search incident to arrest exception in Oregon

2023Defendant points to Mazzola, where the Supreme Court characterized the search incident to arrest doctrine as one that “exists because ‘[a]n arrest * * * creates a type of exigency justifying a warrant- less search of the arrested person,’ ” 356 Or at 812 (quoting 124 State v. Stevens State v. Milligan, 304 Or 659, 669 , 748 P2d 130 (1988)), and explained that “where a warrantless search for evidence of the crime of DUII is supported by probable cause to arrest the defendant, the issue of exigency should be assessed in light of the reasonableness of the search in time, scope, and intensity.” Id

2023One such exception is the search- incident-to-arrest exception, which permits a warrantless search “for any of three purposes: (1) to protect a police offi- cer’s safety; (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence; or (3) to discover evidence of the crime of arrest.” State v. Mazzola, Cite as 329 Or App 639 (2023) 643 356 Or 804, 811 , 345 P3d 424 (2015).

2025In that case, we declined to affirm the trial court’s ruling, which was based on the auto- mobile exception, on the right-for-the-wrong-reason basis of search incident to arrest because the record was “not mate- rially the same one that might have been developed had the 40 State v. Ribota state asserted the search-incident-to-arrest exception before the trial court.” Id. at 218-19 .

2015The search incident to arrest exception for the purpose of discovering evidence is not unlimited — it does not extend to “everything [in the arrestee’s] immediate possession,” Woodall, 181 Or App at 219 — and in the factual circumstances here of searching for evidence of drug possession, the search’s scope and intensity were more intrusive than what is typically allowed for searches incident to arrest.

2020The purpose and justification for the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant require- ment being served, and the search being reasonable in time, Cite as 305 Or App 195 (2020) 219 scope, and intensity, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the contents of the backpack.

2020State v. Brownlee, 302 Or App 594, 603-04 , 461 P3d 1015 (2020); State v. Mazzola, 356 Or 804, 811-12 , 345 P3d 424 (2015); State v. Ramirez, 305 Or App 195, 214-16 , 468 P3d 1006 (2020).

2025Nonprecedential Memo Op: 345 Or App 766 (2025) 769 because the state failed to satisfy the search-incident-to- arrest exception to the warrant requirement and because “without testimony to support the exact location of the pill bottle, the court cannot make the inference on its own.” While describing that the pill bottles would be suppressed, the court made an ambiguous statement about the urine test: “I mean, his urine test is the urine test * * * which showed clonazepam.” There was no explicit mention of the urine test in the court’s written order.

2023One such exception is the search- incident-to-arrest exception, which permits a warrantless search “for any of three purposes: (1) to protect a police offi- cer’s safety; (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence; or (3) to discover evidence of the crime of arrest.” State v. Mazzola, Cite as 329 Or App 639 (2023) 643 356 Or 804, 811 , 345 P3d 424 (2015).

2023Defendant was holding the backpack at her side when the officer ordered her to exit the vehicle, and the same officer testified at the suppression hearing that he watched defen- dant remove the backpack from her seat and place it on Cite as 329 Or App 639 (2023) 647 the floor before she exited the vehicle.

2022Cite as 319 Or App 60 (2022) 65 741, 743, 653 P2d 942 (1982).

2020State v. Brownlee, 302 Or App 594, 603-04 , 461 P3d 1015 (2020); State v. Mazzola, 356 Or 804, 811-12 , 345 P3d 424 (2015); State v. Ramirez, 305 Or App 195, 214-16 , 468 P3d 1006 (2020).

2020State v. Brownlee, 302 Or App 594, 603-04 , 461 P3d 1015 (2020); State v. Mazzola, 356 Or 804, 811-12 , 345 P3d 424 (2015); State v. Ramirez, 305 Or App 195, 214-16 , 468 P3d 1006 (2020).

2020The trial court concluded, however, that Siri and Seagrest Cite as 304 Or App 666 (2020) 671 were “effectively arrested” because they were removed from the van, they were not free to leave, they were given their Miranda warnings, they were being blocked from leaving the premises, and “the parties could see that [the officers] had probable cause to arrest” them.

2020Cite as 307 Or App 297 (2020) 299 Accepting the trial court’s supported implicit and explicit factual findings and reviewing for legal error, State v. Washington, 265 Or App 532, 536 , 335 P3d 877 (2014), we conclude that the warrantless search was justified under the search-incident-to-arrest exception of the Article I, sec- tion 9, warrant requirement; therefore, we do not address whether it was also justified under the inventory exception or the state’s alternative officer-safety theory.

2020Cite as 307 Or App 297 (2020) 299 Accepting the trial court’s supported implicit and explicit factual findings and reviewing for legal error, State v. Washington, 265 Or App 532, 536 , 335 P3d 877 (2014), we conclude that the warrantless search was justified under the search-incident-to-arrest exception of the Article I, sec- tion 9, warrant requirement; therefore, we do not address whether it was also justified under the inventory exception or the state’s alternative officer-safety theory.

2020Cite as 307 Or App 297 (2020) 299 Accepting the trial court’s supported implicit and explicit factual findings and reviewing for legal error, State v. Washington, 265 Or App 532, 536 , 335 P3d 877 (2014), we conclude that the warrantless search was justified under the search-incident-to-arrest exception of the Article I, sec- tion 9, warrant requirement; therefore, we do not address whether it was also justified under the inventory exception or the state’s alternative officer-safety theory.

2019See id . (declining to follow federal precedent on the search incident to arrest exception "under Article I, section 9, without a more fully developed argument on that issue"); Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific , 186 Or.

2019App. 696 , 700 n. 2, 64 P.3d 1193 , adh'd to on recons. , 187 Or.

2019The language from Owens on which defendant Cite as 299 Or App 544 (2019) 551 relies was meant to highlight the larger point that the court was making in Owens: To initiate a search incident to arrest, “the arrest must be for a crime, evidence of which reason- ably could be concealed on the arrestee’s person or in the belongings in his or her immediate possession at the time of the arrest.” Id.

2019The language from Owens on which defendant Cite as 299 Or App 544 (2019) 551 relies was meant to highlight the larger point that the court was making in Owens: To initiate a search incident to arrest, “the arrest must be for a crime, evidence of which reason- ably could be concealed on the arrestee’s person or in the belongings in his or her immediate possession at the time of the arrest.” Id.

2019App. 696 , 700 n. 2, 64 P.3d 1193 , adh'd to on recons. , 187 Or.

2019As defendant acknowledges, the majority in State v. Krause, 281 Or App 143, 146 , 383 P3d 307 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 752 (2017), rejected that proposition, stating that exi- gency relates to only the first two purposes of the search- incident-to-arrest exception.

2019As defendant acknowledges, the majority in State v. Krause, 281 Or App 143, 146 , 383 P3d 307 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 752 (2017), rejected that proposition, stating that exi- gency relates to only the first two purposes of the search- incident-to-arrest exception.

2015After oral argument in this case, the United States Supreme Court held in Riley that the search incident to arrest exception under the Fourth Amendment categorically does not apply to digital data stored on cell phones. _ _ _ US at _ _ _, 134 S Ct at 2494 .

2010First, the state reiterates its position before the trial court that the warrantless search of defendant’s wallet was lawful under the search incident to arrest doctrine because of the arresting officer’s “reasonable concerns regarding officer safety.” Second, the state contends that, even if the search was unlawful, suppression of defendant’s subsequent statements was not required because “the provision of the Miranda warnings, and defendant’s decision to speak with full knowledge of her Miranda rights, broke any causal link between the unlawful search and defendant’s statements.” Although th

2010First, the state reiterates its position before the trial court that the warrantless search of defendant’s wallet was lawful under the search incident to arrest doctrine because of the arresting officer’s “reasonable concerns regarding officer safety.” Second, the state contends that, even if the search was unlawful, suppression of defendant’s subsequent statements was not required because “the provision of the Miranda warnings, and defendant’s decision to speak with full knowledge of her Miranda rights, broke any causal link between the unlawful search and defendant’s statements.” Although th

2010First, the state reiterates its position before the trial court that the warrantless search of defendant’s wallet was lawful under the search incident to arrest doctrine because of the arresting officer’s “reasonable concerns regarding officer safety.” Second, the state contends that, even if the search was unlawful, suppression of defendant’s subsequent statements was not required because “the provision of the Miranda warnings, and defendant’s decision to speak with full knowledge of her Miranda rights, broke any causal link between the unlawful search and defendant’s statements.” Although th

2010First, the state reiterates its position before the trial court that the warrantless search of defendant’s wallet was lawful under the search incident to arrest doctrine because of the arresting officer’s “reasonable concerns regarding officer safety.” Second, the state contends that, even if the search was unlawful, suppression of defendant’s subsequent statements was not required because “the provision of the Miranda warnings, and defendant’s decision to speak with full knowledge of her Miranda rights, broke any causal link between the unlawful search and defendant’s statements.” Although th

2010First, notwithstanding defendant's principal reliance on Clarke before the trial court for the proposition that the search incident to arrest exception was inapplicable because of the lapse of time and the ability to apply for a warrant to search the cellular telephone's contents, see 348 Or.App. at 36-37, 237 P.3d at 846 , defendant, as respondent, does not renew that contention or otherwise attempt to defend the trial court's suppression ruling on that basis.

2002State v. Crampton, 176 Or App 62, 74 , 31 P3d 430 (2001).

2002State v. Crampton, 176 Or App 62, 74 , 31 P3d 430 (2001).

1999While Oregon cases "interpreting the officer safety exception under Article I, section 9, rely on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the *327 Fourth Amendment," State v. Barnett, 132 Or.App. 520, 525 , 888 P.2d 1064 , rev. den. 321 Or. 137 , 894 P.2d 468 (1995), the Oregon Supreme Court has explicitly chosen to define reasonable searches incident to arrest by relying independently on the Oregon Constitution.

1999While Oregon cases "interpreting the officer safety exception under Article I, section 9, rely on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the *327 Fourth Amendment," State v. Barnett, 132 Or.App. 520, 525 , 888 P.2d 1064 , rev. den. 321 Or. 137 , 894 P.2d 468 (1995), the Oregon Supreme Court has explicitly chosen to define reasonable searches incident to arrest by relying independently on the Oregon Constitution.

1996The trial court denied that motion and defendant does not assign error to that ruling. 4 The state also relies on State v. Auer, 90 Or App 459 , 752 P2d 1250 (1988), and State v. Eddy, 107 Or App 489 , 812 P2d 42 (1991), in arguing that Rivett had authority to seek defendant’s consent to a search under the search incident to arrest doctrine.

1996The trial court denied that motion and defendant does not assign error to that ruling. 4 The state also relies on State v. Auer, 90 Or App 459 , 752 P2d 1250 (1988), and State v. Eddy, 107 Or App 489 , 812 P2d 42 (1991), in arguing that Rivett had authority to seek defendant’s consent to a search under the search incident to arrest doctrine.

1996The trial court denied that motion and defendant does not assign error to that ruling. 4 The state also relies on State v. Auer, 90 Or App 459 , 752 P2d 1250 (1988), and State v. Eddy, 107 Or App 489 , 812 P2d 42 (1991), in arguing that Rivett had authority to seek defendant’s consent to a search under the search incident to arrest doctrine.

1996The trial court denied that motion and defendant does not assign error to that ruling. 4 The state also relies on State v. Auer, 90 Or App 459 , 752 P2d 1250 (1988), and State v. Eddy, 107 Or App 489 , 812 P2d 42 (1991), in arguing that Rivett had authority to seek defendant’s consent to a search under the search incident to arrest doctrine.