search incident to arrest exception in Massachusetts

2019Later, he testified that the canine was in the minivan for "[f]ive minutes maybe" but reiterated that he "really [did not] know." 16 The assertion is dubious given that the underpinning for the search incident to arrest exception, as applied here, is to search for and remove weapons that the arrestee might use "to resist arrest or effect his escape." Chimel , 395 U.S. at 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 .

2019Later, he testified that the canine was in the minivan for "[f]ive minutes maybe" but reiterated that he "really [did not] know." 16 The assertion is dubious given that the underpinning for the search incident to arrest exception, as applied here, is to search for and remove weapons that the arrestee might use "to resist arrest or effect his escape." Chimel , 395 U.S. at 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 .

2016Id. at 2174, 2176 , 2178- 2179.

2016Id. at 2174, 2176, 2178-2179 .

2017Specifically, the defendant argues that the principles underlying Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), which foreclosed the application of the search incident to arrest exception to cellular telephones (cell phones), also forecloses the application of this exception to warrantless searches of digital cameras under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the *592 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

2017In Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 , the Supreme Court addressed whether the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones, and concluded that it does not.

2025The defendant relies on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009), a case involving an automobile search, for the proposition that the search incident to arrest exception does not apply when a suspect is handcuffed.

2024On these facts, the United States Supreme Court held that the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not justify the search, because the arrestee was not "unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." Id. at 343 .

2017See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969); Santiago, supra at 743 .

2007The doctrine of search incident to arrest requires: (1) a lawful arrest, see Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737, 743 (1991); (2) a search contemporaneous with defendant’s arrest, see Alvarado, 420 Mass. at 554 ; and (3) a search limited in purpose to “fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made . . . and removing weapons,” G.L.c. 276, §1.

2025Since Gant was decided, however, Massachusetts courts have decided cases outside of the automobile context that support the validity of 4 The defendant's possession of a knife would be admissible in a trial for armed robbery carried out by knife to show he "had the means to commit the offense." Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 780 (1997). 5 the type of search at issue in this case under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

2025Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 259 (2010).

2024The defendant claims that here the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply because, where the police had stopped and handcuffed him before turning their attention to the backpack, the search "took place beyond the Defendant's reach at the time of the search." However, as the Supreme Judicial Court held in Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 216 (2014), officers "may secure the arrestee and then safely search the area within his immediate control at the moment of arrest."[5] In so holding, the court recognized that officer safety would be compromised i

2024The defendant claims that here the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply because, where the police had stopped and handcuffed him before turning their attention to the backpack, the search "took place beyond the Defendant's reach at the time of the search." However, as the Supreme Judicial Court held in Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 216 (2014), officers "may secure the arrestee and then safely search the area within his immediate control at the moment of arrest."[5] In so holding, the court recognized that officer safety would be compromised i

2019See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 762- 763 (1969); Santiago, supra at 743." Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 592 (2017).

2017See Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 160 (1988) (“We have excluded evidence under art. 14 without regard to whether the evidence was inadmissible under [the] Fourth Amendment . . .”). 2 Indeed, with the twin threats justifying the search incident to arrest exception mitigated here because the camera was secure in the custody of the police, the officers had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.

2017See Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 160 (1988) (“We have excluded evidence under art. 14 without regard to whether the evidence was inadmissible under [the] Fourth Amendment . . .”). 2 Indeed, with the twin threats justifying the search incident to arrest exception mitigated here because the camera was secure in the custody of the police, the officers had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.

2017Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim on qualified immunity *594 grounds, where it is open question whether Riley applies to video cameras, but acknowledging that “[t]here are qualities associated with cell phones, significant in the court’s analysis, that are both similar to and different from cameras”). 2 General Laws c. 276, § 1, which codifies the search incident to arrest exception, and which we have recognized, “is more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 607 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Blevine

2017Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim on qualified immunity *594 grounds, where it is open question whether Riley applies to video cameras, but acknowledging that “[t]here are qualities associated with cell phones, significant in the court’s analysis, that are both similar to and different from cameras”). 2 General Laws c. 276, § 1, which codifies the search incident to arrest exception, and which we have recognized, “is more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 607 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Blevine

2015See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 795-798 (2012) (search limited to inspection of cell phone’s log of calls recently made from that cell phone); Commonwealth v. Berry, 463 Mass. 800, 807 (2012) (same; court noted that police search of cell phone involved only pressing one button to view recent call log).

2015See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 795-798 (2012) (search limited to inspection of cell phone’s log of calls recently made from that cell phone); Commonwealth v. Berry, 463 Mass. 800, 807 (2012) (same; court noted that police search of cell phone involved only pressing one button to view recent call log).

2012The search-incident-to-arrest exception “has traditionally been justified by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained.” 4 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-803 (1974).

2012See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 230-234 ; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969).