insured defense in New Jersey

2020The carrier may then promptly offer its insured that sum in exchange for assignment to it by the insured of the claim against the tortfeasor." 223 N.J.

2019The carrier may then promptly offer its insured that sum in exchange for assignment to it by the insured of the claim against the tortfeasor." 223 N.J.

2023Id.

2010The insurer refused to defend or indemnify the insured because a clause in the homeowner’s insurance policy excluded from coverage “any loss ... for bodily injury ... arising out of ... operation, ownership, or use of ... motor vehicles owned ... by ... an insured.” Ibid.

2010The insurer refused to defend or indemnify the insured because a clause in the homeowner's insurance policy excluded from coverage "any loss ... for bodily injury ... arising out of ... operation, ownership, or use of ... motor vehicles owned ... by ... an insured." Ibid.

2008In those situations, the insurer's obligation to defend becomes an obligation to reimburse for defense costs to the extent that the defense is later determined to have been attributable to the covered claims and, if coverage is not determinable in the underlying action, it is later determined that there was in fact coverage. [ Muralo Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 334 N.J.Super. 282, 289-90 , 759 A. 2d 348 (App.Div.2000) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 632 , 772 A. 2d 934 (2001).] *50 The underlying complaints here were ambiguous as to the occurrences triggering coverage.

2008In those situations, the insurer's obligation to defend becomes an obligation to reimburse for defense costs to the extent that the defense is later determined to have been attributable to the covered claims and, if coverage is not determinable in the underlying action, it is later determined that there was in fact coverage. [ Muralo Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 334 N.J.Super. 282, 289-90 , 759 A. 2d 348 (App.Div.2000) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 632 , 772 A. 2d 934 (2001).] *50 The underlying complaints here were ambiguous as to the occurrences triggering coverage.

2001Otherwise, the general rule is that when an insurer has wrongfully refused to defend an action and is then required to reimburse the insured for its defense costs, the "duty to reimburse is limited to allegations [actually] covered under the policy, provided that the defense costs can be apportioned between covered and non-covered claims." SL Industrs., supra, 128 N.J. at 214-15, 607 A. 2d 1266 ; Grand Cove II Condo., supra, 291 N.J.Super. at 73-74 , 676 A. 2d 1123 .

2001Otherwise, the general rule is that when an insurer has wrongfully refused to defend an action and is then required to reimburse the insured for its defense costs, the "duty to reimburse is limited to allegations [actually] covered under the policy, provided that the defense costs can be apportioned between covered and non-covered claims." SL Industrs., supra, 128 N.J. at 214-15, 607 A. 2d 1266 ; Grand Cove II Condo., supra, 291 N.J.Super. at 73-74 , 676 A. 2d 1123 .

1998Id. at 499 , 665 A. 2d 1113 .

1998Id. at 499 , 665 A. 2d 1113 .

1996In Morrone , the insurer appealed a grant of summary judgment directing it to provide the insured a defense under several occurrence-based "garage" policies. 283 N.J.

1996Super. at 413-14 , 662 A. 2d 562 .

1995Thus, in many cases, an insured's failure to comply with its insurer's demand for production of allegedly relevant documents works a forfeiture of coverage, see Williams, supra, 468 N.Y.S. 2d 341 , even though an insured may claim to have a good faith belief that the documents are not material.

1992Id. at 289 , 362 A 2d 1279.

1992Id. at 289 , 362 A. 2d 1279 .

1983The Supreme Court held that this did not terminate the title insurer's liability but that the policy was only suspended during the time that the corporation held title and was revived upon reconveyance to the insured under the doctrine of "suspension and revival." [ Id. at 481-483 ]

1982Danek v. Hommer, 28 N.J.

1973Brown Construction Co. v. D & M Mechanical Contr., Inc., 222 So. 2d 93 (La.

1968Co. v. Barron, 274 Mich. 22 , 263 N.W. 786 (1935), where it was held that the single issue of fact concerns the sanity of the beneficiary because there would be no forfeiture of the right to claim the proceeds if the beneficiary was insane at the time the insured was murdered; and Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 263 F. 2 d 931 (6 Cir. 1959), where it was held that the beneficiary of a National Service Life Insurance policy who murdered the insured may not claim the proceeds "unless the beneficiary was insane at the time, or the killing was accidental, or was committed in self-defense." See also, Simon

1968Co. v. Barron, 274 Mich. 22 , 263 N.W. 786 (1935), where it was held that the single issue of fact concerns the sanity of the beneficiary because there would be no forfeiture of the right to claim the proceeds if the beneficiary was insane at the time the insured was murdered; and Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 263 F. 2 d 931 (6 Cir. 1959), where it was held that the beneficiary of a National Service Life Insurance policy who murdered the insured may not claim the proceeds "unless the beneficiary was insane at the time, or the killing was accidental, or was committed in self-defense." See also, Simon

1968App. Tex. 1964). *241 The decision in United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847 ( E.D.

1955See, Bank of United States v. Braveman, 259 N.Y. 65 , 181 N.E. 50 , 82 A.L.R. 658 ( Ct. App. 1932); Pink v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 167 , 8 N.E. 2 d 321 ( Ct. App. 1937); 54 Columbia L.