search incident to arrest exception in Maryland

2023Whereas the Carroll Doctrine places no limits on the character of the suspected evidence, the Arizona v. Gant exception limits the predicate for the search to “evidence of the offense of arrest.” The Gant Court noted that the search incident to arrest exception is narrower than the automobile exception, which “authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 820–21 (1982)).

2022When police have the requisite probable cause, they may search “every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).

2024The search incident to arrest exception “‘derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.’” Taylor, 448 Md. at 246 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 ).

2024In Gant, 556 U.S. at 346 , the Court revisited the bright-line rule of Belton and revised the search incident to arrest exception with respect to a vehicle.

2000Based on the underlying rationale of the search incident to arrest doctrine, including the principles elucidated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 , appellee argues that “the scope of a search incident to arrest [does not] extend to the passenger compartment of a vehicle when the arrestee has been remoyed from its proximity and the search is not contemporaneous to the arrest.” Appellee maintains that the search offended the Fourth Amendment because it was not confined to the imme

2000Based on the underlying rationale of the search incident to arrest doctrine, including the principles elucidated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 , appellee argues that “the scope of a search incident to arrest [does not] extend to the passenger compartment of a vehicle when the arrestee has been remoyed from its proximity and the search is not contemporaneous to the arrest.” Appellee maintains that the search offended the Fourth Amendment because it was not confined to the imme

2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran

2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran

2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran

2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran

2019The Automobile Exception Carroll and its progeny authorize the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed “probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Johnson, 458 Md. at 533 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982)); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (stating that “[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern [auto- mobile searches] because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating t

2019The Automobile Exception Carroll and its progeny authorize the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed “probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Johnson, 458 Md. at 533 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982)); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (stating that “[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern [auto- mobile searches] because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating t

2024There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’— construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 -63 8 (2018) (observing that “the search incident to arrest exception is applicable as long as the search is essentially contemporaneous with the arrest”).

2020“Whether a particular warrantless action on the part of the police is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pacheco, 465 Md. at 321 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (internal quotations omitted)). 11 Pacheco and the Odor of Marijuana The relevant exception to the warrant requirement in the present case is the search incident to arrest exception set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

2020The justifications underpinning the search incident to arrest exception include the confiscation of weapons potentially used to resist arrest, escape custody, or endanger police officers’ safety, and the seizure of evidence “to prevent its concealment or destruction.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 383, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014) (internal quotation omitted); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons . . . [and] any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its

2015The Supreme Court left intact the search incident to arrest doctrine, as explicated in Robinson, until deciding Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2473 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). 2 The Court held, in an opinion consolidating two cases, Riley and United States v. Wurie, that searches of cell phones fall outside the permitted scope of the search incident to arrest, thereby creating a sea-change in this area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

2023The Supreme Court of Maryland most recently considered the search incident to arrest exception in Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 (2019).

2022Search Incident to Arrest Exception Under the search incident to arrest exception, police may lawfully search a person pursuant to a warrantless arrest if the police have probable cause to believe that the person “has committed a felony or is committing a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the police.” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 , 321- 22 (2019) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369-70 (2003)).

2020Under the automobile exception, “Carroll [v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),] and its progeny authorize the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed ‘probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” Id. at 321 (quoting State v. Johnson, 458 Md. 519, 533 (2018)).

2020“When determining whether probable cause exists for purposes of the automobile exception, courts ask whether ‘there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” Pacheco, 465 Md. at 325 (quoting Johnson, 458 Md. at 533 ).

2023The first issue is the permissible scope of the search incident to arrest exception under Arizona v. Gant that allows “a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)).

2023Id. at 346–47; see also White, 248 Md.

2022Probable cause is “a fluid concept,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 , “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 .

2022Search Incident to Arrest Exception Under the search incident to arrest exception, police may lawfully search a person pursuant to a warrantless arrest if the police have probable cause to believe that the person “has committed a felony or is committing a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the police.” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 , 321- 22 (2019) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369-70 (2003)).

2022When police have the requisite probable cause, they may search “every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).

2022See In re D.D., 479 Md. 206, 224 (2022) (recognizing that “the odor of [cannabis] particularized to a person provided probable cause for an arrest” before 2014); Pacheco, 465 Md. at 323 (explaining the search incident to arrest exception).

2022Whereas the search incident to arrest exception requires probable cause to believe that the arrested person has committed a crime, see supra Part II.A.1, the Carroll doctrine only requires probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013).

2020“Whether a particular warrantless action on the part of the police is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pacheco, 465 Md. at 321 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (internal quotations omitted)). 11 Pacheco and the Odor of Marijuana The relevant exception to the warrant requirement in the present case is the search incident to arrest exception set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

2018See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)....

2018See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)....

2017Although appellant is correct that the search incident to arrest argument was not raised below, that does not preclude this Court from considering the issue. 8 The Court of Appeals has made clear that “an appellee is entitled to assert any ground adequately shown by the record for upholding the trial court’s decision, even if the ground was not raised in the trial court,” and “if legally correct, the trial court’s decision will be affirmed on such alternative ground.” Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 406 (2012).