9 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ybarragreen1 sentence2016Id. (holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape); see also State v. Ybarra, 386 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo.banc 1965) (holding that “intent and motive play but little if any part in [statutory rape]”); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. banc 1955) (stating that in prosecution for statutory rape, “consent ... become[s] immaterial”). | 1 | 1 |
Sykes v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Sykes v. State, 372 S.W.3d 33, 42 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (holding that the success or failure of a trial strategy “is not the measure of reasonableness]”). *837 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bakergreen1 sentence2016Id. (holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape); see also State v. Ybarra, 386 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo.banc 1965) (holding that “intent and motive play but little if any part in [statutory rape]”); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. banc 1955) (stating that in prosecution for statutory rape, “consent ... become[s] immaterial”). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences1996This annotation also cites a Maryland case, which stands for the proposition that “[a] criminal assault which tends to bring about a breach of the public peace is treated as a crime against the public generally, and therefore the consent of the victim is no defense.” Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156 , 133 A.2d 414, 415 (1957) (finding assault with attempt to commit sodomy against juvenile is crime against public generally, and victim’s consent is no defense). 1996This annotation also cites a Maryland case, which stands for the proposition that “[a] criminal assault which tends to bring about a breach of the public peace is treated as a crime against the public generally, and therefore the consent of the victim is no defense.” Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156 , 133 A.2d 414, 415 (1957) (finding assault with attempt to commit sodomy against juvenile is crime against public generally, and victim’s consent is no defense). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Newberrygreen1 sentence1995Id. at 122. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Heckgreen2 sentences1990The court said 570 P.2d at page 1098 : “[Ajbsent proof that it was an independent intervening cause the contributory negligence is not a defense in a prosecution for vehicular homicide.” In Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183 , 491 A.2d 212, 227 (1985), the court said the contributory negligence of the victim would not keep the defendant driver from being criminally liable, “even if the victim’s negligence contributing to the accident is greater than the defendant’s_ The rule is that the contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense to a criminal charge of homicide *78 by vehicle 1990The court said 570 P.2d at page 1098 : “[Ajbsent proof that it was an independent intervening cause the contributory negligence is not a defense in a prosecution for vehicular homicide.” In Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183 , 491 A.2d 212, 227 (1985), the court said the contributory negligence of the victim would not keep the defendant driver from being criminally liable, “even if the victim’s negligence contributing to the accident is greater than the defendant’s_ The rule is that the contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense to a criminal charge of homicide *78 by vehicle | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
J.D.B. v. Juvenile Officer
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 152 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2016Sykes v. State, 372 S.W.3d 33, 42 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (holding that the success or failure of a trial strategy “is not the measure of reasonableness]”). *837 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed 2016Sykes v. State, 372 S.W.3d 33, 42 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (holding that the success or failure of a trial strategy “is not the measure of reasonableness]”). *837 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Stokely
green
1 sentence2016Id. (holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape); see also State v. Ybarra, 386 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo.banc 1965) (holding that “intent and motive play but little if any part in [statutory rape]”); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. banc 1955) (stating that in prosecution for statutory rape, “consent ... become[s] immaterial”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Daniels
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 285 . [[Image here]] Not objecting to the admission of the presumptive test and not objecting to the use of presumptive test results in closing argument to corroborate the credibility of the victim where the defense was premised primarily on discrediting the victim’s version of events, rises to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Neal
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 238 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Dunhill
green
1 sentence1990The court said 570 P.2d at page 1098 : “[Ajbsent proof that it was an independent intervening cause the contributory negligence is not a defense in a prosecution for vehicular homicide.” In Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183 , 491 A.2d 212, 227 (1985), the court said the contributory negligence of the victim would not keep the defendant driver from being criminally liable, “even if the victim’s negligence contributing to the accident is greater than the defendant’s_ The rule is that the contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense to a criminal charge of homicide *78 by vehicle | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Malone
green
1 sentence1977State v. Hale, 371 S.W.2d 249 (Mo.1963); and State v. Malone, 301 S.W.2d 750 (Mo.1957). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Hale
green
1 sentence1977State v. Hale, 371 S.W.2d 249 (Mo.1963); and State v. Malone, 301 S.W.2d 750 (Mo.1957). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.