victim test in Illinois

2020Edmondson, 2018 IL App (1st) 151381, ¶ 63 . ¶ 64 Mr. Willingham argues that the facts of his case are the kind of unusual facts that could confuse the jury and are “identical” to Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103288—a case decided almost 14 years after his appeal—in which this court reversed an attempted murder conviction based on the trial court’s failure to specify the name of the victim in the instruction.

2020Edmondson, 2018 IL App (1st) 151381, ¶ 63 . ¶ 64 Mr. Willingham argues that the facts of his case are the kind of unusual facts that could confuse the jury and are “identical” to Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103288—a case decided almost 14 years after his appeal—in which this court reversed an attempted murder conviction based on the trial court’s failure to specify the name of the victim in the instruction.

2020Edmondson, 2018 IL App (1st) 151381, ¶ 63 . ¶ 64 Mr. Willingham argues that the facts of his case are the kind of unusual facts that could confuse the jury and are “identical” to Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103288—a case decided almost 14 years after his appeal—in which this court reversed an attempted murder conviction based on the trial court’s failure to specify the name of the victim in the instruction.

2020Edmondson, 2018 IL App (1st) 151381, ¶ 63 . ¶ 64 Mr. Willingham argues that the facts of his case are the kind of unusual facts that could confuse the jury and are “identical” to Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103288—a case decided almost 14 years after his appeal—in which this court reversed an attempted murder conviction based on the trial court’s failure to specify the name of the victim in the instruction.

2011Joya, 319 Ill.App.3d at 376 , 253 Ill.Dec. 158 , 744 N.E.2d 891 .

2011Joya, 319 Ill.App.3d at 376 , 253 Ill.Dec. 158 , 744 N.E.2d 891 .

2008Nor is it a defense that the accused thought -10- No. 2--06--0334 the victim was older than 13, as this defendant stated in his post-arrest statement." Barfield, 187 Ill.

2008Nor is it a defense that the accused thought the victim was older than 13, as this defendant stated in his post-arrest statement.” Barfield, 187 Ill.

2006Lee, 342 Ill.

2006Lee, 342 Ill.

1998W.D., 194 Ill.

1998W.D. , 194 Ill.

2026Relying on its prior decision in State v. Craig, 112 A.3d 559 (N.H. 2015), the Dunbar court concluded that the defendant’s posts violated this prohibition, reasoning as follows: “Facebook is a widely used social media website. [Citation.] The site is free to use by anyone with an email account, and the site allows users to share information, maintain a profile page, and send messages to other users, among other functions. [Citation.] A Facebook profile page is a webpage that is intended to convey information about the user. [Citation.] By default, a Facebook profile page is public, and when a

2026Relying on its prior decision in State v. Craig, 112 A.3d 559 (N.H. 2015), the Dunbar court concluded that the defendant’s posts violated this prohibition, reasoning as follows: “Facebook is a widely used social media website. [Citation.] The site is free to use by anyone with an email account, and the site allows users to share information, maintain a profile page, and send messages to other users, among other functions. [Citation.] A Facebook profile page is a webpage that is intended to convey information about the user. [Citation.] By default, a Facebook profile page is public, and when a

2025People v. Morris, 2013 IL App (1st) 110413, ¶ 74 . ¶ 16 “Generally, consent of the victim is not a defense in a criminal prosecution” (People v. Ford, 2015 IL App (3d) 130810 , ¶ 21) because “a criminal offense is a wrong -4- affecting the general public, at least indirectly, and consequently cannot be licensed by the individual directly harmed.” Wayne R.

2024People v. Mpulamasaka, 2016 IL App (2d) 130703 , ¶ 96. ¶ 32 Consent by the victim is a defense to criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.70(a) (West 2020). “‘Consent’ means a freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.” Id. § 11-0.1.

2024People v. Mpulamasaka, 2016 IL App (2d) 130703 , ¶ 96. ¶ 32 Consent by the victim is a defense to criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.70(a) (West 2020). “‘Consent’ means a freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.” Id. § 11-0.1.

2011Farmer relies on People v. Torres, 209 Ill.App.3d 314, 316 , 154 Ill.Dec. 157 , 568 N.E.2d 157 (1991), where counsel in an aggravated sexual assault case clearly misunderstood what qualified as "penetration" under the applicable statute and mistakenly believed that the fact that defendant's family relation to the victim was a defense.

2011Farmer relies on People v. Torres, 209 Ill.App.3d 314, 316 , 154 Ill.Dec. 157 , 568 N.E.2d 157 (1991), where counsel in an aggravated sexual assault case clearly misunderstood what qualified as "penetration" under the applicable statute and mistakenly believed that the fact that defendant's family relation to the victim was a defense.

2011Joya, 319 Ill.App.3d at 376 , 253 Ill.Dec. 158 , 744 N.E.2d 891 .

2004In People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111 , 492 N.E.2d 1303 (1986), our supreme court stated as follows: “A sentencing body ‘ “ ‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [it] may consider, or the source from which it may come5 [citations].55 5 [Citation.] The evidence considered by the sentencing body must be both relevant and reliable [citations], the determination of which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge [citations].

2004In People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111 , 492 N.E.2d 1303 (1986), our supreme court stated as follows: “A sentencing body ‘ “ ‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [it] may consider, or the source from which it may come5 [citations].55 5 [Citation.] The evidence considered by the sentencing body must be both relevant and reliable [citations], the determination of which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge [citations].

1992App. 3d 503 , 546 N.E.2d 71 ), and based upon the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court’s express finding that defendant specifically intended to kill the victim was error.

1992App. 3d 88 , 497 N.E.2d 433 , the court held that a victim of a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act did not have to assert a public injury.

1992In Beaton & Associates, Ltd. v. Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Co. (1987), 159 Ill.

1991People v. Hickman (1973), 9 Ill.

1990People v. Cleveland (1986), 140 Ill.

1988Thus, admission of the prior consistent statement was erroneous (see People v. Gibson (1983), 117 Ill.

1985App. 3d 1060 , 481 N.E.2d 826 , in which the trial court arbitrarily curtailed cross-examination of the victim in violation of the defendant’s right to confront his accuser.

1983Furthermore, a comment concerning the trial tactics of ‘all’ defense attorneys cannot be said to be based on the evidence and does little to help the jury resolve the issues in the case.” (People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497-98 .) The court also found that the prosecution’s argument purported to charge counsel with fabrication of a defense bordering on subornation of perjury. ( 97 Ill. 2d 487, 499 .) Accordingly, we hold that the prosecution’s closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial.

1983Furthermore, a comment concerning the trial tactics of ‘all’ defense attorneys cannot be said to be based on the evidence and does little to help the jury resolve the issues in the case.” (People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497-98 .) The court also found that the prosecution’s argument purported to charge counsel with fabrication of a defense bordering on subornation of perjury. ( 97 Ill. 2d 487, 499 .) Accordingly, we hold that the prosecution’s closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial.