record shows error in Maryland

1982After discussing Duffy and pointing to the possible harm which may have existed in that case, the Court stated in La Guardia ( id. at 458 ): "We hold that if the record shows affirmatively that the appellant was prejudiced by an improper communication of the judge with the jury, there is reversible error; and also that if the record shows error by such communication, but does not show whether or not the error was prejudicial, it is presumed to be prejudicial and requires a reversal. *562 Little v. United States, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 861 , 96 A.L.R. 889 ; Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 9 Cir., 91

1960As to the latter it was stated (in part) that “if the record shows error by such communication, but does not show whether or not the error was prejudicial, it is presumed to be prejudicial and requires a reversal.” 190 Md. at 458 .

1998On the other hand, if the record shows affirmatively that the communication had no ‘tendency to influence the verdict’ (Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 474 , 135 A. 189, 195 ), the judge’s impropriety in communicating with the jury out of the presence of the defendant does not require a reversal.” Id. at 458 , 58 A.2d at 917 . 9 In this case, we decided that the communication, “had no direct relation to the verdict whatever *350 and no possible indirect constraining violation.” Id. at 459 , 58 A.2d at 917 .

1998On the other hand, if the record shows affirmatively that the communication had no ‘tendency to influence the verdict’ (Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 474 , 135 A. 189, 195 ), the judge’s impropriety in communicating with the jury out of the presence of the defendant does not require a reversal.” Id. at 458 , 58 A.2d at 917 . 9 In this case, we decided that the communication, “had no direct relation to the verdict whatever *350 and no possible indirect constraining violation.” Id. at 459 , 58 A.2d at 917 .

1982After discussing Duffy and pointing to the possible harm which may have existed in that case, the Court stated in La Guardia ( id. at 458 ): "We hold that if the record shows affirmatively that the appellant was prejudiced by an improper communication of the judge with the jury, there is reversible error; and also that if the record shows error by such communication, but does not show whether or not the error was prejudicial, it is presumed to be prejudicial and requires a reversal. *562 Little v. United States, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 861 , 96 A.L.R. 889 ; Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 9 Cir., 91

1982After discussing Duffy and pointing to the possible harm which may have existed in that case, the Court stated in La Guardia ( id. at 458 ): "We hold that if the record shows affirmatively that the appellant was prejudiced by an improper communication of the judge with the jury, there is reversible error; and also that if the record shows error by such communication, but does not show whether or not the error was prejudicial, it is presumed to be prejudicial and requires a reversal. *562 Little v. United States, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 861 , 96 A.L.R. 889 ; Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 9 Cir., 91

1982After discussing Duffy and pointing to the possible harm which may have existed in that case, the Court stated in La Guardia ( id. at 458 ): "We hold that if the record shows affirmatively that the appellant was prejudiced by an improper communication of the judge with the jury, there is reversible error; and also that if the record shows error by such communication, but does not show whether or not the error was prejudicial, it is presumed to be prejudicial and requires a reversal. *562 Little v. United States, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 861 , 96 A.L.R. 889 ; Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 9 Cir., 91

1982Little v. United States, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 861 , 96 A.L.R. 889 ; Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 805, 810 .

1982On the other hand, if the record shows affirmatively that the communication had no `tendency to influence the verdict' ( Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 474 , 135 A. 189, 195 ), the judge's impropriety in communicating with the jury out of the presence of the defendant does not require a reversal." The above-quoted harmless error standard is, in substance, the same as the general test for harmless error in criminal cases adopted by us in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). [6] Supplemental communications from the court to the jury, outside of the defendant's presence, were al

1982On the other hand, if the record shows affirmatively that the communication had no `tendency to influence the verdict' ( Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 474 , 135 A. 189, 195 ), the judge's impropriety in communicating with the jury out of the presence of the defendant does not require a reversal." The above-quoted harmless error standard is, in substance, the same as the general test for harmless error in criminal cases adopted by us in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). [6] Supplemental communications from the court to the jury, outside of the defendant's presence, were al

1982On the other hand, if the record shows affirmatively that the communication had no `tendency to influence the verdict' ( Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 474 , 135 A. 189, 195 ), the judge's impropriety in communicating with the jury out of the presence of the defendant does not require a reversal." The above-quoted harmless error standard is, in substance, the same as the general test for harmless error in criminal cases adopted by us in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). [6] Supplemental communications from the court to the jury, outside of the defendant's presence, were al

1982On the other hand, if the record shows affirmatively that the communication had no `tendency to influence the verdict' ( Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 474 , 135 A. 189, 195 ), the judge's impropriety in communicating with the jury out of the presence of the defendant does not require a reversal." The above-quoted harmless error standard is, in substance, the same as the general test for harmless error in criminal cases adopted by us in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). [6] Supplemental communications from the court to the jury, outside of the defendant's presence, were al

1976Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 , 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969); Barker v. Wingo, supra; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30 , 26 L.Ed.2d 26 , 90 S. Ct. 1564 (1970).

1976Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 , 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969); Barker v. Wingo, supra; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30 , 26 L.Ed.2d 26 , 90 S. Ct. 1564 (1970).

1976Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 , 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969); Barker v. Wingo, supra; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30 , 26 L.Ed.2d 26 , 90 S. Ct. 1564 (1970).

1976Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607 , 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969); Barker v. Wingo, supra; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30 , 26 L.Ed.2d 26 , 90 S. Ct. 1564 (1970).

1914In cases where fraud and undue influence are alleged groat latitude is allowed in the introduction of evidence (Griffith v. Diffenderffer, supra; Hoppe v. Byers, supra; Hiss v. Weik, supra), and the record shows that that rule was followed by the Court and counsel in this case.

1914In cases where fraud and undue influence are alleged groat latitude is allowed in the introduction of evidence (Griffith v. Diffenderffer, supra; Hoppe v. Byers, supra; Hiss v. Weik, supra), and the record shows that that rule was followed by the Court and counsel in this case.

1914In cases where fraud and undue influence are alleged groat latitude is allowed in the introduction of evidence (Griffith v. Diffenderffer, supra; Hoppe v. Byers, supra; Hiss v. Weik, supra), and the record shows that that rule was followed by the Court and counsel in this case.