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12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2018See Birchfield , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2184 ; Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19 , ¶ 4, 382 P.3d 1234 . ¶ 7 Furthermore, in light of Birchfield 's broad holding, questions concerning the voluntariness of Diaz's consent to the test are settled from a Fourth Amendment perspective, because the test results squarely fall under the separate search-incident-to-arrest exception. 2018Id. ¶¶ 6-7 & n.5 ; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (blood tests are physically intrusive and, unlike breath tests, do not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the general warrant requirement); Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test is a Fourth Amendment search). | 3 | 3 |
State of Arizona v. Javier Francisco Navarrogreen2 sentences2018See Birchfield , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2184 ; Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19 , ¶ 4, 382 P.3d 1234 . ¶ 7 Furthermore, in light of Birchfield 's broad holding, questions concerning the voluntariness of Diaz's consent to the test are settled from a Fourth Amendment perspective, because the test results squarely fall under the separate search-incident-to-arrest exception. 2018See Birchfield , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2184 ; Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19 , ¶ 4, 382 P.3d 1234 . ¶ 7 Furthermore, in light of Birchfield 's broad holding, questions concerning the voluntariness of Diaz's consent to the test are settled from a Fourth Amendment perspective, because the test results squarely fall under the separate search-incident-to-arrest exception. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gantgreen2 sentences2007Rojers was an occupant of the vehicle; he was kneeling next to the car checking the pressure of a tire when approached by the police officers; he was arrested within either fifteen to thirty or thirty to forty-five seconds of exiting the vehicle; and he walked only about fifteen to twenty feet away from the car before being apprehended. ¶ 12 In Gant , however, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “when the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, seated in the back of the patrol car, and under the supervision of a police officer,” a warrantless search of the arrestee’s vehicle does not f 2007In Gant , the Arizona Supreme Court examined the search incident to arrest exception as applied to the Fourth Amendment. 216 Ariz. at 1, ¶ 1 , 162 P.3d at 641. | 2 | 2 |
New York v. Beltonred2 sentences2007See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (“In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.”); Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (“Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context. 2007See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (“In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.”); Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (“Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context. | 1 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Robin Peoplesgreen1 sentence2020Id. at 401–03; see also Peoples, 240 Ariz. at 248–49 ¶¶ 11–16 (discussing Riley). ¶11 Lietzau argues that after Riley, just as a warrant is generally required to search an arrestee’s cell phone, a warrant is generally required to search a probationer’s cell phone. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rojersgreen2 sentences2016See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1987); State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 558-62, ¶¶ 12-33 , 169 P.3d 651, 654-58 (App. 2007) (stating that although a search of the defendant’s vehicle did not fit within the search incident to arrest exception, the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine because it would inevitably have been discovered during the inventory search that would have taken place after the car was impounded). 8 STATE v. HOLGUIN Decision of the Court placed him in custody—the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evi 2016See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1987); State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 558-62, ¶¶ 12-33 , 169 P.3d 651, 654-58 (App. 2007) (stating that although a search of the defendant’s vehicle did not fit within the search incident to arrest exception, the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine because it would inevitably have been discovered during the inventory search that would have taken place after the car was impounded). 8 STATE v. HOLGUIN Decision of the Court placed him in custody—the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evi | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Cal. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 2486-91 . 2016Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2493 (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”). | 1 | 1 |
Colorado v. Bertinegreen1 sentence2016See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1987); State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 558-62, ¶¶ 12-33 , 169 P.3d 651, 654-58 (App. 2007) (stating that although a search of the defendant’s vehicle did not fit within the search incident to arrest exception, the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine because it would inevitably have been discovered during the inventory search that would have taken place after the car was impounded). 8 STATE v. HOLGUIN Decision of the Court placed him in custody—the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evi | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (“In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.”); Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (“Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context. 2007See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (“In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.”); Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (“Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context. | 1 | 1 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Lee McLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appelleegreen2 sentences2002As Judge Trott aptly noted in his concurring opinion in McLaughlin : "In our application of Belton's `bright-line' [rule] ... the rationales behind the search incident to arrest exception have been abandoned, the purpose has been lost, and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, little certainty remains." 170 F.3d at 894 (Trott, J., concurring). ¶ 21 "The purposes behind Belton were two-fold: to create a single familiar standard to guide police officers in automobile searches and to eliminate the need for litigation in every case to determine whether the passenger compartment of the vehicle is 2002As Judge Trott aptly noted in his concurring opinion in McLaughlin : “In our application of Belton’s ‘bright-line’ [rule] ... the rationales behind the search incident to arrest exception have been abandoned, the purpose has been lost, and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, little certainty remains.” 170 F.3d at 894 (Trott, J., concurring). ¶21 “The purposes behind Belton were two-fold: to create a single familiar standard to guide police officers in automobile searches and to eliminate the need for litigation in every case to determine whether the passenger compartment of the vehicle is w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chimel v. California
red
2 sentences2003Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034 . ¶ 13 Chimel taught that these twin aims of the search incident to arrest exception — officer safety and preservation of evidence— provide “ample justification” for a warrant-less search “of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Id. 2003Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034 . ¶ 13 Chimel taught that these twin aims of the search incident to arrest exception — officer safety and preservation of evidence— provide “ample justification” for a warrant-less search “of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Id. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
2 sentences2018See Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19 , ¶¶ 6-7, 382 P.3d 1234 ; cf. Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (warrantless search per se unreasonable *953 under Fourth Amendment unless one of few well-established exceptions applies, including a search incident to a lawful arrest). 2018See Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19 , ¶¶ 6-7, 382 P.3d 1234 ; cf. Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (warrantless search per se unreasonable *953 under Fourth Amendment unless one of few well-established exceptions applies, including a search incident to a lawful arrest). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2018Id. ¶¶ 6-7 & n.5 ; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (blood tests are physically intrusive and, unlike breath tests, do not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the general warrant requirement); Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test is a Fourth Amendment search). 2018Id. ¶¶ 6-7 & n.5 ; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (blood tests are physically intrusive and, unlike breath tests, do not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the general warrant requirement); Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test is a Fourth Amendment search). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela
green
2 sentences2018It asserted that the admonition given to Diaz was different from that deemed coercive in State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299 , 371 P.3d 627 (2016), and was not coercive. 2018It asserted that the admonition given to Diaz was different from that deemed coercive in State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299 , 371 P.3d 627 (2016), and was not coercive. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Dean
green
2 sentences2006We agree with Gant that our analysis must be guided by the rationales underlying the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and that these rationales are absent under the circumstances here. ¶ 10 In Dean , our supreme court addressed the search of a vehicle incident to a defendant's arrest when the arrest was remote in time and location from the defendant's occupancy of the vehicle. 206 Ariz. 158, ¶¶ 3-4 , 76 P.3d at 431 . 2006We agree with Gant that our analysis must be guided by the rationales underlying the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and that these rationales are absent under the circumstances here. ¶ 10 In Dean , our supreme court addressed the search of a vehicle incident to a defendant's arrest when the arrest was remote in time and location from the defendant's occupancy of the vehicle. 206 Ariz. 158, ¶¶ 3-4 , 76 P.3d at 431 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2006A unanimous court noted that Chimel, the seminal United States Supreme Court case authorizing warrantless searches incident to arrest, had emphasized that the scope of such a search "`must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, ¶ 12 , 76 P.3d at 433 , quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 , 89 S.Ct. at 2039 , quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 2006A unanimous court noted that Chimel, the seminal United States Supreme Court case authorizing warrantless searches incident to arrest, had emphasized that the scope of such a search "`must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, ¶ 12 , 76 P.3d at 433 , quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 , 89 S.Ct. at 2039 , quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Wanzek
green
2 sentences2002As Judge Trott aptly noted in his concurring opinion in McLaughlin : "In our application of Belton's `bright-line' [rule] ... the rationales behind the search incident to arrest exception have been abandoned, the purpose has been lost, and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, little certainty remains." 170 F.3d at 894 (Trott, J., concurring). ¶ 21 "The purposes behind Belton were two-fold: to create a single familiar standard to guide police officers in automobile searches and to eliminate the need for litigation in every case to determine whether the passenger compartment of the vehicle is 2002As Judge Trott aptly noted in his concurring opinion in McLaughlin : “In our application of Belton’s ‘bright-line’ [rule] ... the rationales behind the search incident to arrest exception have been abandoned, the purpose has been lost, and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, little certainty remains.” 170 F.3d at 894 (Trott, J., concurring). ¶21 “The purposes behind Belton were two-fold: to create a single familiar standard to guide police officers in automobile searches and to eliminate the need for litigation in every case to determine whether the passenger compartment of the vehicle is w | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Nadler
green
2 sentences2002Probable Cause ¶ 16 Because we can uphold a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if the court reached the correct result even though based on an incorrect reason, State v. Nadler, 129 Ariz. 19 , 628 P.2d 56 (App.1981), we must consider the state's alternative argument that the police were justified in searching Gant's vehicle independent of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. 2002Probable Cause ¶ 16 Because we can uphold a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if the court reached the correct result even though based on an incorrect reason, State v. Nadler, 129 Ariz. 19 , 628 P.2d 56 (App.1981), we must consider the state's alternative argument that the police were justified in searching Gant's vehicle independent of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Glasco v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2002See also Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-60 , 101 S.Ct. at 2863-64 , 69 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 ; Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 . 2002See also Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-60 , 101 S.Ct. at 2863-64 , 69 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 ; Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.