insured defense in California

2013Co. of Wausau v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 398, 405 (Wausau) [same].) The trial court accepted Rockwell Collins’s analysis, finding Continental did not have a right of equitable contribution pursuant to Aerojet, supra, 17 Cal.4th 38 because the reinsurance agreements, 1990 commutation agreement between Travelers and Constantine and “most critically” the 1994 settlement agreement, “when read together, effectively made Rockwell a self-insured entity for the entire period during which the Travelers policies were in effect.” The court explained, “The Travelers policies effecti

2000“The rule is grounded in basic principles of contract law.” [Citation.] The duty to defend is contractual. [Citations.] ....’” (Ibid., quoting Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 47 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 939 P.2d 766 ].) The point is important here, because the duty to defend arises as soon as tender is made and “before liability is established and apart therefrom . . . ,” ( 17 Cal.4th at p. 58 ), so the insurer is responsible for those costs whether or not there is ultimately any duty to indemnify the insured for the claim.

2017Co. v. Moorefield Construction, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1258 , 1275, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 ( Navigators ).) In Navigators , the insured, a general contractor, made the deliberate decision to have flooring tiles installed in a building despite knowing that the concrete slab on which the tiles were to be installed emitted moisture vapor in excess of specifications. ( *1039 Navigators, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1262, 1266-1268, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 .) The insured knew the excess moisture vapor could cause the flooring tiles to fail, but believed there was low to no risk of that happening. ( Id.

2017Co. v. Moorefield Construction, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1258 , 1275, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 ( Navigators ).) In Navigators , the insured, a general contractor, made the deliberate decision to have flooring tiles installed in a building despite knowing that the concrete slab on which the tiles were to be installed emitted moisture vapor in excess of specifications. ( *1039 Navigators, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1262, 1266-1268, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 .) The insured knew the excess moisture vapor could cause the flooring tiles to fail, but believed there was low to no risk of that happening. ( Id.

2014Co. (2006) 452 F. Supp.2d 972, 989-990 .) Liability Based Upon a Claims Practices Regulation If coverage exists for property damage that occurred within the policy period, then denying an insured a defense and indemnity may give the insured the right to settle with a claimant and expose the insurer to liability for the amount of the settlement.

2014Co. (2006) 452 F. Supp.2d 972, 989-990 .) Liability Based Upon a Claims Practices Regulation If coverage exists for property damage that occurred within the policy period, then denying an insured a defense and indemnity may give the insured the right to settle with a claimant and expose the insurer to liability for the amount of the settlement.

2013Co. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 930 (Jaffe), the insurer argued that, “since the policy excludes payment for damages resulting from criminal acts, legal defense to criminal charges is also excluded” and that section 533 was “in accord with the policy.” (Id. at p. 935 & fn. 9.) The court disagreed, concluding that, although “the policy behind section 533 would prohibit coverage for fines resulting from a criminal conviction,” section 533 only “restricts the possible liability of insurers for losses.

2013Co. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 930 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 567 ] (Jaffe), the insurer argued that, “since the policy excludes payment for damages resulting from criminal acts, legal defense to criminal charges is also excluded” and that section 533 was “in accord with the policy.” (Jaffe, at p. 935 & fn. 9.) The court disagreed, concluding that, although “the policy behind section 533 would prohibit coverage for fines resulting from a criminal conviction,” section 533 only “restricts the possible liability of insurers for losses.

2007Guarantee Assn., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 .) This settled principle has a significant impact on the analysis of the insured's claim that an insurer has acted in bad faith when it refused to provide the insured with a defense to a potentially covered claim.

2007Guarantee Assn., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 .) This settled principle has a significant impact on the analysis of the insured's claim that an insurer has acted in bad faith when it refused to provide the insured with a defense to a potentially covered claim.

2005Guarantee Assn. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 751 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 338 ( Tamrac ), a post- Buss decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed that if the insurer is legally uncertain whether any claims in the third party complaint are potentially covered, it may defend the third party action to conclusion under a reservation of its right to reimbursement, *159 and may then recoup all its defense costs if an intervening decision has established, as a matter of law, that the potential for coverage, and thus the duty to defend, never arose. ( Id., at pp. 757-758, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 338 .) Tamrac expressly rejected

2005Guarantee Assn. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 751 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 338 ( Tamrac ), a post- Buss decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed that if the insurer is legally uncertain whether any claims in the third party complaint are potentially covered, it may defend the third party action to conclusion under a reservation of its right to reimbursement, *159 and may then recoup all its defense costs if an intervening decision has established, as a matter of law, that the potential for coverage, and thus the duty to defend, never arose. ( Id., at pp. 757-758, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 338 .) Tamrac expressly rejected

2024(James 3, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104 .) Here, a review of the Policy demonstrates that it does not include a provision obligating Colony to fund and/or provide legal counsel to prosecute APR’s affirmative claims against the Commission.

2024Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 914, 927 .) This is because insurance policies are contracts, and while a general commercial liability policy obligates the insurer to provide the insured with a defense to covered claims, absent a contractual provision obligating the insurer to fund and prosecute an insured’s affirmative relief counterclaims or cross-complaints, no such duty to 14 Although APR contends that Colony had a duty to pay for the costs of prosecuting its claims in both the Two Sites Action and Three Sites Action, we limit our discussion of this question to considering Colony’s duty in the Tw

2023Co. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 615 , 625- 626.) Further, while it is more common for a voluntary payment by an insured in violation of an NVP provision to occur before tender of the claim, it may also occur (and the violation of that provision may be so asserted by the insurer) after tender of the claim.

2023(Harper, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086 .) “Under California law third party beneficiaries of contracts have the right to enforce the terms of the contract under Civil Code section 1559 which provides: ‘A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.’ ” (Harper, at p. 1086.) “A third party may qualify as a beneficiary under a contract where the contracting parties must have intended to benefit that individual and such intent appears on the terms of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 1087.) For example, where an i

2020To the contrary, the endorsement references only the landlords’ liability, providing coverage “with respect to [the landlords’] liability arising out of [the tenant’s] use” of the property. “[T]he fact that an accident is not attributable to the named insured’s negligence is irrelevant when the additional insured endorsement does not purport to allocate or restrict coverage according to fault.” (Vitton Construction, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767- 768 [emphasis in original]; see also Fireman’s Fund Ins.

2020As the court in Syufy observed, “Insurance companies are free to, and commonly have, issued additional insured endorsements that specifically limit coverage to situations in which the additional insured is faced with vicarious liability for negligent conduct by the named insured. [Citations.] We believe the better view is that when an insurer chooses not to use such clearly limited language in an additional insured clause, but instead grants coverage for liability ‘arising out of’ the named 20 insured’s work, the additional insured is covered without regard to whether injury was caused by the

2019Co. (Minn. 1997) 559 N.W.2d 411, 419 ; see also Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (Minn. 2006) 722 N.W.2d 283, 302 [“the duty to defend exists regardless of the merits of the underlying claims”].) “In addition to looking at the complaint, the insurer can look to facts outside the complaint to determine whether coverage exists.” (Haarstad v. Graff (Minn. 1994) 517 N.W.2d 582, 584 .) Thus, in determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend, Minnesota courts consider the nature of the claim against the insured and whether that claim is covered by the policy, not whether the cla

2017There is no obligation to pay benefits under a title policy unless there is a loss; a secured lender suffers an indemnifiable "loss" under a title policy only if the lender fails to recoup the debt because of an undisclosed senior lien. ( *435 Karl v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 972 , 978-979, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ; see Cale v. Transamerica Title Ins. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 422 , 427, 275 Cal.Rptr. 107 .) Wells Fargo, however, never made a claim for this type of damage and the underlying action did not seek to recover such damages.

2017There is no obligation to pay benefits under a title policy unless there is a loss; a secured lender suffers an indemnifiable "loss" under a title policy only if the lender fails to recoup the debt because of an undisclosed senior lien. ( *435 Karl v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 972 , 978-979, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ; see Cale v. Transamerica Title Ins. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 422 , 427, 275 Cal.Rptr. 107 .) Wells Fargo, however, never made a claim for this type of damage and the underlying action did not seek to recover such damages.

2017Co. v. Frake (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 568 , 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 ( Frake ), the insured struck his friend, John King, in the groin while the two were engaged in horseplay. ( Id. at p. 571, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 .) King sustained injuries and sued the insured, who tendered his defense to the insurer under a liability provision of a renter's policy. ( Ibid. ) The insurer sued the insured for a declaration regarding the duty to defend. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court, held the insurer had no duty to defend because the insured engaged in an intentional act. ( Id. at pp. 582-583

2017Co. v. Frake (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 568 , 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 ( Frake ), the insured struck his friend, John King, in the groin while the two were engaged in horseplay. ( Id. at p. 571, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 .) King sustained injuries and sued the insured, who tendered his defense to the insurer under a liability provision of a renter's policy. ( Ibid. ) The insurer sued the insured for a declaration regarding the duty to defend. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court, held the insurer had no duty to defend because the insured engaged in an intentional act. ( Id. at pp. 582-583

2017Co. v. Frake (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 568 , 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 ( Frake ), the insured struck his friend, John King, in the groin while the two were engaged in horseplay. ( Id. at p. 571, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 .) King sustained injuries and sued the insured, who tendered his defense to the insurer under a liability provision of a renter's policy. ( Ibid. ) The insurer sued the insured for a declaration regarding the duty to defend. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court, held the insurer had no duty to defend because the insured engaged in an intentional act. ( Id. at pp. 582-583

2017Co. v. Frake (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 568 , 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 ( Frake ), the insured struck his friend, John King, in the groin while the two were engaged in horseplay. ( Id. at p. 571, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 .) King sustained injuries and sued the insured, who tendered his defense to the insurer under a liability provision of a renter's policy. ( Ibid. ) The insurer sued the insured for a declaration regarding the duty to defend. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court, held the insurer had no duty to defend because the insured engaged in an intentional act. ( Id. at pp. 582-583