record shows defense in Florida

2015See, e.g., Capehart v. State, 583 So. 2d 1009, 1013 (Fla. 1991) (“We find no merit to Capehart’s argument that the trial court erred in permitting the state’s fingerprint - 47 - expert to testify that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement confirmed his conclusions because the record shows that defense counsel ‘opened the door’ during cross-examination.”).

2014See, e.g., Capehart v. State, 583 So.2d 1009, 1013 (Fla.1991) (“We find no merit to Capehart’s argument that the trial court erred in permitting the state’s fingerprint expert to testify that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement confirmed his conclusions because the record shows that defense counsel ‘opened the door’ during cross-examination.”).

2020See Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312, 1323 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in directing defense counsel to ask a question concerning the defendant’s young age as a factor in deciding whether to impose the death penalty “generically” where the record reflected that “the trial court left defense counsel with plenty of latitude to discuss mitigating circumstances with the jurors in the context of the legal instructions that would be given by the court”); Farina v. State, 679 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the trial court did not improperly r

2020See Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312, 1323 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in directing defense counsel to ask a question concerning the defendant’s young age as a factor in deciding whether to impose the death penalty “generically” where the record reflected that “the trial court left defense counsel with plenty of latitude to discuss mitigating circumstances with the jurors in the context of the legal instructions that would be given by the court”); Farina v. State, 679 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the trial court did not improperly r

2020See Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312, 1323 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in directing defense counsel to ask a question concerning the defendant’s young age as a factor in deciding whether to impose the death penalty “generically” where the record reflected that “the trial court left defense counsel with plenty of latitude to discuss mitigating circumstances with the jurors in the context of the legal instructions that would be given by the court”); Farina v. State, 679 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the trial court did not improperly r

2019Thompson did not suggest what line of testimony would have been more effective in impeaching Lampley “or how the failure to do so affected his trial.” See Mohr v. State, 17 So. 3d 1249, 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

2013“Absent any inconsistent express covenants to the contrary, every lease carries an implied covenant of peaceable and quiet enjoyment.” McClosky v. Martin, 56 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla.1951) (citing Hankins v. Smith, 103 Fla. 892 , 138 So. 494 (1931)).

2010See Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 130 (Fla.2001); Thomas v. State, 730 So.2d 667, 668-69 (Fla.1998).

2010See Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 130 (Fla.2001); Thomas v. State, 730 So.2d 667, 668-69 (Fla.1998).

2006Smith did not make this claim in his postconviction motion, the circuit court did not address it, and it is not preserved. [6] At trial, the evidence was used to link the bullets for Smith's uncle's gun with the lead fragment found on the victim. [7] His brother and the aunt who raised him after his mother's death testified before the jury, and his sister testified in the hearing held pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [8] Smith alleges that the State's failure to disclose pertinent facts undermines our determination that the evidence of Smith's commission of a robbery wit

2005Furthermore, as this Court explained *179 in Reese v. State, 728 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla.1999), when a case is remanded for a new sentencing order based on Campbell error, "the court is to conduct a new hearing, giving both parties an opportunity to present argument and submit sentencing memoranda before determining an appropriate sentence." However, "[n]o new evidence shall be introduced at the hearing." Id.

2005Furthermore, as this Court explained *179 in Reese v. State, 728 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla.1999), when a case is remanded for a new sentencing order based on Campbell error, "the court is to conduct a new hearing, giving both parties an opportunity to present argument and submit sentencing memoranda before determining an appropriate sentence." However, "[n]o new evidence shall be introduced at the hearing." Id.

1996Compare Flanning v. State, 597 So.2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 605 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 1992). [2] Here the record shows that defense counsel also wanted the case over and done with because he had obligations in another case in another part of the state later in the week. [3] In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 , 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1906 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of reducing juries from twelve to six, after noting that the Sixth Amendment mandates a jury of sufficient size to promote group deliberation, to insulate members from outside int

1996Compare Flanning v. State, 597 So.2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 605 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 1992). [2] Here the record shows that defense counsel also wanted the case over and done with because he had obligations in another case in another part of the state later in the week. [3] In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 , 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1906 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of reducing juries from twelve to six, after noting that the Sixth Amendment mandates a jury of sufficient size to promote group deliberation, to insulate members from outside int

1996Compare Flanning v. State, 597 So.2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 605 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 1992). [2] Here the record shows that defense counsel also wanted the case over and done with because he had obligations in another case in another part of the state later in the week. [3] In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 , 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1906 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of reducing juries from twelve to six, after noting that the Sixth Amendment mandates a jury of sufficient size to promote group deliberation, to insulate members from outside int

1995See Rhoden, 448 So.2d at 1016-1017 .

1995Jones v. State, 569 So.2d 1234, 1237 (Fla. 1990).

1984See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709-11 (1967); § 924.33, Fla.Stat. (1983).

1984See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709-11 (1967); § 924.33, Fla.Stat. (1983).

1978In Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.1968), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said: "It is now clear that Brady imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution to produce at the appropriate time requested evidence which is materially favorable to the accused either as direct or impeaching evidence." The record shows that defense counsel assiduously sought all relevant data from the State concerning Haskew's bargain, that this bargain was brought out before the jury in an endeavor to discredit Haskew's testimony, and that Haskew's credibility was a dominant issue, if not the domina

1968That burden is discharged where the record shows error which, `within the range of a reasonable probability, may have affected the verdict.' Braswell v. United States, 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 597, 602 (1952); Bacino v. United States, 10 Cir., 316 F.2d 11, 14 (1963).

1968That burden is discharged where the record shows error which, `within the range of a reasonable probability, may have affected the verdict.' Braswell v. United States, 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 597, 602 (1952); Bacino v. United States, 10 Cir., 316 F.2d 11, 14 (1963).