search incident to arrest exception in California

2019Riley's Fourth Amendment analysis was made in the context of searches incident to arrest and not in the context of probation. ( Riley, supra , 573 U.S. at p. 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473 .) As a result, it is inapposite because a probationer is not entitled to the same expectation of privacy as an ordinary citizen ( Mason, supra , 5 Cal.3d at p. 768 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 ), and the governmental interests supporting a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest are different from those justifying a probation search condition. ( Riley, supra , 573 U.S. at pp. 384-385, 134 S.Ct. 2473 [conce

2019Riley's Fourth Amendment analysis was made in the context of searches incident to arrest and not in the context of probation. ( Riley, supra , 573 U.S. at p. 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473 .) As a result, it is inapposite because a probationer is not entitled to the same expectation of privacy as an ordinary citizen ( Mason, supra , 5 Cal.3d at p. 768 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 ), and the governmental interests supporting a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest are different from those justifying a probation search condition. ( Riley, supra , 573 U.S. at pp. 384-385, 134 S.Ct. 2473 [conce

2018The United States Supreme Court recently applied the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to BAC testing in Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. ----, [ 136 S.Ct. 2160 ], 195 L.Ed.2d 560 ( Birchfield ).

2018The United States Supreme Court recently applied the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to BAC testing in Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. ----, [ 136 S.Ct. 2160 ], 195 L.Ed.2d 560 ( Birchfield ).

2019The justification for the search incident to arrest exception, Gant emphasized, is ultimately only to permit law enforcement to respond to particular safety or evidentiary concerns that may arise during the course of the arrest of a driver or recent occupant of a vehicle. ( Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 335, 347.) To ensure the scope of the exception did not 21 PEOPLE v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. become “untether[ed]” from its justifications, Gant insisted that the exception be limited to the subset of arrests in which genuine safety or evidentiary concerns are present—that is, c

2019Relatedly, some out-of-state courts have upheld vehicle searches for identification under the search incident to arrest exception, which authorizes searching an arrestee’s vehicle for evidence relevant to his or her crime when an officer has reason “ ‘to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ ” (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343 ; see Deemer v. State (Alaska Ct.App. 2010) 244 P.3d 69, 75 [search incident to arrest for lying to officer]; State v. Gordon (1991) 110 Or.App. 242 , 245–246 [ 821 P.2d 442 , 443–444] [same]; Armstead v. Com. (2010) 56 Va.App. 5

2010As Justice O'Connor had observed some five years earlier, "lower court decisions seem . . . to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel [v. California, supra , 395 U.S. 752 ] [officer safety and preservation of evidence]." ( Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615 , 624 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 905 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 ] (cone. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) The Gant court eliminated the legal fiction that the passenger compartment was actually accessible to an arrestee secur

2010As a part of the negotiated disposition, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charge of resisting an officer in the performance of his duties (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) and the special allegations of a strike prior (§ 1170.12) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 2 As defendant's appeal raises issues relating solely to his motion to suppress, only the factual and procedural histories relating to that motion are discussed. 3 Pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the police could search the entire passenger compartment, including containers therein. ( Belton, supra , 453

1986The trial court thought so, either as a search incident to arrest or because the bag was abandoned. *1132 (3) The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, however, is limited in time and place. ( Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ].) The search must be contemporaneous ( Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 ]; United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 538 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 ]), and it may "not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee." ( New York v. Belton (19

1986The trial court thought so, either as a search incident to arrest or because the bag was abandoned. *1132 (3) The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, however, is limited in time and place. ( Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ].) The search must be contemporaneous ( Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 ]; United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 538 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 ]), and it may "not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee." ( New York v. Belton (19

2026(Id. at p. 386, citing United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 (Robinson).) The scope of the search incident to arrest exception included “‘personal property . . . immediately associated with person of the arrestee.’” (Riley, at p. 384.) However, the Court noted that modern cell phones have immense storage capacity, and therefore “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative 23 sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” (Riley, supra, 573 U.S. at p. 393.) The Court explained that among other things cell phone data can include a person’s browsing history, rev

2016(United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 7 .) Having concluded there was probable cause to support Thomas’s arrest, the subsequent search of Thomas’s pockets and the van were authorized each as a search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement.6 (See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224 [search of arrestee incident to lawful arrest is a settled exception to the warrant requirement]; Arizona v. Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 338 [police may search a vehicle incident to the recent occupant’s arrest if it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of

2011In this respect, the language of those decisions is entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment itself, which protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." (Italics added.) It is also consistent with one of the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception: "the reasonableness of searching for . . . evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained. [Citation.]" ( Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 802-803, italics added.) Contrary to the dissent's analysis, whether an item of personal property co

1986The trial court thought so, either as a search incident to arrest or because the bag was abandoned. *1132 (3) The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, however, is limited in time and place. ( Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ].) The search must be contemporaneous ( Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 ]; United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 538 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 ]), and it may "not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee." ( New York v. Belton (19

1999Robinson left undecided whether such a search would be reasonable where the defendant was cited for an infraction, like a routine traffic stop, without being taken into custody. (414 U.S. at p. 236, fn. 6 [94 S.Ct. at p. 477].) The United States Supreme Court answered that question in Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [ 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 ], ruling the mere issuance of a traffic citation for speeding does not justify a full search of an automobile under the search incident to arrest exception recognized in Robinson.

1999Robinson left undecided whether such a search would be reasonable where the defendant was cited for an infraction, like a routine traffic stop, without being taken into custody. (414 U.S. at p. 236, fn. 6 [94 S.Ct. at p. 477].) The United States Supreme Court answered that question in Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [ 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 ], ruling the mere issuance of a traffic citation for speeding does not justify a full search of an automobile under the search incident to arrest exception recognized in Robinson.

2018Birchfield Comes to California "The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine has an ancient pedigree." ( Birchfield, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 2174 .) It is a " 'categorical rule' " that "justifies 'a full search of the person' " upon lawful arrest. ( Id. at p. 2176.) In Birchfield , the United States Supreme Court heard three consolidated cases, each addressing an aspect of "how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood tests incident to [DUI] arrests." ( Id. at p. 2174.) In two of the cases, North Dakota drivers were directed to take blood tests, and in the third a Minnesota

2018Birchfield Comes to California "The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine has an ancient pedigree." ( Birchfield, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 2174 .) It is a " 'categorical rule' " that "justifies 'a full search of the person' " upon lawful arrest. ( Id. at p. 2176.) In Birchfield , the United States Supreme Court heard three consolidated cases, each addressing an aspect of "how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood tests incident to [DUI] arrests." ( Id. at p. 2174.) In two of the cases, North Dakota drivers were directed to take blood tests, and in the third a Minnesota

2016(Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 243 (Davis).) The People do not argue Riley is inapplicable.

2015Evidence obtained in a search conducted in good faith reliance on binding appellate precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule In Davis v. United States (2011) ___U.S. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. 2419 ] (Davis), the United States Supreme Court considered whether evidence obtained from a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate authority may be excluded pursuant to the exclusionary rule when that authority is overruled by a decision released after the search.

2015(US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 905 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 ].) In any event, we agree with the dissenting justices that the majority’s view ignores the import of McNeely, and indeed, does away with McNeely entirely: “It strains credulity to suppose that, after the Supreme Court carefully examined the exigent-circumstances exception in McNeely, it would conclude in some future case that the search would have been justified anyway under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, which . . . turns on the same rationale regarding the preservation of evidence that th

2015(US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 905 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 ].) In any event, we agree with the dissenting justices that the majority’s view ignores the import of McNeely, and indeed, does away with McNeely entirely: “It strains credulity to suppose that, after the Supreme Court carefully examined the exigent-circumstances exception in McNeely, it would conclude in some future case that the search would have been justified anyway under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, which . . . turns on the same rationale regarding the preservation of evidence that th

2010As Justice O'Connor had observed some five years earlier, "lower court decisions seem . . . to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel [v. California, supra , 395 U.S. 752 ] [officer safety and preservation of evidence]." ( Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615 , 624 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 905 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 ] (cone. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) The Gant court eliminated the legal fiction that the passenger compartment was actually accessible to an arrestee secur

2010As Justice O'Connor had observed some five years earlier, "lower court decisions seem . . . to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel [v. California, supra , 395 U.S. 752 ] [officer safety and preservation of evidence]." ( Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615 , 624 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 905 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 ] (cone. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) The Gant court eliminated the legal fiction that the passenger compartment was actually accessible to an arrestee secur

2023(See People v. Monroe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1195 (Monroe).) This exception does not justify Fortson’s detention and frisk.

2021(Id. at pp. 401-402 [“even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone”]; see United States v. Gardner (6th Cir. 2018) 887 F.3d 780, 783-784 [holding that even though “cell phones have become singular instruments with singular importance to many people,” the “third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the same”; thus, minor prostitute’s consent to search cell phone shared with pimp 12 was valid]; United States v. Truong Son Do (N

2021(Id. at pp. 401-402 [“even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone”]; see United States v. Gardner (6th Cir. 2018) 887 F.3d 780, 783-784 [holding that even though “cell phones have become singular instruments with singular importance to many people,” the “third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the same”; thus, minor prostitute’s consent to search cell phone shared with pimp 12 was valid]; United States v. Truong Son Do (N

2021(Id. at pp. 401-402 [“even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone”]; see United States v. Gardner (6th Cir. 2018) 887 F.3d 780, 783-784 [holding that even though “cell phones have become singular instruments with singular importance to many people,” the “third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the same”; thus, minor prostitute’s consent to search cell phone shared with pimp 12 was valid]; United States v. Truong Son Do (N

2021(Id. at pp. 401-402 [“even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone”]; see United States v. Gardner (6th Cir. 2018) 887 F.3d 780, 783-784 [holding that even though “cell phones have become singular instruments with singular importance to many people,” the “third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the same”; thus, minor prostitute’s consent to search cell phone shared with pimp 12 was valid]; United States v. Truong Son Do (N

2020The threat to officer safety was minimal since the the context of distinguishing Macabeo’s situation from Virginia v. Moore, supra, 553 U.S. 164 , and was not the Macabeo court’s endorsement of the rule Joseph proposes. 7 We are cognizant that an officer’s subjective intentions “play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 ; accord, Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 153 [“an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause”]; People v. Ovieda (2

2020The threat to officer safety was minimal since the the context of distinguishing Macabeo’s situation from Virginia v. Moore, supra, 553 U.S. 164 , and was not the Macabeo court’s endorsement of the rule Joseph proposes. 7 We are cognizant that an officer’s subjective intentions “play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 ; accord, Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 153 [“an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause”]; People v. Ovieda (2

2020(Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1217 ) In a nutshell, a “ ‘search must be incident to an actual arrest, not just to probable cause that might have led to an arrest, but did not.’ ” (People v. Lee, supra, 402 P.3d at p. 1105 , quoting People v. Reid, supra, 26 N.E.3d at p. 239 .) As O’Mary only intended to cite Joseph, the search incident to arrest exception did not apply.

2020(Ibid.) The Lee court also discussed out-of-state authorities holding “that the search incident to arrest exception should not apply when no arrest is to take place.” (Lee, supra, 402 P.3d at p. 1104 .) These decisions included People v. Reid (N.Y. 2014) 26 N.E.3d 237, 239 (“It is irrelevant that, because probable cause existed, there could have been an arrest without a search.

2020(Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1217 ) In a nutshell, a “ ‘search must be incident to an actual arrest, not just to probable cause that might have led to an arrest, but did not.’ ” (People v. Lee, supra, 402 P.3d at p. 1105 , quoting People v. Reid, supra, 26 N.E.3d at p. 239 .) As O’Mary only intended to cite Joseph, the search incident to arrest exception did not apply.