in situations where the court gives a particular charge after initially indicating that it would not do so (see, e.g., Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 260 SE2d 355 ) (1979); Thomas v. State, 168 Ga. App. 587 (4) ( 309 SE2d 881 ) (1983); Hudson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 126 (3) ( 257 SE2d 312 ) (1979)), it is obvious that the opportunity to present a new argument in the present case, without reference to the “mere association” principle, would have availed the defendant nothing. 1986Although a different result might obtain in situations where the court gives a particular charge after initially indicating that it would not do so (see, e.g., Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 260 SE2d 355 ) (1979); Thomas v. State, 168 Ga. App. 587 (4) ( 309 SE2d 881 ) (1983); Hudson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 126 (3) ( 257 SE2d 312 ) (1979)), it is obvious that the opportunity to present a new argument in the present case, without reference to the “mere association” principle, would have availed the defendant nothing. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Maddox v. Thomas
neutral
2 sentences1986Although a different result might obtain in situations where the court gives a particular charge after initially indicating that it would not do so (see, e.g., Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 260 SE2d 355 ) (1979); Thomas v. State, 168 Ga. App. 587 (4) ( 309 SE2d 881 ) (1983); Hudson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 126 (3) ( 257 SE2d 312 ) (1979)), it is obvious that the opportunity to present a new argument in the present case, without reference to the “mere association” principle, would have availed the defendant nothing. 1986Although a different result might obtain in situations where the court gives a particular charge after initially indicating that it would not do so (see, e.g., Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 260 SE2d 355 ) (1979); Thomas v. State, 168 Ga. App. 587 (4) ( 309 SE2d 881 ) (1983); Hudson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 126 (3) ( 257 SE2d 312 ) (1979)), it is obvious that the opportunity to present a new argument in the present case, without reference to the “mere association” principle, would have availed the defendant nothing. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Hudson v. State
green
2 sentences1986Although a different result might obtain in situations where the court gives a particular charge after initially indicating that it would not do so (see, e.g., Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 260 SE2d 355 ) (1979); Thomas v. State, 168 Ga. App. 587 (4) ( 309 SE2d 881 ) (1983); Hudson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 126 (3) ( 257 SE2d 312 ) (1979)), it is obvious that the opportunity to present a new argument in the present case, without reference to the “mere association” principle, would have availed the defendant nothing. 1986Although a different result might obtain in situations where the court gives a particular charge after initially indicating that it would not do so (see, e.g., Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 260 SE2d 355 ) (1979); Thomas v. State, 168 Ga. App. 587 (4) ( 309 SE2d 881 ) (1983); Hudson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 126 (3) ( 257 SE2d 312 ) (1979)), it is obvious that the opportunity to present a new argument in the present case, without reference to the “mere association” principle, would have availed the defendant nothing. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Davis v. Alaska green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Favors v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1983For these reasons, appellant's argument that the trial court improperly prohibited him from using the witness' juvenile record for purposes of impeachment is without merit, and we thus do not need to reach appellant's contentions regarding Davis v. Alaska, supra. See generally Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80 (3) ( 214 SE2d 645 ) (1975); Gilstrap v. State, 250 Ga. 814 (2) ( 301 SE2d 277 ) (1983); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 190 (3) ( 267 SE2d 826 ) (1980). 1983For these reasons, appellant's argument that the trial court improperly prohibited him from using the witness' juvenile record for purposes of impeachment is without merit, and we thus do not need to reach appellant's contentions regarding Davis v. Alaska, supra. See generally Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80 (3) ( 214 SE2d 645 ) (1975); Gilstrap v. State, 250 Ga. 814 (2) ( 301 SE2d 277 ) (1983); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 190 (3) ( 267 SE2d 826 ) (1980). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gilstrap v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Hobbs v. Hobbs neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| James v. State green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| James v. Hudson green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.