18 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Millergreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Miller , 385 Mass. 521 , 523-524, 432 N.E.2d 463 (1982). 1985The reenactments and amendments of these statutes have not attempted to alter our decisions (Nichols v. Vaughan, 217 Mass. 548, 551 [1914]), and this legislative silence shows “that the Legislature intended to exclude mistaken belief as to the age of the victim as a defense to the crime.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 524 (1982). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Rosariogreen1 sentence2025See Rosario, 477 Mass. at 80-81 . [12] Moise did not testify at the evidentiary hearing on the second new trial motion, so we are in as good a position as the motion judge to evaluate his testimony. [13] First, when Moise was interviewed by the police, four days after the homicide, he denied that the defendant had participated in the assault on the victim in the bar. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Paintengreen1 sentence2017See id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Patongreen1 sentence2017See Paton, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 220 ("defendant's staring at the victim in the bar without speaking and then unexpectedly appearing in proximity to her in other places had an ominous, menacing, even sinister quality" and "constitute[d] legally malicious conduct"); O'Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 291, 293 (defendant acted maliciously by sending victim numerous letters that presumed a relationship between them where none existed). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'Neilgreen1 sentence2017See Paton, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 220 ("defendant's staring at the victim in the bar without speaking and then unexpectedly appearing in proximity to her in other places had an ominous, menacing, even sinister quality" and "constitute[d] legally malicious conduct"); O'Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 291, 293 (defendant acted maliciously by sending victim numerous letters that presumed a relationship between them where none existed). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Almelegreen1 sentence2016The judge allowed the Commonwealth to refer to some other “misconduct” during cross-examination to give context to the telephone conversation. 2 We conclude that the alleged delayed disclosure of new testimony by the victim was not error but that the issue does not warrant discussion because it will not recur at any potential retrial. 3 We note that the rule of preservation has been changed for cases tried since the issuance of Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016) (“Going forward, . . . [w]e will no longer require a defendant to object to the admission of evidence at trial where he | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gradygreen1 sentence2016The judge allowed the Commonwealth to refer to some other “misconduct” during cross-examination to give context to the telephone conversation. 2 We conclude that the alleged delayed disclosure of new testimony by the victim was not error but that the issue does not warrant discussion because it will not recur at any potential retrial. 3 We note that the rule of preservation has been changed for cases tried since the issuance of Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016) (“Going forward, . . . [w]e will no longer require a defendant to object to the admission of evidence at trial where he | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Christiangreen1 sentence2014An error is not prejudicial where it “did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.” Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 563 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Flebottegreen1 sentence2014An error is not prejudicial where it “did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.” Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 563 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen1 sentence2006The defendant maintains, and the Appeals Court agreed, that the presence of the victim’s father “present[ed] a real risk of suggestiveness.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 593 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2000Furthermore, even if we assume that the evidence would warrant a rational trier of fact in finding that the defendant was prompted to hit the victim in defense of Maribella Muniz, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 372-373 (1992) (use of excessive force in defense of third person may mitigate degree of guilt for homicide), nevertheless testimony, by both defense and prosecution witnesses, that the defendant hit the victim multiple times after she was on the ground, incapacitated, and no longer involved in a fight with Muniz, precludes a reasonable doubt whether the defendant “availed | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Delgadogreen1 sentence1996See Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 435-437 (1975); Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 609-610 (1982); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 722-725 (1995); Commonwealth v. Powell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1016 (1983); Commonwealth v. Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 434 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Jacksongreen1 sentence1996See Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 435-437 (1975); Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 609-610 (1982); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 722-725 (1995); Commonwealth v. Powell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1016 (1983); Commonwealth v. Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 434 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Powellgreen1 sentence1996See Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 435-437 (1975); Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 609-610 (1982); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 722-725 (1995); Commonwealth v. Powell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1016 (1983); Commonwealth v. Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 434 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Howardgreen1 sentence1996See Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 435-437 (1975); Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 609-610 (1982); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 722-725 (1995); Commonwealth v. Powell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1016 (1983); Commonwealth v. Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 434 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Vaughangreen1 sentence1985The reenactments and amendments of these statutes have not attempted to alter our decisions (Nichols v. Vaughan, 217 Mass. 548, 551 [1914]), and this legislative silence shows “that the Legislature intended to exclude mistaken belief as to the age of the victim as a defense to the crime.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 524 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Dennis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982While the “existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence,” Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951), it is just that — a general principle, not always a constitutionally mandated doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Adreygreen1 sentence1981“As the evidence involved here went primarily to [the victim’s] credibility, we hold that ultimate and effective presentation of the evidence to the jury cured any error that might otherwise have existed.” 5 Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 755 (1978), and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bysgreen1 sentence1977Commonwealth v. Bys, 370 Mass. 350, 357-361 (1976), and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
O'BRIEN v. Borowski
green
1 sentence2025To satisfy the statutory definition of criminal harassment, the harassing acts "must 'seriously alarm[]' the targeted victim." O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 420 , quoting G. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Hurley
green
2 sentences2019We agree with the judge that "the issue was [the victim]'s identification of [the defendant], regardless of whether it consisted of attacking the procedure the police utilized or attacking [the victim]'s credibility, which, in fact, defense counsel attempted to do." Cf. Hurley , 455 Mass. at 63 n.9, 913 N.E.2d 850 ("there may be circumstances in which a defense counsel's motive to cross-examine **31 a declarant at a pretrial detention hearing may differ from her motive to cross-examine at trial, such as where the defense counsel did not challenge the declarant's accuracy or credibility at cros 2019We agree with the judge that "the issue was [the victim]'s identification of [the defendant], regardless of whether it consisted of attacking the procedure the police utilized or attacking [the victim]'s credibility, which, in fact, defense counsel attempted to do." Cf. Hurley , 455 Mass. at 63 n.9, 913 N.E.2d 850 ("there may be circumstances in which a defense counsel's motive to cross-examine **31 a declarant at a pretrial detention hearing may differ from her motive to cross-examine at trial, such as where the defense counsel did not challenge the declarant's accuracy or credibility at cros | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Caruso
green
2 sentences2019Although the issue at the suppression hearing and the defendant's motive for examining the victim at that hearing were not precisely the same as they would be at trial, the issue was "substantially the same" and the motive was "similar." Caruso , 476 Mass. at 293 , 67 N.E.3d 1203 . 2019Although the issue at the suppression hearing and the defendant's motive for examining the victim at that hearing were not precisely the same as they would be at trial, the issue was "substantially the same" and the motive was "similar." Caruso , 476 Mass. at 293 , 67 N.E.3d 1203 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Latimore
green
1 sentence2018Accordingly, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether there was enough evidence to satisfy a rational trier of fact, see Commonwealth v. Latimore , 378 Mass. 671 , 677-678 (1979), that the Facebook communication the defendant posted intentionally placed the victim "in fear of imminent serious physical harm." G. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Reed
green
2 sentences2000Furthermore, even if we assume that the evidence would warrant a rational trier of fact in finding that the defendant was prompted to hit the victim in defense of Maribella Muniz, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 372-373 (1992) (use of excessive force in defense of third person may mitigate degree of guilt for homicide), nevertheless testimony, by both defense and prosecution witnesses, that the defendant hit the victim multiple times after she was on the ground, incapacitated, and no longer involved in a fight with Muniz, precludes a reasonable doubt whether the defendant “availed 2000Commonwealth v. Reed, supra at 103 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Curtis
green
1 sentence2000Furthermore, even if we assume that the evidence would warrant a rational trier of fact in finding that the defendant was prompted to hit the victim in defense of Maribella Muniz, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 372-373 (1992) (use of excessive force in defense of third person may mitigate degree of guilt for homicide), nevertheless testimony, by both defense and prosecution witnesses, that the defendant hit the victim multiple times after she was on the ground, incapacitated, and no longer involved in a fight with Muniz, precludes a reasonable doubt whether the defendant “availed | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Powell
green
1 sentence1996See Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 435-437 (1975); Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 609-610 (1982); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 722-725 (1995); Commonwealth v. Powell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1016 (1983); Commonwealth v. Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 434 (1996). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
1 sentence1995The prosecutor explained that she did so because the Commonwealth was mindful of North Carolina v. Pearce , “which indicates that higher sentences that are received after a first conviction on a retrial should be based on objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding and should affirmatively appear on the record.” No mention was made of the impact of Texas v. McCullough, supra, on principles expressed in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra. After hearing the victim and defense counsel, the judge mad | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Texas v. McCullough
green
1 sentence1995The prosecutor explained that she did so because the Commonwealth was mindful of North Carolina v. Pearce , “which indicates that higher sentences that are received after a first conviction on a retrial should be based on objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding and should affirmatively appear on the record.” No mention was made of the impact of Texas v. McCullough, supra, on principles expressed in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra. After hearing the victim and defense counsel, the judge mad | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.