victim defense in Texas

2015See Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191 (recognizing that injuries inflicted on the victim are factors to be considered in determining whether an object was used as a deadly weapon).

2013Quincy v. State, 304 S.W.3d 489, 500 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.); see Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (stating that wounds are not a necessary prerequisite for an object to be considered a deadly weapon; but, injuries, if any, inflicted on the victim are factors to be considered in determining whether the object was used as a deadly weapon); Baltazar v. State, 331 S.W.3d 6, 8 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd).

2011Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Ex parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), which Lopez cites, holding that there was an actual conflict when counsel, who was aware of a particular conflict from the start of his joint representation, advised one co-defendant not to testify that he shot the victim in defense of the other.

2011See id. at 105 .

1981Compare Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) with Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) and Griffin v. State, 514 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1981Compare Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) with Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) and Griffin v. State, 514 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1981Compare Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) with Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) and Griffin v. State, 514 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1981Compare Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) with Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) and Griffin v. State, 514 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1981Compare Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) with Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) and Griffin v. State, 514 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1981Compare Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) with Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) and Griffin v. State, 514 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

2018See United States v. Renville , 779 F.2d 430 , 438 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that "statements of identity to a physician by a child sexually abused" are admissible "where the physician makes clear to the victim that the inquiry into the identity of the abuser is important to diagnosis and treatment, and the victim manifests such an understanding"); Taylor v. State , 268 S.W.3d 571 , 588-90 (Tex. Crim.

2008Without any 45 Id. at 438-39 . 46 Id. at 438 . 47 Id. at 439 . 48 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987).

2025See, e.g., Sisk v. State, 74 S.W.3d 893 , 898–900 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (evidence that appellant followed the victim in violation of a protective order was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for stalking, considering that “the relationship between appellant and [the victim] was at times confusing, confrontational, and tumultuous”).

2024Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191 ; see also Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688 , 691–92 (Tex. Crim.

2020For instance, a victim hearing a gun shot, witnessing the accused attempting to break down the door, fearing for her life, and fleeing as the defendant gave chase was sufficient to prove assault in Young v. State, 993 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). 7 Here, we have evidence illustrating that the victim (King) 1) just returned home, 2) saw an unknown person (appellant) skulking in a neighbor’s yard, 3) heard appellant crash through her own door, 4) saw appellant rush into her home with gun in hand, and 5) feared for her life.

2020See Alarcon v. State, Nos. 13-16-00243-CR, 13-16-00244-CR, 2017 WL 1737958 , at *3 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi May 4, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by admission of certain out-of-court statements by the victim in violation of the Confrontation Clause where “similar evidence” was admitted through other sources at trial); Irhirhi v. State, No. 01-14-00002-CR, 2016 WL 7104015 , at *5 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the defendant failed to prov

2018See Gilbert, 196 S.W.3d at 165-66 (holding that neither appellant’s denial that he intended to kill the victim nor his claim that the shooting was an accident established that appellant was reckless in having discharged the gun).

2013Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim.

2013Quincy v. State, 304 S.W.3d 489, 500 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.); see Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (stating that wounds are not a necessary prerequisite for an object to be considered a deadly weapon; but, injuries, if any, inflicted on the victim are factors to be considered in determining whether the object was used as a deadly weapon); Baltazar v. State, 331 S.W.3d 6, 8 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd).

2013App. 2004) (stating that wounds are not a necessary prerequisite for an object to be considered a deadly weapon; but, injuries, if any, inflicted on the victim are factors to be considered in determining whether the object was used as a deadly weapon); Baltazar v. State, 331 S.W.3d 6, 8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d).

2013Quincy v. State, 304 S.W.3d 489, 500 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.); see Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (stating that wounds are not a necessary prerequisite for an object to be considered a deadly weapon; but, injuries, if any, inflicted on the victim are factors to be considered in determining whether the object was used as a deadly weapon); Baltazar v. State, 331 S.W.3d 6, 8 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd).

2005Russell v. State, 749 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. Crim.

2000Appellant cites Kemp v. State , 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) which says: I[t] is well-settled that testimony referring to or implying extraneous offenses can be rendered harmless by an instruction to disregard by the trial judge, unless it appears that the evidence was so clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or is of such damning character as to suggest it would be impossible to remove the harmful impression from the jury's mind.

1999Pointing to the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473-74 (5th Cir.1995), the court of appeals concluded that a prior bankruptcy cannot prevent a court from ordering restitution of a victim whose claim had been discharged in bankruptcy.

1999Pointing to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United, States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473-74 (5th Cir.1995), the court of appeals concluded that a prior bankruptcy cannot prevent a court from ordering restitution of a victim whose claim had been discharged in bankruptcy.

1998See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 646 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("endless chain"/pyramid promotional scheme); Goss v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (failure to stop and render aid); West v. State, 567 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (criminal trespass); Zachery v. State, 552 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (attempted rape); Tew v. State, 551 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (unlawful possession of firearm by felon); Ex Parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (burglary); Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Tex.Crim.

1998See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 646 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("endless chain"/pyramid promotional scheme); Goss v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (failure to stop and render aid); West v. State, 567 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (criminal trespass); Zachery v. State, 552 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (attempted rape); Tew v. State, 551 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (unlawful possession of firearm by felon); Ex Parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (burglary); Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Tex.Crim.