record shows defense in Colorado

2015See, e.g., United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116 , 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true 'waiver,' which will negate even plain error review.") (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 , 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as "well established" law); accord United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565 , 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and "[h]aving made th

2015See, e.g. , United States v. Yu-Leung , 51 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate even plain error review.”) (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones , 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as “well established” law); accord United States v. Verdugo , 617 F.3d 565, 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and “[h]aving made t

2015See, e.g., United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116 , 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true 'waiver,' which will negate even plain error review.") (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 , 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as "well established" law); accord United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565 , 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and "[h]aving made th

2015See, e.g. , United States v. Yu-Leung , 51 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate even plain error review.”) (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones , 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as “well established” law); accord United States v. Verdugo , 617 F.3d 565, 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and “[h]aving made t

1912The following decisions may be consulted as supporting the foregoing conclusions: Omaha etc. Co. v. Tabor; 13 Colo. 41, 54-55, 58-59 ; Green v. Taney, 7 Colo. 278 ; Keener v. Wilkinson, 33 Colo. 445 ; Farmers’ etc. Co. v. Trombly, 17 Colo. App. 513 ; Rickey v. Brady, 18 Colo. App. 158 ; Miller v. Kinsel, 20 Colo. App. 346 ; Hugus v. Hardenburg, 19 Colo. App. 464 , 472.

1912The following decisions may be consulted as supporting the foregoing conclusions: Omaha etc. Co. v. Tabor; 13 Colo. 41, 54-55, 58-59 ; Green v. Taney, 7 Colo. 278 ; Keener v. Wilkinson, 33 Colo. 445 ; Farmers’ etc. Co. v. Trombly, 17 Colo. App. 513 ; Rickey v. Brady, 18 Colo. App. 158 ; Miller v. Kinsel, 20 Colo. App. 346 ; Hugus v. Hardenburg, 19 Colo. App. 464 , 472.

2015See, e.g., United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116 , 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true 'waiver,' which will negate even plain error review.") (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 , 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as "well established" law); accord United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565 , 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and "[h]aving made th

2015See, e.g. , United States v. Yu-Leung , 51 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate even plain error review.”) (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones , 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as “well established” law); accord United States v. Verdugo , 617 F.3d 565, 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and “[h]aving made t

2015See, e.g., United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116 , 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true 'waiver,' which will negate even plain error review.") (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 , 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as "well established" law); accord United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565 , 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and "[h]aving made th

2015See, e.g. , United States v. Yu-Leung , 51 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“If, however, the party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate even plain error review.”) (citations and footnote omitted); United States v. Quinones , 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Yu-Leung as “well established” law); accord United States v. Verdugo , 617 F.3d 565, 578 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that while unpreserved claims are usually reviewed for plain error, counsel failed to object for tactical reasons, and “[h]aving made t

1990See, e.g., Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo.1982) ("Even where the record shows defense counsel has given some explanation to his client of the count to which the plea of guilty is tendered, we have held that this showing by itself does not constitute the type of demonstration sufficient to justify the conclusion that the defendant knew the critical elements of the charge when the plea of guilty was entered.”); People v. Mason, Jr., 176 Colo. 544, 545-46 , 491 P.2d 1383, 1383-84 (1971) (defense counsel’s explanation to the defendant of charge against him held insufficient to satisfy

1990See, e.g., Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo.1982) ("Even where the record shows defense counsel has given some explanation to his client of the count to which the plea of guilty is tendered, we have held that this showing by itself does not constitute the type of demonstration sufficient to justify the conclusion that the defendant knew the critical elements of the charge when the plea of guilty was entered.”); People v. Mason, Jr., 176 Colo. 544, 545-46 , 491 P.2d 1383, 1383-84 (1971) (defense counsel’s explanation to the defendant of charge against him held insufficient to satisfy

2025“The concept of ‘opening the door’ represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression.” People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996). 49 ¶ 110 The record shows that the defense opened the door to admission of the medical testimony by arguing that A.R. willingly engaged in sex with Plascencia.

2019Cf. People v. Allgier, 2018 COA 122, ¶¶ 4-28 (holding that defense counsel did not waive for appellate review a CRE 403 argument regarding the admission of certain exhibits even though defense counsel said “no objection” when the prosecution moved to introduce them because the “record [did] not foreclose the possibility that defense counsel overlooked the possible prejudice . . . .”).

2011Thus, I would conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defense counsel's repeatedly examining Cordova regarding the timing of his meeting with the detective and his plea agreement did not materially advance the "truth-seeking function of the trial." People v. James, 40 P.3d 36, 48 (Colo.App.2001).

2011Cf. People v. Johnson, 30 P.3d 718, 726 (Colo.App.2000) (it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to choose whether to permit a party to recall a witness).

1990See, e.g., Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo.1982) ("Even where the record shows defense counsel has given some explanation to his client of the count to which the plea of guilty is tendered, we have held that this showing by itself does not constitute the type of demonstration sufficient to justify the conclusion that the defendant knew the critical elements of the charge when the plea of guilty was entered.”); People v. Mason, Jr., 176 Colo. 544, 545-46 , 491 P.2d 1383, 1383-84 (1971) (defense counsel’s explanation to the defendant of charge against him held insufficient to satisfy

1985See In re Marriage of Nichols, 38 Colo.App. 82 , 553 P.2d 77 (1976).

1985See In re Marriage of Nichols, 38 Colo.App. 82 , 553 P.2d 77 (1976).