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11 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tognottigreen2 sentences2021Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 338–39 (2009); see also State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, ¶ 8 , 663 N.W.2d 642 (recognizing the scope of the search incident to arrest exception is limited). [¶14] The search incident to arrest exception is limited to searches that implicate interests in protecting officer safety and evidence preservation. 2021Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 338–39 (2009); see also State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, ¶ 8 , 663 N.W.2d 642 (recognizing the scope of the search incident to arrest exception is limited). [¶14] The search incident to arrest exception is limited to searches that implicate interests in protecting officer safety and evidence preservation. | 2 | 2 |
Arizona v. Gantgreen2 sentences2021Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 338–39 (2009); see also State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, ¶ 8 , 663 N.W.2d 642 (recognizing the scope of the search incident to arrest exception is limited). [¶14] The search incident to arrest exception is limited to searches that implicate interests in protecting officer safety and evidence preservation. 2016He argues the backpack was not within his immediate control and therefore the search of it violated the Fourth Amendment. [¶25] Mercier relies on Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), an automobile-search case, arguing the search of his backpack did not qualify for the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement because, at the time of the search, he was handcuffed in the back of a squad car. | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Chadwickred2 sentences2016See also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 (“Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”); United States v. Matthews, 532 Fed.Appx. 211, 218 (3d Cir.2013) (“However, ‘[o]nce law enforcement officers have [exclusive control over] luggage or other personal property not immediately 2016See also Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 15 (“Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”); United States v. Matthews , 532 Fed.Appx. 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2013) (“However, ‘[o]nce law enforcement officers have [exclusive control over] luggage or other personal property not immediately associated wi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Matthewsgreen2 sentences2016See also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 (“Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”); United States v. Matthews, 532 Fed.Appx. 211, 218 (3d Cir.2013) (“However, ‘[o]nce law enforcement officers have [exclusive control over] luggage or other personal property not immediately 2016See also Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 15 (“Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”); United States v. Matthews , 532 Fed.Appx. 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2013) (“However, ‘[o]nce law enforcement officers have [exclusive control over] luggage or other personal property not immediately associated wi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dale Eldridge, Also Known as Dale Smith, United States of America v. John David Fuget, Also Known as Poncho Proffergreen2 sentences2014Our holding simply noted that, by leaving the purse behind voluntarily, the purse remained in the area that was already covered by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. [¶ 22] Similarly, the State points to United States v. Padilla, an unpublished Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a vehicle itself was the subject of a search, pursuant to the consent of the driver, who had common authority over the vehicle. 242 F.3d 378 , 2000 WL 1533260 , *1 (8th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1993) (explaining that the consen 2014Our holding simply noted that, by leaving the purse behind voluntarily, the purse remained in the area that was already covered by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. [¶22] Similarly, the State points to United States v. Padilla , an unpublished Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a vehicle itself was the subject of a search, pursuant to the consent of the driver, who had common authority over the vehicle. 242 F.3d 378 , *1 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Eldridge , 984 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the consent exception app | 1 | 1 |
State v. Olsongreen2 sentences1999See State v. Olson, 1998 ND 41, ¶ 13 , 575 N.W.2d 649 (recognizing the search incident to arrest exception). 1999See State v. Olson, 1998 ND 41, ¶ 13 , 575 N.W.2d 649 (recognizing the search incident to arrest exception). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riley v. Cal. United States
green
2 sentences2016Thus, the District Court was correct in concluding that the search could not be justified under the search incident to arrest exception.”) (alteration in original). [¶ 65] “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2482 . 2016Thus, the District Court was correct in concluding that the search could not be justified under the search incident to arrest exception.”) (alteration in original). [¶65] “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Riley , 134 S.Ct. at 2482 . | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Preston v. United States
green
2 sentences2021E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 367–368, 84 S.Ct. 881 , 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). 2021E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 367–368, 84 S.Ct. 881 , 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
1 sentence2018Birchfield held for the first time that "the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify the warrantless taking of a blood sample," and that "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense." Id. at 2185-86 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Overby
green
2 sentences2005State v. Overby, 1999 ND 47, ¶ 9 , 590 N.W.2d 703 . 2005State v. Overby, 1999 ND 47, ¶ 9 , 590 N.W.2d 703 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Wanzek
neutral
1 sentence2000Haverluk also argues the testimony establishes he “was not yet combative, was out of the vehicle,” and was “actually moving away from the vehicle.” [¶10] In Wanzek , we held a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is valid even if the arrestee voluntarily exits the vehicle prior to arrest. 1999 ND 163 , ¶¶ 6, 22, 598 N.W.2d 811 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Wanzek
green
1 sentence2000Haverluk also argues the testimony establishes he “was not yet combative, was out of the vehicle,” and was “actually moving away from the vehicle.” [¶10] In Wanzek , we held a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is valid even if the arrestee voluntarily exits the vehicle prior to arrest. 1999 ND 163 , ¶¶ 6, 22, 598 N.W.2d 811 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1999A search incident to arrest is justified because “[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification ... [i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). [¶ 8] A valid arrest based upon probable cause clearly justifies a warrantless search of the arrestee, but as the name of this exception implies, lawful arrest typically 1999A search incident to arrest is justified because “[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification ... [i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). [¶ 8] A valid arrest based upon probable cause clearly justifies a warrantless search of the arrestee, but as the name of this exception implies, lawful arrest typically | 1 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. George Perry Pollack
green
2 sentences1990Pollack, 895 F.2d at 693 . 1990Pollack, 895 F.2d at 693 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ker v. California
green
2 sentences1981In Ker , the Court expressly ruled that the observation and seizure of the brick of marijuana need not be considered under that exception because “the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view.” 374 U.S. at 43 , 83 S.Ct. at 1635 , 10 L.Ed.2d at 744 . 9 . 1981In Ker , the Court expressly ruled that the observation and seizure of the brick of marijuana need not be considered under that exception because “the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view.” 374 U.S. at 43 , 83 S.Ct. at 1635 , 10 L.Ed.2d at 744 . 9 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.