search incident to arrest exception in Texas

2020“If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search- incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S. Ct. at 1716 .

2020“If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search- incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S. Ct. at 1716 .

2017The Supreme Court has recognized the unique characteristics of modern cell phones as different “in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other objects, acknowledging that they “implicate privacy concerns far beyond . . . the search of . . . a wallet, or a purse.” Id. at 2488-89 (discussed in the context of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to a warrant).

2017The Supreme Court has recognized the unique characteristics of modern cell phones as different “in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other objects, acknowledging that they “implicate privacy concerns far beyond ... the search of ... a wallet, or a purse.” Id. at 2488-89 (discussed in the context of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to a warrant).

2016Furthermore, in Villarreal, the court of criminal appeals determined that the special-needs exception was inapplicable “when the search of a DWI suspect’s blood is undertaken by law-enforcement officers for the primary purpose of generating evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution,” 475 S.W.3d at 807 , and that the search-incident-to-arrest exception was inapplicable “because that exception to the warrant requirement applies only if such a search is ‘substantially contemporaneous’ with the arrest and is confined to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee” and because “there

2016Furthermore, in Villarreal, the court of criminal appeals determined that the special-needs exception was inapplicable “when the search of a DWI suspect’s blood is undertaken by law-enforcement officers for the primary purpose of generating evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution,” 475 S.W.3d at 807 , and that the search-incident-to-arrest exception was inapplicable “because that exception to the warrant requirement applies only if such a search is ‘substantially contemporaneous’ with the arrest and is confined to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee” and because “there

2020The facts in Chadwick, a case where the Supreme Court refused to hold that the search incident to arrest exception applied, are strikingly similar to this case.14 In Chadwick, the police were informed that there were individuals aboard a train headed towards a certain destination who were believed to be carrying marijuana.15 The officers awaited the appellants’ arrival with a canine unit.16 A drug dog alerted on the appellants’ luggage, and the officers watched as the appellants walked outside the station with the luggage.17 The officers then went outside, arrested all three appellants, and se

2020App. 2003) (emphasis added); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 10 Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63. 11 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 12 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ). 13 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 5 Accordingly, the exigency requirement is a necessary element of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and should not be confused with the exigent circumstances exception.

2023State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim.

2019These exceptions include “the consent exception, the exigency exception, the automobile exception, the search-incident- to-arrest exception, and the special-needs exception.” State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim.

2020However, the Court recognized an exception for cases where it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in 14 the vehicle.” Id. at 343 , 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 , 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2137 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).

2020However, the Court recognized an exception for cases where it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in 14 the vehicle.” Id. at 343 , 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 , 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2137 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).

2024As a result, “[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent[,] and the rule does not apply.” Id. at 339 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 367–68 (1964)).

2024These searches are “unqualified” and “are always justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, upon no more justification than the arrest itself.” Id.

2015The blood draw should also have been valid pursuant to the search- incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant preference, especially in light of the recognized exigency regarding the dissipation of alcohol from the blood. 18 McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568 (“in every case the law must be concerned that evidence is being destroyed”); but see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966) (suggesting that search incident to arrest may not extend so far as a forced blood draw).

2014Although the State contends that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a “recognized exigency” that would justify applying the search-incident-to-arrest exception here, we find that argument to essentially propose adoption of a per se exigency rule that was expressly disavowed by McNeely. 133 S.Ct. at 1568 .

2020App. 2003) (emphasis added); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 10 Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63. 11 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 12 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ). 13 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 5 Accordingly, the exigency requirement is a necessary element of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and should not be confused with the exigent circumstances exception.

2010Further, Bishop did have a legitimate objection to raise at trial because, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Gant , the rationale for a search incident to arrest has always been based on the dual purposes of officer safety and preservation of evidence, and “[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to arrest exception are absent. ...” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1716-17 (noting the limitations set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (196

2016The United States Supreme Court first considered how to apply the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the occupant of an automobile in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).

2016The United States Supreme Court first considered how to apply the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the occupant of an automobile in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).

2020As this Court observed in State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399 , 413 & n.54 (Tex. Crim.

2015State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224-26 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ). 4 In its opinion in Riley v. California, however, issued after trial and briefing in these cases, the United States Supreme Court determined that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not extend to a search of data on a lawfully seized cell phone.

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2018"If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the [exception] does not apply." Id. ; see also *704 Knowles v. Iowa , 525 U.S. 113 , 116-17, 119 S.Ct. 484 , 487, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that, when both justifications for exception are absent, namely "(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial," search is unjustified).

2018"If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the [exception] does not apply." Id. ; see also *704 Knowles v. Iowa , 525 U.S. 113 , 116-17, 119 S.Ct. 484 , 487, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that, when both justifications for exception are absent, namely "(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial," search is unjustified).

2018See Carrasco, 712 S.W.2d at 123 (upholding search incident to arrest of the defendant’s shoulder bag because she was within a few feet of it and clearly could have obtained access to it; “Had the bag contained a weapon, the risk of appellant gaining access to it was no less dangerous once in the hands of the officer standing immediately adjacent to appellant than while it was in the actual grasp of the appellant.”).

2018See Carrasco, 712 S.W.2d at 123 (upholding search incident to arrest of the defendant’s shoulder bag because she was within a few feet of it and clearly could have obtained access to it; “Had the bag contained a weapon, the risk of appellant gaining access to it was no less dangerous once in the hands of the officer standing immediately adjacent to appellant than while it was in the actual grasp of the appellant.”).

2015This unprecedented totality-of-the-exceptions approach adds zeros to create one, ignoring that the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “have been jealously and carefully drawn.” Hudson v. State, 588 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim.

2014This unprecedented totality-of-the-exceptions approach adds zeros to create one, ignoring that the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “have been jealously and carefully drawn.” Hudson v. State, 588 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)).

2015It is, in fact, information within a cell phone besides the mere numbers dialed. 8 Justice Chapa’ correctly analogized the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine in Riley to the Third Party Doctrine: “Similar to the way that the search-incident-to- arrest doctrine was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones seized during an arrest, the third-party doctrine is ‘ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.’” Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 202 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014

2015Justice Chapa’ correctly analogized the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine in Riley to the Third Party Doctrine: “Similar to the way that the search-incident-to- arrest doctrine was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones seized during an arrest, the third-party doctrine is ‘ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.’” Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 202 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014)(quoting U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 9 The ma

2015See Villarreal, — S.W.3d at—, 2014 WL 6734178, at *8 (discussing consent, automobile, search-incident-to-arrest, and special-needs exceptions); Gore v. State, 451 S.W.3d 182,193-97 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (discussing exigency exception) Here, it is undisputed that appellant’s blood sample was taken without a warrant.

2015See Villarreal, — S.W.3d at —, —, 2014 WL 6734178, at *8 (discussing consent, automobile, search-incident-to-arrest, and special-needs exceptions); Gore v. State, 451 S.W.3d 182, 193-97 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (discussing exigency exception).

2014See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2013), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 999 , 187 L.Ed.2d 848 , 82 U.S.L.W. 3104 (2014) (citing Gant and holding that "the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee's person, because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence.”); United States v. DiMarco, No. 12 CR 205(RPP), 2013 WL 444764 , *8 & *11-12 (S.D.N.Y.

2014See United States v. Wurie , 728 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-212) (citing Gant and holding that "the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee's person, because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence." ); United States v. DiMarco , No. 12 CR 205 (RPP), 2013 WL 444764 ,*8 & 11-12 (S.D.N.Y.

2014Feb. 5, 2013) (not designated for publication) (citing Gant and concluding that warrantless search of arrestee’s cell phone more than six hours after defendant’s arrest was unlawful; "delayed search” was not incident to arrest nor supported by the officer-safety and evidence-protection justifications of that exception); United States v. Dixon, - F.Supp.2d -, -, 2013 WL 6055396, *3 (N.D.Ga.2013) (citing Gant and concluding that agent’s action of taking arrestee’s cell phone back to his office and searching it was not a search incident to arrest and was unlawful; motion to suppress granted); Uni

2014Feb. 5, 2013) (not designated for publication) (citing Gant and concluding that warrantless search of arrestee's cell phone more than six hours after defendant's arrest was unlawful; "delayed search" was not incident to arrest nor supported by the officer-safety and evidence-protection justifications of that exception); United States v. Dixon , __ F. Supp.2d __, 2013 WL 6055396, *3 (N.D.

2014The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement that the State suggests are implicated in the present case are the consent exception, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); the automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); the search-incident-to-arrest exception, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ; and the special-needs doctrine, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 2.

2014The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement that the State suggests are implicated in the present case are the consent exception, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); the automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); the search-incident-to-arrest exception, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ; and the special-needs doctrine, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 2.

2014Reásonableness is Judged Under the Totality of Circumstances “Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)).

2014Reásonableness is Judged Under the Totality of Circumstances “Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)).

2014The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement that the State suggests are implicated in the present case are the consent exception, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); the automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); the search-incident-to-arrest exception, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ; and the special-needs doctrine, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 2.

2014The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement that the State suggests are implicated in the present case are the consent exception, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); the automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); the search-incident-to-arrest exception, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ; and the special-needs doctrine, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 2.

2025See Moreno v. State, 124 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.); see also Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2004, no pet.) (“An objective standard is applied to determine the validity of the first arrest which leads to another arrest”).

2025See Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732 ; see also Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. Crim.

2025When making this claim, Normand highlights language from cases addressing the exception explaining that it applied when the search and arrest occurred “in rapid succession” and were separated “by a few moments,” Williams, 726 S.W.2d at 101 & n.1, that it does not matter whether the search preceded the arrest “[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search,” Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980), and that “it is irrelevant that the arrest occurs immediately before or after the search,” Ballard, 987 S.W.2d at 892 .

2025See Moreno v. State, 124 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.); see also Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2004, no pet.) (“An objective standard is applied to determine the validity of the first arrest which leads to another arrest”).

2025See Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732 ; see also Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. Crim.

2025When making this claim, Normand highlights language from cases addressing the exception explaining that it applied when the search and arrest occurred “in rapid succession” and were separated “by a few moments,” Williams, 726 S.W.2d at 101 & n.1, that it does not matter whether the search preceded the arrest “[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search,” Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980), and that “it is irrelevant that the arrest occurs immediately before or after the search,” Ballard, 987 S.W.2d at 892 .