26 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grissom v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Grissom v. State, 296 Ga. 406, 410 (1) ( 768 SE2d 494 ) (2015) (explaining “required evidence” test). “[M]alice murder requires proof of, among other things, the victim’s death, a fact which is not required to support” false imprisonment; the latter requires proof that Johnson did arrest, confine, and detain the victim in violation of her personal liberty. 2017Grissom v. State, 296 Ga. 406, 410 (1) ( 768 SE2d 494 ) (2015) (explaining “required evidence” test). “[M]alice murder requires proof of, among other things, the victim’s death, a fact which is not required to support” false imprisonment; the latter requires proof that Johnson did arrest, confine, and detain the victim in violation of her personal liberty. | 2 | 2 |
McDonald v. Stategreen2 sentences2017McDonald v. State, 296 Ga. 643, 649-650 (5) ( 770 SE2d 6 ) (2015). 2017McDonald v. State, 296 Ga. 643, 649-650 (5) ( 770 SE2d 6 ) (2015). | 2 | 2 |
Vasquez v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 225 (2) ( 830 SE2d 143 ) (2019). 2024See Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 225 (2) ( 830 SE2d 143 ) (2019). | 1 | 1 |
Strong v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See also Strong, 309 Ga. at 318 n.22 (holding that the admission of nine prior acts not involving the defendant and the victim was error, but noting that two other incidents involving the defendant and the victim “may have been admissible to show [the defendant] and [the victim’s] relationship”) (citing Flowers, 307 Ga. at 621 (2)). (b) Miller’s argument that the undue prejudicial impact of the prior difficulties substantially outweighs their probative value likewise fails. 2024See also Strong, 309 Ga. at 318 n.22 (holding that the admission of nine prior acts not involving the defendant and the victim was error, but noting that two other incidents involving the defendant and the victim “may have been admissible to show [the defendant] and [the victim’s] relationship”) (citing to Flowers, 307 Ga. at 621). (b) Miller’s argument that the undue prejudicial impact of the prior difficulties substantially outweighs their probative value likewise fails. | 1 | 1 |
Flowers v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See also Strong, 309 Ga. at 318 n.22 (holding that the admission of nine prior acts not involving the defendant and the victim was error, but noting that two other incidents involving the defendant and the victim “may have been admissible to show [the defendant] and [the victim’s] relationship”) (citing Flowers, 307 Ga. at 621 (2)). (b) Miller’s argument that the undue prejudicial impact of the prior difficulties substantially outweighs their probative value likewise fails. 2024See also Strong, 309 Ga. at 318 n.22 (holding that the admission of nine prior acts not involving the defendant and the victim was error, but noting that two other incidents involving the defendant and the victim “may have been admissible to show [the defendant] and [the victim’s] relationship”) (citing to Flowers, 307 Ga. at 621). (b) Miller’s argument that the undue prejudicial impact of the prior difficulties substantially outweighs their probative value likewise fails. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2024See id. (b) Alternatively, Padilla-Garcia contends that the trial court improperly prejudged the facts by instructing the jury that consent of the victim is not a defense to the crime. | 1 | 1 |
PERCELL v. the STATE.green2 sentences2020See also Percell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 219, 222 (3) ( 816 SE2d 344 ) (2018) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration); Freeman v. State, 333 Ga. App. 6, 12 (2) ( 775 SE2d 258 ) (2015) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration). 2020See also Percell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 219, 222 (3) ( 816 SE2d 344 ) (2018) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration); Freeman v. State, 333 Ga. App. 6, 12 (2) ( 775 SE2d 258 ) (2015) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration). | 1 | 1 |
Pratt v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Pratt v. State, 167 Ga. App. 819, 820 (1) ( 307 SE2d 714 ) (1983). 2020See Pratt v. State, 167 Ga. App. 819, 820 (1) ( 307 SE2d 714 ) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. the Stategreen2 sentences2020See also Percell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 219, 222 (3) ( 816 SE2d 344 ) (2018) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration); Freeman v. State, 333 Ga. App. 6, 12 (2) ( 775 SE2d 258 ) (2015) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration). 2020See also Percell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 219, 222 (3) ( 816 SE2d 344 ) (2018) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration); Freeman v. State, 333 Ga. App. 6, 12 (2) ( 775 SE2d 258 ) (2015) (excluding a victim from the rule of sequestration). | 1 | 1 |
Danaipour v. McLareygreen1 sentence2017Evid. 803 (4) provided “the physician makes clear to the victim that the inquiry into the 18 identity of the abuser is important to diagnosis and treatment, and the victim manifests such an understanding.” Id. at 438 (II). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harvey M. Renvillegreen1 sentence2017Evid. 803 (4) provided "the physician makes clear to the victim that the inquiry into the identity of the abuser is important to diagnosis and treatment, and the victim manifests such an understanding." Id. at 438 (II). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Godfreygreen2 sentences2013See State v. Godfrey, 309 Ga. App. 234, 238, n. 1 ( 709 SE2d 572 ) (2011) (“Former OCGA § 17-3-1 (c), [which] provided a seven-year limitation period for prosecutions involving victims under the age of 14, . . . [is] applicable to offenses committed prior to 2002.”). 7 For crimes committed during the period beginning on July 1, 1992, and ending on June 30, 2012, if the victim of a violation of: . . . (5) Child molestation or aggravated child molestation, as defined in Code Section 16-6-4; . . . [or] (7) Incest, as defined in Code Section 16-6-22, is under 16 years of age on the date of the vio 2013See State v. Godfrey, 309 Ga. App. 234, 238, n. 1 ( 709 SE2d 572 ) (2011) (“Former OCGA § 17-3-1 (c), [which] provided a seven-year limitation period for prosecutions involving victims under the age of 14, . . . [is] applicable to offenses committed prior to 2002.”). 7 For crimes committed during the period beginning on July 1, 1992, and ending on June 30, 2012, if the victim of a violation of: . . . (5) Child molestation or aggravated child molestation, as defined in Code Section 16-6-4; . . . [or] (7) Incest, as defined in Code Section 16-6-22, is under 16 years of age on the date of the vio | 1 | 1 |
Hervey v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Hervey v. State, 308 Ga. App. 290, 292 ( 707 SE2d 189 ) (2011); see also Davidson v. State, 295 Ga. App. 702, 704-706 ( 673 SE2d 91 ) (2009) (the evidence was sufficient to prove a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior and, thus, supports a conviction for aggravated stalking, where the defendant telephoned the victim in violation of a condition of probation, which was preceded by threats and conduct that predated the imposition of the probation condition). 2012See Hervey v. State, 308 Ga. App. 290, 292 ( 707 SE2d 189 ) (2011); see also Davidson v. State, 295 Ga. App. 702, 704-706 ( 673 SE2d 91 ) (2009) (the evidence was sufficient to prove a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior and, thus, supports a conviction for aggravated stalking, where the defendant telephoned the victim in violation of a condition of probation, which was preceded by threats and conduct that predated the imposition of the probation condition). | 1 | 1 |
Davidson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Hervey v. State, 308 Ga. App. 290, 292 ( 707 SE2d 189 ) (2011); see also Davidson v. State, 295 Ga. App. 702, 704-706 ( 673 SE2d 91 ) (2009) (the evidence was sufficient to prove a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior and, thus, supports a conviction for aggravated stalking, where the defendant telephoned the victim in violation of a condition of probation, which was preceded by threats and conduct that predated the imposition of the probation condition). 2012See Hervey v. State, 308 Ga. App. 290, 292 ( 707 SE2d 189 ) (2011); see also Davidson v. State, 295 Ga. App. 702, 704-706 ( 673 SE2d 91 ) (2009) (the evidence was sufficient to prove a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior and, thus, supports a conviction for aggravated stalking, where the defendant telephoned the victim in violation of a condition of probation, which was preceded by threats and conduct that predated the imposition of the probation condition). | 1 | 1 |
Haisman v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 899 (2) ( 252 SE2d 397 ) (1979). 3 It should be noted that OCGA § 17-3-2.1 expressly excludes from periods of limitation prosecution for certain offenses, including the situation of a victim of a violation of OCGA § 16-5-70, relating to cruelty to children if the victim is under 16 years of age on the date of the violation. 2011Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 899 (2) ( 252 SE2d 397 ) (1979). 3 It should be noted that OCGA § 17-3-2.1 expressly excludes from periods of limitation prosecution for certain offenses, including the situation of a victim of a violation of OCGA § 16-5-70, relating to cruelty to children if the victim is under 16 years of age on the date of the violation. | 1 | 1 |
Brittian v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Brittian, supra, 274 Ga. App. at 865 (2) (identification of defendant was independently supported by testimony of a passenger and the fact that vehicle was co-registered to defendant). 5. 2010See Brittian, supra, 274 Ga. App. at 865 (2) (identification of defendant was independently supported by testimony of a passenger and the fact that vehicle was co-registered to defendant). 5. | 1 | 1 |
Bogan v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Bogan v. State, 255 Ga. App. 413, 414 (1) ( 565 SE2d 588 ) (2002). 2. 2006See Bogan v. State, 255 Ga. App. 413, 414 (1) ( 565 SE2d 588 ) (2002). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Carlisle v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Carlisle v. State, 273 Ga. App. 567, 572 (2) ( 615 SE2d 543 ) (2005). 2006Carlisle v. State, 273 Ga. App. 567, 572 (2) ( 615 SE2d 543 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Pittman v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Pittman v. State, 273 Ga. 849, 850 (4), n. 2 ( 546 SE2d 277 ) (2001). 2004Pittman v. State, 273 Ga. 849, 850 (4), n. 2 ( 546 SE2d 277 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Rucker v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Moreover, a claim that an indictment improperly identifies the victim is a challenge to the form of the indictment, Mooney v. State, 250 Ga. App. 13, 14 ( 550 SE2d 421 ) (2001), and it has long been held that if the charging instrument is void for any reason, the challenge “should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.” Rucker v. State, 114 Ga. 13, 14 (1) ( 39 SE 902 ) (1901). 2003Moreover, a claim that an indictment improperly identifies the victim is a challenge to the form of the indictment, Mooney v. State, 250 Ga. App. 13, 14 ( 550 SE2d 421 ) (2001), and it has long been held that if the charging instrument is void for any reason, the challenge “should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.” Rucker v. State, 114 Ga. 13, 14 (1) ( 39 SE 902 ) (1901). | 1 | 1 |
Mooney v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Moreover, a claim that an indictment improperly identifies the victim is a challenge to the form of the indictment, Mooney v. State, 250 Ga. App. 13, 14 ( 550 SE2d 421 ) (2001), and it has long been held that if the charging instrument is void for any reason, the challenge “should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.” Rucker v. State, 114 Ga. 13, 14 (1) ( 39 SE 902 ) (1901). 2003Moreover, a claim that an indictment improperly identifies the victim is a challenge to the form of the indictment, Mooney v. State, 250 Ga. App. 13, 14 ( 550 SE2d 421 ) (2001), and it has long been held that if the charging instrument is void for any reason, the challenge “should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.” Rucker v. State, 114 Ga. 13, 14 (1) ( 39 SE 902 ) (1901). | 1 | 1 |
Hooper v. Stategreen2 sentences2002OCGA § 16-5-91 (a); see Hooper v. State, 223 Ga. App. 515, 517 (2) ( 478 SE2d 606 ) (1996). 2. 2002OCGA § 16-5-91 (a); see Hooper v. State, 223 Ga. App. 515, 517 (2) ( 478 SE2d 606 ) (1996). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Everett, Ridley & Co. v. Holcombgreen1 sentence1987See generally Everett, Ridley & Co. v. Holcomb, 1 Ga. App. 794 , *640 798 ( 58 SE 287 ) (1907). | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences2023The trial 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 ( 91 SCt 160 , 27 LE2d 162) (1970). 3 court then advised Appellant that she was waiving her right to be tried by jury, that the State would not present witnesses, that those witnesses would not be cross- examined by Appellant’s attorneys, that Appellant would not be able to present witnesses to support her defense, that she would not testify before the jury or have the jury instructed that her failure to testify could not be used against her, and that, ultimately, she was giving up her “right to go to trial so that [she] can resolve this with 2023The trial 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 ( 91 SCt 160 , 27 LE2d 162) (1970). 3 court then advised Appellant that she was waiving her right to be tried by jury, that the State would not present witnesses, that those witnesses would not be cross- examined by Appellant’s attorneys, that Appellant would not be able to present witnesses to support her defense, that she would not testify before the jury or have the jury instructed that her failure to testify could not be used against her, and that, ultimately, she was giving up her “right to go to trial so that [she] can resolve this with | 1 | 2023–2023 |
WARD v. the STATE.
green
1 sentence2020Carlton was charged with a violation of OCGA § 16-5-91 (a), which requires proof that the defendant stalked the victim in violation of a court order then “in effect.” See also Ward v. State, 351 Ga. App. 490 , 495-496 ( 831 SE2d 199 ) (2019) (physical precedent only). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Leroy George
green
1 sentence2017Relying to a large extent on Renville 's logic, the Ninth Circuit held that statements of identity are reasonably pertinent to the treatment of victims in all sexual assault cases, explaining: "Sexual abuse involves more than physical injury; the physician must be attentive to treating the victim's emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which often depend on the identity of the abuser." United States v. George , 960 F.2d 97 , 99 (II) (A) (9th Cir. 1992). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Louisyr v. State
green
1 sentence2013Louisyr, supra. Crumity’s argument that his repeated proximity to the victim in violation of the protective order was not initiated for the purpose of harassing or intimidating her is also unavailing. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
1 sentence1994Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Powell v. State
green
1 sentence1992Although another lawyer may have conducted the defense in a different manner and taken another course of action, the fact that defendant and his present counsel disagree with the decision made by trial counsel does not require a finding that defendant’s original representation was inadequate. [Cits.]” [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Powell, supra at 511-512 . (b) Defense counsel did not object to the failure to authenticate the videotape of the victim because defense counsel himself first requested the playing of the videotape during cross-examination of the state licensing investigator. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Saylors v. State
green
2 sentences1987However, because Stewart testified that he was not mad at *214 the victim and because his defense was justification, not provocation, this issue is controlled adversely to Stewart by Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735 (2) ( 309 SE2d 796 ) (1983). 1987However, because Stewart testified that he was not mad at *214 the victim and because his defense was justification, not provocation, this issue is controlled adversely to Stewart by Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735 (2) ( 309 SE2d 796 ) (1983). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Blalock v. Blalock green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.