insured claim in Texas

2005Co. , 492 S.W.2d at 313 .

2005Co., 492 S.W.2d at 313 .

2020Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. 1988) (“The business of insurance includes the investigation and adjustment of claims and losses.”). 2 of action for an insurer’s breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing accrues when the insured under a standard automobile liability policy providing UM coverage obtains a binding judgment against the insurer for benefits, the payment of which the insurer had no reasonable basis to deny or delay. 725 S.W.2d 165 , 166–67 (Tex. 1987).

2011Id. at 504 . 8 Finally, in determining the issue of whether the insurance company owed the insured a defense, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas addressed the “That Particular Part” exclusion under exclusions J(5) and J(6).

2006Tex., Sept. 4, 1990) (finding that an insurance policy did not cover a former employee = s defamation claims against the insured because the clause excluded personal injury claims A sustained by any person as a result of an offense directly or indirectly related to the employment of such person @ ), rev = d on other grounds , 964 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Altivia , 161 S.W.3d at 54 (holding that defamation claims against the insured were A employment related acts @ subject to exclusionary clause); Adams v. Pro Sources, Inc. , 231 F.Supp.2d 499 (M.D.

2006Tex., Sept. 4, 1990) (finding that an insurance policy did not cover a former employee = s defamation claims against the insured because the clause excluded personal injury claims A sustained by any person as a result of an offense directly or indirectly related to the employment of such person @ ), rev = d on other grounds , 964 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Altivia , 161 S.W.3d at 54 (holding that defamation claims against the insured were A employment related acts @ subject to exclusionary clause); Adams v. Pro Sources, Inc. , 231 F.Supp.2d 499 (M.D.

2005Paul rely heavily on Hanson Production Co. v. Americas Insurance Co., 108 F.3d 627 (5th Cir.1997), and Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.1994), for the proposition that insurance companies must always show prejudice before a breach by the insured will bar coverage.

2005Paul rely heavily on Hanson Production Co. v. Americas Insurance Co., 108 F.3d 627 (5th Cir.1997), and Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.1994), for the proposition that insurance companies must always show prejudice before a breach by the insured will bar coverage.

1999We believe that Forty-Eight Insu-lations and its progeny are irreconcilable with Keene’s holding that each insurer is fully liable to the insured for defense costs. 10 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1050 .

1999When the oil company was sued for negligence, it sought coverage under the additional insured clause of the contractor’s general liability policy, which provided the oil company was covered “with respect to operations performed by or for [contractor].” Id. at 1110 .

1999The appellate court held: “Because the accident [that the plaintiff] sues upon is directly related to [contractor’s] work, this clause is satisfied, and the policy extends insured status to [oil company].” Id.

1996Underwriters v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787 (negligent entrustment was not an insured claim when use of a recreational vehicle was excluded from homeowners policy).

1996Underwriters v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787 (negligent entrustment was not an insured claim when use of a recreational vehicle was excluded from homeowners policy).

1996Co. v. Albarez, 380 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(negligent entrustment is not an insured claim when driver was excluded from coverage under the policy); Fidelity & Guar.

1996Co. v. Albarez, 380 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(negligent entrustment is not an insured claim when driver was excluded from coverage under the policy); Fidelity & Guar.

1994When there is a requirement, such as the one contained in the [excess insurer’s] policy, that the excess insurer cannot be liable unless the insured has first made a significant payment of his own, the risk that the insured and the injured will take unfair advantage of the excess insurer is greatly reduced. 775 F.Supp. at 993 ; see also State Farm Fire & Cas.

1994When there is a requirement, such as the one contained in the [excess insurer's] policy, that the excess insurer cannot be liable unless the insured has first made a significant payment of his own, the risk that the insured and the injured will take unfair advantage of the excess insurer is greatly reduced. 775 F.Supp. at 993 ; see also State Farm Fire & Cas.

1994Subsequently, the court of appeals held that "the [pretrial] covenant not to enforce adjudged damages against the insured does not bar recovery from the insurer within its policy limits." Id. at 310 .

1994Subsequently, the court of appeals held that “the [pretrial] covenant not to enforce adjudged damages against the insured does not bar recovery from the insurer within its policy limits.” Id. at 310 .

1985In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Martin Surgical Supply Co., 689 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, ref’d n.r.e.), this court upheld an action under art. 21.21 by an additional insured, which was unaware of existing coverage in its favor, against an insurer which failed to disclose coverage and afford the additional insured a defense.

1985In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Martin Surgical Supply Co., 689 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, ref'd n.r.e.), this court upheld an action under art. 21.21 by an additional insured, which was unaware of existing coverage in its favor, against an insurer which failed to disclose coverage and afford the additional insured a defense.

1976Fishel’s Pine Furniture v. Rice Food Market, 474 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Civ.App—Houston (14th Dist.) 1971, writ dism’d).

1974In Wildman v. Government Employees’ Insurance Co., 48 Cal.2d 31 , 307 P.2d 359 (1957), the Court said: “It appears that section 415 must be made a part of every policy of insurance issued by an insurer since the public policy of this state is to make owners of motor vehicles financially responsible to those injured by them in the operation of their vehicles. . . .We are of the opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an accident which occurs when a person, other than the insured, is driving with the permission and consent of the insured is a violation of

1974In Wildman v. Government Employees’ Insurance Co., 48 Cal.2d 31 , 307 P.2d 359 (1957), the Court said: “It appears that section 415 must be made a part of every policy of insurance issued by an insurer since the public policy of this state is to make owners of motor vehicles financially responsible to those injured by them in the operation of their vehicles. . . .We are of the opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an accident which occurs when a person, other than the insured, is driving with the permission and consent of the insured is a violation of

1932Co. v. Tabor, 111 Tex. 155 , 230 S.W. 397, 398 ; American National Ins.

1932Co. v. Tabor, 111 Tex. 155 , 230 S.W. 397, 398 ; American National Ins.

1918Insurance Co. v. Vallandingham, 116 Ky. 287 , 76 S. W. 22 , 105 Am.

1918Insurance Co. v. Vallandingham, 116 Ky. 287 , 76 S. W. 22 , 105 Am.